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The chief purpose of this thesis is to describe, 
analyse and evaluate the role the Organization of African 
Unity has played in African conflicts. In order to be 
able to view the OAU in a broad perspective the first 
chapter traces the historical background of Pan- Africanism 
and the inter -African relations between 1957 -1963 
culminating in the foundation of the OAU. The purpose of 
the second chapter is to provide an analysis of the structure, 
functions and objectives of the Organization with regard to 
its role as an instrument of conflict resolution. 
The main focus of the thesis is on three case studies 
illustrating two types of conflicts with which the OAU 
was confronted. While chapter III examines two territorial 
disputes, i.e. the Algerian- Moroccan Territorial Conflict 
and the Ethiopia -Somalia - Kenya Territorial Dispute, which 
are examples of conflicts between independent states, chapter 
IV deals with the Nigerian Civil War as a case study of a 
crisis stemming from intra -state problems. Taking into 
account the inherent limitations of comparative analysis, 
the chapters aim to discuss the performance of the OAU 
within the context of the specific historical and political 
character of each dispute. 
The closing chapter suggests some general conclusions 
about the basic reasons for the success or failure of the 
OAU in achieving the objective of peace -making in Africa. 
It attempts to provide some insight into certain categories of 
problems concerning the international African system with 
the Organization of African Unity as its institutionalized 
framework. 
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This thesis sets out to provide material and points 
of discussion to the question: Has the pan- African idea 
developed into an institutionalized system able to cope with 
challenges to the peace and stability of the African inter- 
state system arising from inter -African disputes? As the 
tiLLe of the thesis indicates it is not meant to be a 
comprehensive study of the Organization of African Unity 
as regards all its various functions. According to the 
intentions of its founding fathers it was set up to promote 
inter -African co- operation in many fields, such as the 
maintenance of peace, and the development of political, 
economic, cultural and educational co- operation. Like other 
international organizations the OAU was supposed to attempt 
to minimize the conflicts and to maximize the co- operation 
in the international community of its member states. The 
maintenance of peace and good relations in Africa must be 
seen as the main prerequisite of progress in all other realms 
of pan -African co- operation. With the foundation of the 
OAU the African politicians supplied themselves with an 
instrument and forum which was supposed to increase their 
capacities for conflict resolution. The settlement of 
disputes is a task encountered in pursuit of this goal. It 
is this aspect of the OAU's assignments on which the thesis 
focuses. 
Limiting the analysis and evaluation of the OAU's work 
to only one of its preoccupations implies that a comprehensive 
assessment of the Organization's importance in inter -African 
relations cannot be provided. This might be regarded as a 
shortcoming. On the other hand a study on the OAU's role 
in inter- African conflicts seems justified not only on 
the grounds of allowing for a more detailed analysis of the 
problems involved but also because inter- African disputes 
have dominated the Organization's activities from the very 
beginning of its existence. It is conceivable that this 
picture will change as the pan -African Organization enters 
the second decade of its history. The anti -colonial 
struggle for the liberation of those African territories 
still under white domination might acquire a greater 
prominence. However, as long as old and new conflicts 
threaten to erupt, conflict resolution will remain the first 
and foremost preoccupation for the African leaders and their 
Organization. 
In writing the thesis, two main sets of problems came 
to the foreground, hampering a conclusive assessment of the 
OAU's role in each of the three conflicts dealt with. The 
first obstacle was of a more practical nature. The study is 
entirely composed on the basis of the material available in 
Edinburgh. This meant a lack of documentary sources. OAU 
documents are not currently made available anywhere except 
at the OAU's Headquarters in Addis Ababa. As far as I 
could find out even there the availability of documents is 
restricted. Thus it is a regrettable shortcoming that the 
particularly relevant verbatim records of the meetings of the 
OAU organs could not be used. I had to rely entirely on the 
case studies and works of scholars who have concerned them- 
selves with various aspects of inter -African problems and 
conflicts. They had to a lesser or greater extent access 
to some unpublished documentary material as well as to 
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documents released to the public by the OAU. It is 
obvious that the almost complete dependence on the works 
of scholars in the absence of first -hand documentary 
evidence makes it difficult to falsify contentions 
asserted in the literature. By the same token the scarcity 
of available empirical material and documents was especially 
impeding in those cases where the facts and findings of 
scholars were conflicting. 
The second set of difficulties was caused by inherent 
analytical problems. One concerns the limitations of 
comparative analysis. Is it legitimate and appropriate to 
base an assessment of the OAU's role as a 'peace -maker' in 
inter -African conflicts on a few case studies? The case 
studies included in this thesis will show that they can 
help elucidate certain categories of problems with which the 
OAU as an institution is confronted in the realm of disputes 
between its members and within a member state. The other 
difficulty stems from the enormous amount of historical, 
political and other data with relevance to any conflict and 
any mediation attempt. The process of selecting the kind 
of background material which has to be given to explain all 
the different aspects of a conflict remains a somewhat 
arbitrary decision. However, it was always aimed at dealing 
with the internal and external facts and connotations of each 
crisis in a way which reveals the specifically African problems 
involved as well as those which are the results of the 
international political system at large. 
The first chapter describes the historical and 
ideological background for the foundation of the OAU. In 
its first part it gives a brief account of the phenomenon 
of Pan- Africanism, which became the main idea influencing 
African inter -state relations. Since the foundation of 
the OAU was the outcome of developments in the international 
African system even more than an institutionalization of 
the pan- African idea the second part of the first chapter 
provides a summary of inter -African relations between 19.57- 
1963. 
Chapter II analyses the institutions of the Organization 
of African Unity. The emphasis is focused on those aspects 
of its Charter and organizational framework which show the 
character of the OAU with regard to its role in inter -African 
conflicts. 
Chapters III and IV are concerned with three case 
studies which reveal the problems encountered by the OAU in 
this role. The two conflicts examined in chapter III, i.e. 
the Algerian- Moroccan Territorial Conflict and the Ethiopia - 
Somalia -Kenya Territorial Dispute, are examples of crises 
between independent African states over territorial claims. 
These conflicts confronted the OAU with its first major 
tasks as a peace -maker in the African continent. Both 
disputes have their own distinctive histories as far as the 
background and the role of the OAU is concerned. However, 
they can be regarded as prototypes of conflicts which emerge 
whenever an OAU member state challenges some of the 
principles codified in the OAU Charter upon which the African 
international system is based. To be more concrete, the 
OAU had to concern itself with two cases in which countries 
departed from the majority view prevailing in Africa, in that 
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they did not accept the colonial legacy in its territorial 
consequences and thus threatened the territorial status 
quo of their neighbours. 
In this respect the Nigerian civil war dealt with 
in chapter IV confronted Africa with a similar problem: 
Biafra's secession was a contest of the colonial legacy and 
an attack on the territorial status quo. However, the 
fact that the conflict stemmed from intra -state problems 
puts it into a different category of disputes as far as 
the OAU is concerned. The nature of the conflict put one 
of the basic principles of the OAU Charter, i.e. the non- 
interference in the domestic affairs of a member state, to 
a crucial test. Strict adherence to the Charter implied 
that this was not a crisis in which the OAU should become 
involved. On the other hand Africa had to face the fact 
that the conflict quickly outgrew its national boundaries. 
If the OAU refused to concern itself with the civil war 
it faced accusations of impotence. The Organization could 
only fulfil its assignment as a 'peace- maker' able to find 
'African solutions' to disputes if it could come to grips 
with the phenomenon that many conflicts in Africa erupt 
from within a member country. This implied that it should 
not limit its activities to disputes arising between independent 
African states. The Nigerian civil war was a relevant 
example showing how the OAU tried to sort out its role vis -á- 
vis "internal" conflicts. For comparative purposes the 
fourth chapter contains also a brief look at the second Congo 
crisis. 
The final chapter sets out to draw some conclusions 
about the failures and successes of the Organization as 
a "peace-maker" in the two different types of disputes. 
In addition to this it is also concerned with the question 
of what the conflicts have revealed about the organizational 
stability and effectiveness of the Organization of African 
Unity. 
CHAPTER I 
PAN- AFRIOANISM AND AFRICAN UNITY 
As the heading of the chapter indicates we are not 
concerned with drawing an overall picture of the phenomenon 
of Pan -Africanism. Neither is a full historic account 
aimed at. 
1 
Such an attempt would deviate too much from 
the purpose of this study as outlined in the introduction. 
But as the Organization of African Unity2 is often 
seen as the institutionalisation of the dream of Pan - 
Africanism or, as Suzanne Bonzon puts it: "L'OUA est la 
réalisation d'un mythe, le panafricanisme, qui depuis 
plusieurs décennies, donnait sa vigueur a l'idéologie et 
orientait la recherche de solidarités nouvelles en 
Afrique, "3 we will try to give as many facts as seems to 
be required in order to explain what this "dream" or 
"mythe" has been all about. 
The fact that the OAU in its special organizational 
form was founded in 1963 is due to political developments 
in international relations among African states and 
influences from outside. In this respect only a short span 
1. Since the publication of Imanuel Geiss' book, 
Panafrikanismus, Zur Geschichte der Dekolonisation, 
Frankfurt, l9bö, a detailed analysis would be possible. 
2. From now on referred to as OAU or OUA in French 
quotations. 
3. Suzanne Bonzon, "L'OUA d'Addis Ababa á Kinshasa ", in: 
Revue Francaise d'etudes politiques africaines, No. 22, 
Oct. 1967, p.20. 
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of time would have to be considered. But that there was 
a need for it and the whole rhetoric of Pan -Africanism has a 
long history. This is why we are impelled to go further 
back into history in order to understand the emotional drive 
behind Pan -Africanism. In many respects we face a kind of 
dichotomy between a cluster of ideas never precisely defined 
but subsumed under the heading of Pan -Africanism. ïIany 
leading Pan- Africanists throughout the "movement's" history 
have tried to give a definition, combining modern Western 
thoughts with preserving at the same time the African 
heritage. On the other hand we are faced with a sort of 
"Realpolitik ". This covers the time when the independent 
African states tried to work for some form of organized 
co- operation among each other. This dichotomy at the 
same time provides us with a division -line between the two 
main parts of this chapter. In its first half we will try 
to describe Pan -Africanism - "probably one of the most 
complex phenomena in modern history" - and its rhetoric.4 
What matters most is how leading African politicians, who 
influenced inter -African politics between the decisive years 
of 1957 and 1963 and later, perceived Pan- Africanism and its 
history. We will also touch the problem of relationship 
between Pan -Africanism and African nationalism. Can 
4. Imanuel Geiss, "Notes on the Development of Pan - 
Africanism", in: Journal of the Historical Society 
of Nigeria, Vol.Ill, no.4, June 1967, p.719. 
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Pan -Africanism be seen as a form of macro -nationalism as 
opposed to micro -nationalism geared towards the territorial 
units inherited by colonialism?5 In dealing with this 
question we are encountering another major problem of 
definition, mainly the phenomena of "nationhood" and 
"nationalism",6 
When I start this chapter with general reflections on 
the problems of Pan -Africanism, its history and its 
relationship to nationalism, I do so not because I can offer 
a solution to the problem of definition which occupied many 
a scholar's mind who worked on nationalism and Pan - 
movements in the African and non -African context but simply 
to pinpoint some of these problems in their complexity. 
African leaders must have given time and thoughts to them. 
In the second part of the chapter we analyse inter - 
African relations from the time of the independence of Ghana 
to the Addis Ababa Conference in 1963 with the formation of 
such groups as the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAIVI) , the 
Union of African States (UAS), "Casablanca" and "Monrovia" 
during this period. Zartman calls it the 'proto- balance- 
of power period', "when alliances and counteralliances were 
formed and expanded to check one another's growing power. 
5. Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States, 
London, 1965, p.10. 
6. In seeking an answer to it we limit ourselves 
to 
consulting only a few but influential books 
concerned 
with this problem. 
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This alliance race dissolved in the OAU, without by any 
means ending the...conflicts on which it was based."7 
This clearly indicates that apart from facts and figures 
we are confronted with the problem of defining major 
political variables that affected the emerging patterns of 
African interstate relations e.g. ideologies and decision - 
makers in African foreign policy. If this above outlined 
approach to the problems dealt with in this chapter sounds 
pretentious the reader has to keep constantly in mind that 
I do not intend to answer such a difficult question as that 
concerning the ideological motivations of the African 
political elites in extenso. The problem is only touched 
in so fax as it reveals something about the difficulties 
the OAU as a "peace- maker" encounters and in so far as it 
illuminates the nature and the procedure of the OAU and its 
organs and thereby helps us with a critical evaluation of 
the OAU's achievements. What we need to see are the 
African ideals against which to judge the performance of 
the OAU. 
1) The History of Pan -Africanism 
Unfortunately there is no such thing as a conclusive 
definition of the term "Pan- Africanism ".8 To cite Langley 
7. I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966, p.146. 
8. If not indicated otherwise, in my description I will 
follow Geiss' treatment of the phenomenon. 
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who stresses this point: "It is difficult to define 
comprehensively for the simple reason that it has assumed 
different meanings and orientations at various stages in 
its evolution. "9 As will be seen below it is interpreted 
differently today by African leaders. Colin Legum states 
"Pan -Africanism has come to be used both by its protagonists 
and its antagonists as if it were a declaration of political 
principles. It is not. "10 If it were, most of what is 
contained in the following passages would be superfluous. 
In order to systematize our further discussion of 
Pan -Africanism we can give two basic definitions of it 
closely linked to certain historical periods. The broader 
definition would perceive Pan- Africanism as Pan -Negroism 
i.e. "an intellectual or political movement among Africans 
or people of African descent which saw Africa, Africans 
people of African descent as a unit".11 Comprising 
cultural and intellectual streams of Afro -Asian solidarity 
and anti- colonial sentiments it takes up feelings of identity 
with the anti- colonial struggle of all people under colonial 
domination. Pan -Africanism is the answer of the black race 
to the humiliation suffered from the dominating white race. 
It is a demand for equality and a means to infuse self- esteem 
into the peoples of Africa. and African descent. As the 
9. Jabez Ayodele Langley, West African Aspects of the Pan- 
African Movements: 1900 -1945, Thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, May 1968, p.9. 
10. Colin Legum, Pan- Africanism, A Short Political Guide, 
New York, 19b3, p.14. 
11. I.Geiss, "Notes on ", op.cit., p.720. 
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ideology of African emancipation it is "an essentially 
modern idea ", which came out as a result of the contact of 
the "Europeanized" Africans and people of African descent 
with the ideas and philosophies of the modern world and 
their reaction to it. "It thus mirrors the fluid state 
of transition from traditional society to a new form of 
society, the clashing and fusing of modern and traditional 
elements in African society 
12 
In his fight against 
theory and practice of racial discrimination Pan- Africanism 
became the ideology of decolonisation.13 The narrower 
definition of Pan -Africanism describes it as the achievement 
of some kind of African political unity or a close political 
co- operation;4 the quest for continental unity.15 
In the same sense we can talk with Geiss of a wider 
and a narrower history of Pan- Africanism. The latter 
starts with the two Pan- African conferences in 1958 in Accra 
while the former divides into the period of "proto -Pan- 
Africanism" before 1900 and the period after 1900 when it 
became a kind of congress movement.16 The historical 
12. I. Geiss, "Notes on ", op.cit., p.721. 
13. I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.11. 
14. I. Geiss, "Notes on ", op.cit., p.720. 
15. Vincent B. Thompson, Africa and Unity, London, 1969, 
P.XXI. Strauch sees the development from linguistic - 
ethnical and religious Pan -movements to continental 
Pan- movements as "progress geared towards the reality 
of this modern world." Pan -Africanism is one of the 
most striking examples. Hans Peter Strauch, Panafrika, 
Kontinentale Weltmacht im Werden? Zurich, 1967, p.15. 
16. see I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.13. 
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conditions for the first appearance of ideas that can be 
called "proto -pan- African" were characterized by the slave - 
trade, slavery and racial discrimination in the New World. 
It is no wonder that the first signs of pan -African ideas 
developed in the New World i.e. the West Indies and the 
United States.17 "The final emergences of Pan- Africanism 
in America was a by- product of the tension between 
assimilation and segregation..." 
18 
The Negroes in the 
Western Hemisphere detached from their African tribal 
background regarded as one "inferior race" by their white 
masters "became so united in experience and so exposed to 
the impact of new cultures that they began to think of 
Africa as one idea and one land. "19 They were first to 
perceive "Africa" as a unity by adopting the white people's 
view of Africa.L0 One of the main ideas incorporated in 
Pan -Africanism was, as could be seen, already developed 
before West Africa became involved in the emergence of 
"proto- Pan -Africanism "as a part of the classic triangle of 
17. see George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro American 
Influences on the Emerge of African Nationalism ", in: 
The Journal of African History, vol.I, No.2, 1960. 
18. I. Geiss, "Notes on.... ", o .cit., p.724. It was only with 
the 5th Pan -African Congress , in Manchester that the 
pan -African ideas "ceased to be largely a brainchild of 
Negro intellectuals and African students in the diaspora" 
and "was transplanted organisationally to Africa's own 
soil." Colin Legum, Panafricanism, A Short Political 
Guide, New York, 1963, p.33. 
19. William Edward Burghardt DuBois, The World and Africa, 
New York, 1965, 2nd ed. see I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus 
op.çit., p.338 index. 
20. I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.28, as he points 
out, an attitude to be found likewise for Teutons or Slays 
who got their names from their respective neighbours, that 
is Romans and Germans. 
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pan -African activities.21 The ideas which developed 
throughout the nineteenth century and ended in the stream 
called Pan- Africanism were the concern of very small 
minorities. 
The nineteenth century saw the emergence of other 
Pan -movements and in comparison with them "Pan -Africanism 
is neither an exotic nor an entirely new phenomenon 
fundamentally different from other Pan- movements."22 
It shows the same kind of eclecticism, romanticism, and 
emotionalism so characteristic of all Pan -movements. 
Members of people who begin to look at themselves as a unity 
by race, language or religion compensate for their political 
impotence by ascribing a spiritual world -role to 
themselves.23 This often goes hand in hand with an 
ambivalence towards a value -system imposed upon them by the 
dominating "alien" group.24 
It is more than understandable that, given the starting 
point of Pan- Africanism namely slavery and white racialism, 
it developed as an emotional protest- movement. Its self - 
educated or church -educated protagonists in the 19th century 
devoted much of their energy refuting the European race 
theories, which denied dignity and the possibility of a just 
development to the black people. They tried to invest a 
21. Participation of the French- speaking Negro -world can only 
be detected after 1919 and Africans from other European 
colonies only took part in pan- African activities in a 
rather sporadic form, as Geiss points out on page 17 of 
his book. 
22. J.A. Langley, Thesis, op.cit., p.9. 
23. Ibid., p.10. 
24. John Erickson, Pan -Slavism, London, 1964. In this work 
on Pan -Slavism Erickson discloses the same phenomenon. 
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new pride in the black people in referring to the glory of 
the Egyptian civilization - an African civilization - as 
the origin of modern civilization and the naming of out- 
standing men throughout history and claiming them as 
Negroes. The early Pan -Africanists share this approach 
to history with many other exponents of pan- nationalism in 
the 19th and 20th century. It is "the customary appeal 
to a glorious past, earnest of a still more glorious future, 
and warrant for the subversion of present and existing 
institutions. "25 The latter part of this quotation leads 
on to one of the major shortcomings in the proto-pan- 
African edifice of ideas. With the exception of Horton 
all people in the 19th century whose writings influenced 
the thinking of Pan- Africaniste never solved the discrepancy 
between modernity and the conservation of indigenous culture 
and institutions. Nkrumah is only one of the most pro- 
minent leaders in this line.26 
"The educated, westernized African found himself 
thoroughly suspended between two worlds. Trained 
to uncritical acceptance of the West, he was 
rejected as an equal, unable to return to a 
traditional Africa he no longer respected, he 
rose to its defence in part through loyalty and 
in part as an expression of national sentiments 
learned from the West." 27 
"Side by side with the slav's discovery of himself and his 
potential world -historical role went a certain ambivalence 
towards Europeand its civilization." p.11. 
25. Elie Kedourie, ationalism in Asia and Africa, London, 
1971, p.42. E.W. Blyden is a prominent protagonist of 
this attitude, "For we believe that as descendents of Ham 
had a share, as the most prominent actors on the scene, 
in the founding of cities and in the organization of 
government, so members of the same family, developed under 
different circumstances, will have an important part in 
the closing of the great drama." see E.W. Blyden, The 
People of Africa, New York, 1871, p.34. 
26. See I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.329. 
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The year 1900 is obviously a watershed in the history 
of Pan -Africanism. The word "pan -African" was put on record 
for the first time by the Trinidad barrister H. Sylvester 
Williams28 What had been so far a movement of ideas and 
emotions dominated by Negroes in the Western Hemisphere 
without taking organizational shape developed slowly into a 
more institutionalised movement with gradually increasing 
African participation. As will be seen below it was still 
a very weak movement and very far from becoming the mouth- 
piece for African emancipation. Various organizational 
efforts were made, most of them, however, remained 
embryonic. The unfolding of organizational strength - 
a history of ups and downs - reached its first climax after 
1945 with "the determination of Negro peoples to organize 
and unite against the oppressors and to make radical Pan- 
Africanism the ideology of the new liberation movements 
throughout colonial Africa. "29 
What follows here is not a detailed account of the 
activities and importance of the Pan- African meetings held 
between 1900 and 1945 but only a summary of the general 
trends which emerged in these years, and the important 
controversy between two leading Pan- Africanists W.E.B. DuBois 
27. Robert W. July, The Origins of Modern African Thought, 
London, 1968, p.463. 
28. C. Legum, op.cit., p.24 
29. J.A. Langley, Thesis, op.cit., p.17, Compare with 
footnote13. 
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and M.A. Garvey. The congress- movement of Pan- Africanism 
began at a time when the pan- African- orientated intellectual 
vanguard of Afro- Americans saw a solution of their problems 
not in immigration to Africa. What they tried to promote 
was an improvement of Africa's social, economic and 
intellectual status which would eventually affect their own 
situation in the States.30 As fax as the participation 
was concerned the pan -African Conference in 1900 was pan- 
Negro but in its resolution it focused on Africa and in 
addition to it included the whole problem of pan- coloured 
solidarity. It launched an appeal to the world not to 
tolerate the exploitation of Africa and to grant "responsible 
government" as soon as possible to Africa and the West 
Indies.31 After the closure of the conference all efforts 
to bring about an organization which would co- ordinate the 
pan- African activities and help organizing other meetings on 
an intercontinental level were unsuccessful. The efforts 
failed because the social and political conditions were not 
yet ripe for long- lasting success. The elites in Africa, 
America and the West Indies were numerically and economically 
too weak while the colonial imperialism was still unshaken.32 
The history of the following four Pan- African Congresses is 
the history of a more or less accomplished effort to carry 
30. I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.136 
31. Ibid., p.150. 
32. Ibid., p.156 
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on with the task begun in 1900. The first ran- African 
Congress held in Paris in 1919 "adopted a lengthy 
resolution which nowhere spoke of the African's right to 
independence. "33 Compared with the declaration of the 
1900 pan -African Conference this was a much tamer resolu- 
tion. But if one sees this resolution in its historical 
context "outright demands for self -government and 
independence would have been hopelessly premature ".34 
The following three Congresses (London and Brussels 
1921; London and Lisbon 1923; and New York 1927) brought 
a continuation of these reformist ideas as far as self - 
government was concerned. Geiss, in summarizing the 
results and importance of the pan-African-Congress- 
Movement up to the 1930s, comes down with a very fierce 
criticism concerning DuBois' part in this movement and the 
significance of these Congresses as such. Politically 
very little did materialize35 and the Congress -movement 
failed to play a part in the political education of 
Africans and Pan- Africans. Given the historical circum- 
stances in which these meetings took place, one was not to 
expect more than to give publicity to the grievances of 
the black people. There were no tangible results in terms 
33. C. Legum, op.cit., p.29. 
34. Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa, the Search for a New 
Society, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1967, p.63. 
35. It is not without importance that at the Congress 
in 
Paris 1919 "some kind of collaboration between English - 
speaking and French -speaking Africans and Negroes from 
the Caribbean was brought about." I. Geiss, Notes on... 
op.cit., p.731. 
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of conceptualization of the pan -African ideas. The 
Pan- Congresses were mainly meeting places in order to 
voice the grievances of the Africans and Afro -Americans. 
DuBois, although he had a reputation as a leading scholar 
was not able to formulate a rational concept of Pan - 
Africanism. Thus he did not become the leading 
theoretician of the pan- African movement. Also, he was 
not able to reconcile the values of traditional Africa 
with the demands of a modern world. He as a person, was 
the epitome of Pan -Africanism, unable to reconcile the 
two main components which are strong currents in the realm of 
pan- African ideas: those who wanted a consequent modern- 
ization of the African society and those who romanticized 
the traditional Africa.36 It is, however, due to DuBois 
that the idea of Pan- Africanism survived and took some 
shape. DuBois' Congress- movement therefore served as a 
starting -point for a new beginning after the Second World 
War. 
Geiss, based on his research, comes to a slightly 
more critical assessment of the "Father of Pan -Africanism "37 
than one encounters among other authors. He gives more 
credit to Garvey who, parallel to DuBois and his Congress - 
movement, became the other leading figure of Pan- Africanism 
in the 1920's. Garvey's "contribution to the development 
of Pan -Africanism ought to be taken seriously now, for he 
inspired not only the masses of Afro- Americans, but also 
some of the new African intellectuals, and his influence 
even spread to the masses in Africa, who DuBois could 
never 
36. I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.202. 
37. see George Padmore, Pan- Africanism or Communism ?, 
London, 1956, p.89. 
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have hoped to reach. "38 Padmore classifies Garvey as 
"the greatest black prophet and visionary since Negro 
emancipation ".39 But following DuBois he gives a rather 
critical account of his activities and deplores his short- 
comings in statesmanship. 
It was Garvey's basic idea to inspire separate 
development for the Afro -Americans appealing to their 
racial pride. Rather than integrating them into the white 
society he urged them to create "a Black State in the new 
world and associate it with an independent Africa ".40 
If he had imperial ideas of founding a black Empire in 
Africa and if he answered white racialism with his own 
slightly exaggerated black racialism, he was in line with 
the thinking of his days. Although it is difficult to trace 
a concrete program as far as his "Back -to- Africa" plans 
were concerned, it seems clear that he was realistic enough 
to understand that bringing the Afro -Americans to Africa 
was not feasible, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
In the meantime his aim was to inculcate into the Negroes 
of the Western Hemisphere the idea of self- sufficiency by 
establishing their own capitalistic system independent from 
that of the white capitalists.41 His emphasis lay on 
establishing a kind of national basis for the Afro -Americans 
38. I. Geiss, "Notes on.... ", op.cit., p.734. 
39. G. Padmore, op.cit., p.87. 
40. J. Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, Metuchen, N.J., 
1970, p.13. 
41. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.42. 
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by helping to free Africa.42 He realized that the 
liberation of Africa might require the use of violence, 
something DuBois did not dream of.43 Beyond all that, 
Garvey's idea was to unite all Africans the world over and 
to weld the whole of Africa into a united nation. 
"Almost at the same time that he was planning a Negro State 
in America, Garvey began his grand design of a "universal 
confraternity" spreading from the Americas to Africa, and 
even further.... wherever Negroes lived." 44 Altogether 
Garvey's ideas carried with them enough appeal to the 
masses and part of the elites in the colonies to make the 
colonial powers take measures to hinder the propagation of 
Garveyism in their colonial territories and thereby 
helping to incite the indigenous people.45 
When Garveyism collapsed in the mid- 1920's and the 
Congress- movement came to a halt in 1927, the vacuum in 
pan- African development was filled by efforts to bring 
pan -African ideas and Communism closer together. In this 
period another prominent figure of Pan- Africanism came to 
the forefront, George Padmore. He set himself the task to 
form Pan -Africanism into an ideology for Africa well 
demarcated from other ideologies. 
The question was, as Woronoff has put it: "Why not 
42. I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.217. 
43. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.45. 
44. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.15. 
45. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.45. 
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work with the one international movement that proclaimed 
colonialism its enemy and swore to overthrow it ? "46 
A number of Pan -Africanists were attracted by Marxism and 
furthermore thought that they could work hand in hand with 
the Communists to destroy the capitalist- colonialist 
forces. The Soviet Union had wooed the colonized peoples 
as allies. But when in the 1930's the Soviet Union 
sought alliances with the Western powers in an "anti- 
fascist" front, she sacrificed her alliance with the 
nationalists in the "Third World ".47 Realising that they 
were used for the ends of Soviet foreign policy people 
like Padmore and others who were prominent in the 
Comintern showed their disillusionment with organized 
international Communism and left the party. Rejecting 
organized international Communism was not tantamount to a 
rejection of Marxist theory. It continued to attract many 
Pan -Africanists. They "began to see colonial and racial 
oppression as based on economic considerations. They did 
not take up the ideology for its own sake but for another 
end... "48 The Communist interlude in the activities of 
Padmore and Kenyatta to name only the most well -known 
leaders had some relevance for the development of Pan - 
Africanism. 
46. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.20. 
47. Ibid., p.21. 
48. Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity 
London, 1968, p.9. 
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Firstly the international Communist movement gave 
them the opportunity of political training.49 Secondly 
it was the beginning of a trend to look at pan -African 
ideology as an alternative to Communism represented by 
white exponents and expression of Western thought. "This 
was the beginning of a new independence and self -reliance, 
of 'African' socialism and non -alignment with the East as 
well as the West. "50 
To end this brief account of the wider history of 
Pan- Africanism we must turn now to the 5th pan- African 
Congress convened in Manchester in 1945. Due to Padmore's 
activities and those of other groups who made London the 
centre of pan- African endeavours, DuBois' hopes of a 
revival of his Congress- movement became true.51 The 
Manchester Congress is remarkable for a series of reasons 
which have some impact on the history of Pan- Africanism. 
It was the first meeting of its kind in which "the lead was 
finally taken by Africans ".52 It equally became more 
"plebeian ", more "politicized" because for the first time 
some African political parties were represented. On the 
whole it was a move towards a more radical and less middle - 
class political movement. The resolutions were unequi- 
vocally dominated by anti- imperialistic tones. Quoting 
49. I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.264. 
50. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.22. 
51. see I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., p.265. 
52. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.23. 
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the "Atlantic Charter" it condemned all forms of 
colonialism and demanded independence in the near future. 
"We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence; 
so far and no further than it is possible in this 'One 
World' for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject 
to inevitable world unity and federation. "53 The 
resolutions had clear socialist undertones. "In pinning 
their faith to political action as the necessary measure 
for combating imperialism and accomplishing the social, 
economic and political emancipation of Africa, the Congress 
participants forged the instruments for "Positive Action" 
which were mentioned as strikes and boycotts in order to 
impress their claims on the colonial powers. "54 
Manchester saw the end of the pan- Negro -Movement which was 
based on racial solidarity. The end of Pan -Africanism as 
a pan- Negro -movement was one of the prerequisites for 
continental Pan- Africanism, which saw its goal as the unity 
of the African continent as a whole. This would include 
non -Negro peoples. "In Africa, unlike Europe an equation 
of colour and continental origins is very vulnerable. "55 
Pan -Africanism had started on its long march back home to 
Africa. It had become a rhetorical "tool of African 
nationalist movements fighting colonial rule, thus reaching 
its stage of 'nationalization'. "56 
53. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.59. 
54. Ibid., p.59. 
55. Ali Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana, London, 1966, 
pp.117 -118. 
56. Immanual Wallerstein, "Larger Units: Pan- Africanism 
and Regional Federations ", in: Peter J.M. McEwan and 
Robert B. Sutcliffe, The Study of Africa, London, 1967 
p.218, 
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After the 5th Congress "the pan -African movement 
seemed to peter out in a series of national movements" 
only to be revived after the independence of Ghana.57 
After its revival it became more and more a movement based 
on "a doctrine of continental exclusiveness implicit in 
the very composition of the OAU" leaving behind its 
intercontinental origins..58 Pursuing the ideas of Pan - 
Africanism from then on meant working for the political 
goal of African unity. The years between 1945 and 1957 
may be called a "lull" period as far as the organizational 
aspect of Pan- Africanism is concerned. But insofar as 
the Pan- Africanists regarded the liquidation of colonial- 
ism as a prerequisite of African unity, the struggle 
within the territorial units in colonial Africa for self - 
determination and independence bore direct relevance 
the pan- African goals. The growth of the movement after 
1957 is a direct outcome of the activities in the preceding 
years.59 After 1957 Pan- Africanism almost had to start 
from scratch as far as the organizational side was 
concerned. The OAU had to cover new territory in respect 
of its organizational aspect. The political set -up in 
Africa changed completely and rapidly with the bulk of 
former colonies reaching the status of formal independence. 
Pan- Africanism became the main idea which influenced 
interstate relations. The African governments faced new 
57. I. Geiss, "Notes on...", op.cit., p.739. 
58. A. Mazrui, op.cit., p.182. 
59. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.64. 
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organizational problems which were completely different 
from those the "old" Pan -Africanists were confronted with 
between 1900 and 1945. This to me is the reason why it 
seems more important to give a picture of the edifice of 
pan- African ideas throughout its history than merely of 
its organizational set -up. After 1957 Pan -Africanism 
became transformed into a new movement, the movement 
toward African unity. 
2) Pan- Africanism and African Nationalism 
Before analysing the Pan -African ideas as expressed 
by leading African politicians, we must touch on the 
problem of relationship between Pan- Africanism and African 
nationalism. Dealing with the historical background of 
Pan -Africanism we have not mentioned the somewhat 
simultaneous development of African nationalism. The 
following part of this chapter will not contain a historical 
account of African nationalism before and after the Second 
World War,60 but rather a more general look at the two 
abovementioned phenomena. It will be helpful to compare 
the relationship between Pan- Africanism and African 
nationalism in the light of the findings of scholars who 
have concerned themselves with the question of nationalism 
and Pan -movements. 
60. For detailed background analyses of the earlier 
period see: J.A.Langley, Thesis, op.cit., and 
I. Geiss, Panafrikanismus, op.cit., Chapt. 6, 
p.220. 
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Previously I pointed out the difficulties one 
encounters trying to define "Pan- Africanism ". When it 
comes to "nationalism" the problem of definition is 
repeated. Has "Pan -Africanism" in its wider definition 
been the prerequisite for "African nationalism "? Is 
"African nationalism" a previous condition to "Pan - 
Africanism" in its narrower definition ?61 Are the two 
phenomena just related to each other as part of one and 
the same argument? In other words, are they both serving 
the same political purposes, or do they exclude each other 
as some authors have argued? To answer such questions 
can be partly a semantic problem depending on the given 
definitions of "Pan -Africanism" and "nationalism ". But 
the greater problem is that the answer also depends on the 
way these terms are used in political life by politicians 
and intellectuals. It then becomes a question of how 
ideas are manipulated, shaped and related to one another 
in practical terms. 
"Nationalism is an untidy and unrefined abstraction. 
All attempts to produce a theory of it will generate 
abstract models. "c2 There are a number of reasons to 
explain this contention. The origin of the concept of 
"nation" and "nationalism" is rooted in European history 
and experience. Each "nationalism" has to be looked at as an 
"individual case in its proper perspective and in its con- 
ditional nature. "63 It is only then that comparative 
studies become a satisfying undertaking. From such 
61. H. Strauch, Panafrika,..., op.cit., p.44. 
62. Kenneth R. Minogue, Nationalism, London, 1967, p.145. 
63. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, New York, 1946, p.120. 
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comparative analyses two trends are likely to emerge. 
Firstly, most "nationalisms" share no more than what Kohn 
and Sokolsky call the "prime ingredient of nationalism" 
namely "the will to be a nation "4 and secondly, there are 
no fundamental differences between nationalism in the 
Western and non -Western world. 
65 
"Each new nationalism, having received its original 
impulse from the cultural contact with some older national- 
ism, looked for its justification and its differentiation 
to the heritage of its own past and peculiarities.... "66 
This is certainly true with African nationalists who are 
influenced by and have embraced the ideas of nationalism 
and "nationhood" as a European concept and who are trying 
desperately to bring this concept in line with indigenous 
ideas. President Senghor's ideas might be taken as a 
good example of a new conceptulization. He calls the 
Serer country and the Malinké country the Fatherland 
comprising "a land, blood, a language or at least a 
dialect, mores, customs, folk -lore, art, in one word a 
culture rooted in a native soil and expressed by a race.M 
The Nation groups fatherlands in order to transcend them. 
As can be inferred, the Nation is superior to the Father- 
land on the level of humanity and even of efficiency. It 
64. Hans Kohn, and Wallace Sokolsky, African Nationalism 
in the 20th Century, Princeton, 1965, p.9. 
65. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism ", in: International Encyclo- 
pedia of Social Science, Ed. David L. Sills, The 
1Viacmillan Company and the Free Press, vol.11, 1968, 
p.68. 
66. H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, op.cit., p.330. 
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distils the values of the latter, sublimates them by 
transcending them. "67 The state "is primarily a means 
of realising the Nation. "68 Senghor advocates the idea 
of a federal state able to integrate a multitude of 
fatherlands with various populations to be moulded into 
one Negro African Nation which ultimately blends 
characteristics of traditional Negro African civilisation 
with European and French contributions.69 
We will only get some answers to our questions if 
we try to talk about the spiritual drive, the rhetoric 
and the political goals behind "nationalism" and compare it 
with "Pan- movements ". The idea of nationalism in Africa 
was adopted by elite groups as a result of the encounter 
with the modern Western idea "that humanity must be 
organized into a world of nation -states ".70 In addition 
to it nationalism became a doctrine of political mobilisation, 
of "activating and canalizing dormant political energies ".71 
African leaders understood "nationalism" as a weapon in 
their fight to free their countries from colonialism. 
It was likewise one answer in their search for identity. 
Here again African elites were closely following their 
European "nationalistic predecessors" who made "national- 
ism" a tool in their fight for the right to be free, not 
only as an individual but as a group. Following the 
67. .Léopold Sedar Senghor, Nationhood and the African Road 
to Socialism, Présence Africaine, Paris 1962, p.23. 
68. Ibid., p.41. 
69. see ibid., p.41. 
70. E. Kedourie, op.cit., p.29. 
71. Ibid., p.70. 
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European example Africans became convinced "that progress 
and equality were possible only at the price of "nation - 
hood".72 The growth of this conviction has along history 
and only came of age after the Second World War. They 
faced two main tasks, namely to inculcate this notion of 
"nationhood" into their people and to overcome the 
discrepancy between existing state -patterns and perceived 
nationhood. 
Much that has been said so far clearly indicates 
similarities between the idea of nationalism and Pan - 
Africanism in its wider definition.73 This is even more 
true when the rhetoric of both "movements" are compared. 
In the language of "African nationalism" there is the same 
appeal to a glorious past and a still more glorious future 
and the urge to change the existing political institutions 
so familiar a theme in the rhetoric of Pan- Africanism. 
Both Pan- Africanism and African nationalism "are mani- 
festations of the same general urge toward independence and 
freedom ".74 Both have the objective of unification, but 
with the crucial difference of tackling the problem on 
different levels. 
It is less in the rhetoric and ideological back- 
72. B. Davidson, op.cit., p.58. 
73. Compare with p.5 of this chapter. 
74. David E. Apter, James S. Coleman: "Pan- Africanism or 
Nationalism in Africa ", in: Pan- Africanism Reconsidered, 
ed. by American Society of African Culture, Los Angeles, 
1962, p.81. 
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ground that one encounters the differences between Pan - 
Africanism and African Nationalism but rather in their 
different political goals, namely nation -building and 
African unity. In their rhetoric most African national- 
ists were Pan- Africanista at the same time. The slogan 
"independence and unity" if taken seriously indicates 
that the national fight will not be finally accomplished 
until the second goal, i.e. unity, will be achieved.75 
Most African nationalists have to be Pan- Africanists at 
the same time because although they feel that national 
consciousness in the inherited territories can and must 
be developed for the sake of development and modernization, 
they are aware that many of the ingredients of nationhood 
such as language, culture and common history spill over 
from one territory into the other. This phenomenon 
results in a call for unity in a greater frame and thus 
leads to "pan- movements and ideas ".76 
Looking at the relationship between Pan- Africanism 
and African Nationalism as a relationship between ideas 
and concepts, the answers to the questions raised at the 
beginning of this passage seem plausible. The two 
phenomena are closely related to each other serving 
ultimately the same purposes, namely the independence and 
development of Africa and her people. The clashes and 
75. J. Wallerstein, "Larger Units.... ", op.cit., p.219. 
76. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation; The Mise of 
Self- assertion of Asian and African Peop es, 
Cambridge Wass., 19b2, p.100. 
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obstacles lie in political reality. Once elites have 
established themselves inside the nation -state and 
acquired vested interests it is doubtful, to say the least, 
whether they want to set this at risk for the uncertain 
future of regional or continental unity, leaving quite 
apart for the moment the pressures brought to bear on them 
by powers from outside Africa. It remains to be seen 
how much this whole framework of ideas, concepts, emotions 
and historical developments bears its relevance on the 
thinking and acting of the African political leaders in 
their attempt to find an embodiment of their "pan- African 
dreams ". 
3) Some Concepts of African Unity 
Trying to give an overall and distinct picture of 
the ideas of P an- Africanism and the political plans to 
achieve some form of African Unity as expressed by Africa's 
political leaders is rendered difficult by the fact that 
we do not encounter comprehensive schools of thought. 
In our case it will suffice to give a brief account of the 
ideas put forward by some of the most prominent African 
politicians in the years before the OAU. It will always 
remain a controversial point in dealing with problems of 
international relations how fax political ideology and 
rhetoric explain political actions. It is the problem 
of the relationship "between the actual practice of 
politics and the language which its practitioners use to 
describe it. "77 It is very difficult to assess the role 
77. Christopher Clapham, "The Context of African Political 
Thought ", in: Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.8, 
no. I, 1970, p.l. 
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of ideas or ideology in bringing about the integration of 
states. An assessment of this kind becomes all the more 
problematic the shorter the historical process we are 
dealing with. To put it in concrete terms we ask whether 
the pan -African ideas and beliefs expressed by African 
politicians are "superfluous rhetoric or an integral part 
of the action ".78 As Nye sees it, it is the problem of 
blending ideals and interests. "Rarely does one find a 
case in international politics where clear and weighty 
interest has been sacrificed for an ideal. But in cases 
where the scales of interest are more nearly balanced, 
ideas play a subtle part that renders inadequate inter- 
pretations of motive that are based solely on interest. "79 
Whatever the different interests of the African 
leaders were they all advocated the principle of African 
unity, although it meant different things to different 
leaders. It was, however, the how and when which was at 
stake.80 They were aware that their task was not 
fulfilled with the achievement of independence. They had 
to continue their struggle in order to lead their countries 
on to the path of development and progress. They 
demanded a place in world politics proportionate to the 
importance of Africa in the world. The leaders felt that 
78. Joseph S. Nye, Pan -Africanism and East African 
Integration, iJondon and Nairobi, 1966, p.4. 
79. Ibid., p.5. 
80. J. Gus Liebenow, "Which Road to Pan- African Unity? 
The Sanniquellie Conference, 1959 ", in: Gwendolen M. 
Carter (ed.), Politics in Africa, 7 Cases, New York - 
Chicago; Burlington, 1966, p.5. 
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to bring about continental unity could become Africa's 
major contribution "to the sum total of human achievement "; 
something that no other continent had so far managed to 
do.81 And furthermore there was some sort of agreement 
that the continent might never be able to liberate itself 
completely from colonialism without achieving unity and 
thereby strength. However, if there is basic consensus 
that to work for unity on the continent is one of the major 
tasks in African foreign relations, there is on the other 
hand disagreement among the leaders concerning the ways and 
means to reach this target. We can distinguish two camps. 
Oddly enough we face a situation in which the desire for 
unity was one of the causes for principal division between 
African states.82 
In the literature concerned with Pan -Africanism and 
African Unity most authors classify the African leaders as 
"radicals" and "moderates" on the ground of their pan- 
African ideas83 or as "federalists" and "functionalists ".84 
In the ensuing paragraphs we will give in very condensed 
form a description of the political concepts of African 
unity of some of the major exponents of these groups. It 
is by no means an exhaustive philosophy of these leaders 
that we are getting. None of the leaders (with probably 
the exception of Nkrumah) has ever expressed a conclusive 
81. A. Mazrui, op.cit., pp.87 -88. 
82. Erasmus H. Kloman Jr., "African Unification Movements ", 
in: International Organization, vol. XVI, no. 2, Spring 
1962, p.387. 
83. see for ex. I. Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of 
Unity, op.cit., p.21. 
84. J.S. Nye, op.cit., p.14. 
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philosophy of their pan- African ideas. V.B. Thompson 
rightly points out that "the views which these leaders 
hold and use as their guiding light in promoting Pan - 
Africanism.... are also used in the building of their 
individual states. "85 The selection of the leaders one 
can deal with is limited by the fact that "many leaders 
have never written anything nor articulated any consistent 
ideas. "86 This certainly accounts for the fact that most 
authors focus their analysis on the same selection of 
African politicians, which does not leave us a great 
choice. 
It seems appropriate to start the synopsis with 
Kwame Nkrumah, the most prominent in the group of the 
"radicals ", because he is unanimously given credit for 
furthering the ideas of Pan -Africanism after 1957 in 
Africa.87 Furthermore the fact that Pan -Africanism after 
1957 was identified largely with suprastate political 
unification was due to Nkrumah's tireless propaganda for 
his main goal in foreign policy.88 He became the ardent 
advocate for "political unity now ", that is to say, before 
the individual states strengthened their individual identities 
they should unite to form a "United States of Africa ".89 
He was fully aware that once the leaders in the territorial 
states had become fond of their roles they were playing on 
85. V.B. Thompson, op.cit. 
86. Ibid., p.249. 
87. Ronald Segal, African 
Middlesex, 1962, p.235 
88. Claude E. Welch, Jr., 
Political Unification 
1965, p.l4. 
89. see W. Scott Thompson, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 
, p.249. 
Profiles, Harmondsworth, 
, taken as one example. 
Dream of Unity: Pan- Africanism and 
in West Africa, Ithaca, New York, 
Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-666, 
1969, p.8. 
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the internal and international political platform they 
would be reluctant to give up their newly won independence, 
thus jeopardizing their positions of influence. He was 
equally opposed to the formation of regional blocs or 
federations. In his own words "Regional Federations are 
a form of balkanization on a grand scale,.... "90 However, 
he did not emphasize this viewpoint from the beginning of 
his agitation for African unity. Earlier on under the 
influence of George Padmore importance was given to 
regional federations.91 For Nkrumah the immediate uni- 
fication was the sine qua non for economic development and 
the only barrier against neo- colonialism on the continent. 
The important industrialization of Africa can only come 
about if the African states plan their development centrally 
without competing with one another. "Effective economic 
links, however, are impossible to establish without sound 
political direction to give them force and purpose. 
Therefore, we must come to grips first with the major and 
basic issue of African unity, which alone can clear the 
way for the united effort in erecting the powerful industrial 
and economic structure... "g2 He equally strongly rejected 
any ideas of "Eurafrica ", which in his eyes were only other 
devices of the neo- colonialistic threat to the African 
continent.93 
A careful review of Nkrumah's ideas of how to achieve 
African unity and his notion of such a united continent in 
90. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, Dondon, 1963, p.215. 
91.C,E. Welch, op.cit., p.22. 
92. Kwame Nkrumah, op.cit., p.172. 
93. Ibid., p.187. 
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its relationship to the existing territorial units reveals 
that his thoughts were far from being unequivocal. On one 
hand he advocated that even in a united Africa the "states 
would continue to exercise independent authority. "94 
Only a few pageslater in the same book he stated that with 
the existence of a political union of Africa "territorial 
boundaries which are the relics of colonialism will become 
obsolete and superfluous. "95 It was especially this 
latter attitude which led to suspicion on behalf of other 
African leaders about Nkrumah's sincerity. They could only 
see it as an attempt to veil his claim that a re- alignment 
of the political boundaries was necessary in the name of 
the principle of self- determination. Referring to this 
doctrine Nkrumah asserted that because of tribal 
affiliations Togo and parts of the Ivory Coast should be 
joined to Ghana.96 The problem of boundaries would not 
become entirely obsolete, even if continental unity could 
4064 
be achieved. The African continent would still have sub- 
divided if only for administrative purposes. Nkrumah's 
policy of trying to deal not only with his counterparts 
in other countries but also with the opposition groups 
aroused the suspicion of the African Heads of State and 
Government. The question of who in each country should be 
included in the efforts to achieve African unity was 
important especially in the first years of endeavours to 
94. Ibid., p.218. 
95. Ibid., p.221. It should be acknowledged that Nkrumah 
wrote his book "Africa Must Unite" for the purpose of 
conciliating the views of the "Casablanca" and 
Monrovia" group. 
96. Rupert Emerson, "Pan- Africanism ", in: International 
Organization, Vol.XVI, No. 2, 1962, p.278. 
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reach the goal of continental unity. And last but not 
least the African leaders accused Nkrumah of being such 
an ardent propagandist for African unity because of his 
ambition to become himself the leader of an African union.97 
Ghana's leadership and Nkrumah's ideas and style were 
unacceptable to most of his fellow colleagues. 
Nkrumah has definitely been the African leader 
who personified most of the traditions of Pan- Africanism. 
"He represents a synthesis of the various ideas which 
operated in the pan -African field during its first phase: 
Garveyite and DuBoisian conceptions, Marxist Socialist 
ideas induced by his studies, as well as his association 
with other Marxists such as the late George Padmore. "98 
The other most eminent advocate of Pan -Africanism 
in the "radical" group is Sekou Touré. He, like Nkrumah, 
adheres to the idea that African unity is the only weapon 
against the danger of neo- colonialism. For Sekou Touré 
economic and political independence are closely inter- 
twined. Africa can only accomplish the task of integrating 
her multitude of states into a United States of Africa by 
freeing herself from all forms of imperialism. She can 
only find this ultimate freedom if the African himself has 
"returned to his African culture and moral source to 
recover his own conscience, reconvert himself and his 
thoughts and his actions to the values, conditions and 
97. Ibid., p.288. 
98. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.277. 
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interests of Africans. "99 In this sense Sekou Touré 
clearly thinks on the same lines as Nkrumah. With his 
Ghanaian colleague he equally repudiates ideas of 
"Eurafrica" and he means a United States of Africa rather 
than mere co- operation between sovereign states when he 
talks about African unity. 
The great majority of African leaders can be found 
in the camp of the "moderates ". We will pick out a few 
who in varying degrees are representative in their thinking, 
namely Senghor, Houphouët- Boigny and Tubman. Leopold S. 
Senghor summarizes some of his attitudes towards African 
unity as follows: "African unity is not for tomorrow, not 
even in the form of a United States of Africa, for which I 
struggled. Let us speak only of Union, and try to 
regroup the independent African States on the basis of 
regional and cultural affinities. "100 In Senghor's mind 
this is the only realistic assessment of the possibilities 
for unity; Africa's leaders would deceive themselves if 
they underestimate the territorial nationalism. On the 
whole in his writing Senghor is preoccupied with his ideas 
of "Negritude ", in other words he looks for a reassertion 
of worthwhile African values - blending them with European 
ideas - in order to achieve Africa's cultural liberation as 
99. Ibid., p.270. 
100.L.S. Senghor, op.cit., p.10. 
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a prerequisite for any political liberation. 
His approach to unity is a gradual one, as he says 
himself: "Horizontal inter -African solidarity will 
gradually be established, by beginning at the beginning 
with economic and cultural relations, while vertical 
solidarity between ourselves and our European metropoles 
will be modified but not dissolved."101 His dream is 
one of rebuilding the former A.O.F. into a "nation 
négro- africaine d'expression francaise. "102 As far as 
the political side goes Eurafricanism and Pan- Africanism 
cannot be reconciled. A united Africa has to become 
politically and economically independent from Europe. 
But as far as the process of modernization is concerned, 
Africa cannot escape the influence of Western ideas. 
In the course of the years when a realization of his dream 
did seem to be unfeasible, Senghor turned towards co- 
operation with the moderate states in the Brazzaville and 
Monrovia- groupings. 
Another influential figure in these groupings is 
Houphouét- Boigny. His political ideas are based on a 
firm Eurafrican outlook. He believes in a close co- 
operation with Western Europe and especially France as a 
precondition of his country's development. He is very 
little concerned with neo- colonialism and does not talk 
much about the "African personality ", although he does 
not disregard certain "African modes of thought and conduct. "103 
101. Ibid., p.85. 
102. FranzNAnsprengeri "Nationsbildung im Schwarzen Afrika 
franzosischer Pragung ", in: Vierteljahreshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart, Heft 2, April 1963, p.185. 
103. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.263. 
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He is definitely no advocate of the radical stream of Pan- 
Africanism; the idea of a United States of Africa is 
purely Utopian in his view. Although Houphougt has used 
pan- African language when it seemed to him politically 
opportune, however, he can hardly be labelled a "Pan - 
Africanist". His main concern is with co- operation on 
the regional level for economic reasons for which the 
Conseil del'Entente seemed to be an appropriate entity. 
His co- operation with other African countries is clearly 
directed by the demands of his own country's economic 
requests. In contrast to the abovementioned leaders, he 
does not adhere to ideas of "Socialism ". He was one of 
the chief promoters of the "moderate" groups, considering 
and openly admitting that the development of the sovereign 
nation -state has priority over African unification. 
When it comes to Tubman's pan -African ideas there is 
a great affinity with Houphouët- Boigny's concepts. He is 
opposed to political unification saying "We must have 
unity in such a way that each nation retains its sovereignty."1°4 
He would only go as far as talking about regional economic 
and cultural co- operation as a prerequisite to political 
unity at the continental level.105 Taking into considera- 
tion the different cultural and social background, the 
different economic and political systems and the different 
political allegiances of the independent African countries 
leads him to the conclusion that only a functional approach 
to African unity is realistic. "....We advocate that type 
of African unity, and West African unity and solidarity in 
104. Quoted in R. Segal, op.cit., p.260. 
105. J.G. Liebenow, op.cit., p.l. 
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particular which is based upon treaties and conventions 
of friendship, on the basis of mutual respect and 
106 
This is hardly the equal consideration for all." 
language of a comitted Pan- Africanist. What he does is 
only to advocate orthodox means of improving the co- 
operation between neighbour states. In his attempt to 
achieve African unity he wanted to follow the West 
European pattern, i.e. political unity once a satisfactory 
level of supranational co- operation in the functional 
realm had been reached.107 In this period from 1958 to 
the foundation of the OAU, President Tubman with his 
functional approach to unity was found at the centre of 
pan- African activities. This prominence was partly owing 
to the fact that Liberia could claim a considerable amount 
of prestige being one of the oldest "independent" states 
and partly because President Tubman was anxious to avoid 
his country's isolation. 
It seems proper to end this exploration of the pan- 
African ideas of some African leaders with a short analysis 
of Nyerere's justifications for African unity. The 
Tanzanian President, "sans doute l'un des hommes politiques 
africains qui a le plus écrit pour justifier sa politique 
intérieure et extérieure ",108 does not easily fit into 
either category, i.e. "moderate" or "radical ". On one 
106. Ibid., p.10. 
107. Ibid., p.12. 
108. Frank Moderne, "Le Panafricanisme et la politique 
extérieure de la Tanzanie ", in: Revue francaise d'Etudes 
politique africaines, no. 62, February 1971, p.32. 
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hand he is a zealous advocate of this great Utopian idea, 
which places him in the neighbourhood of Nkrumah. On the 
other hand he is too much of a realist to believe that 
African unity can be achieved overnight.109 
It is well known that Nyerere was prepared to delay 
Tanganyika's independence in order that all East African 
territories would gain independence together as a federal 
unit.110 But, unfortunately, he found little support 
among African political elites who presumably saw that 
much of their influence would dwindle in a Federation and 
therefore wanted to go it alone.111 11 clear indication 
of Nyerere's realism in inter -African politics is expressed 
in a speech in Parliament on June 15, 1962, when he said: 
"Each area is groping towards unity using the circumstances 
available to itself, imposed upon it by history and by 
other reasons, but the object is one. It is unity for the 
whole continent." 
112 
In order to avoid a wrong picture 
it has to be pointed out that only a year later he had changed 
his attitude - the foundation of the OAU demanded a revision - 
allowing for regional groupings albeit within the framework 
of the continental organization.113 He wants Union Govern- 
ment, in so far that unity is necessary to fight both 
colonialism and neo- colonialism. But he believes that 
every committed Pan- Africanist faces a dilemma between 
109. Marion IVïushkat, "Some Characteristics of Colonialism 
and its Product African Nationalism ", in: African 
Studies Review, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 
Michigan, vol.XIV, no.2, Sept. 1971., p.236. 
110. J.S. Nye, op.cit., p.175. 
111. This obviously is only one of the reasons why Nyerere's 
proposal was not put into reality. 
112. Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Oxford University 
Press, Dar Es Salaam, 1966, p.173. 
113. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.590. 
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African consciousness and loyalty and the concern for his 
own nation's freedom and development. "In order to 
fulfil its responsibilities to the people it has led to 
freedom, each national government must develop its own 
economy, its own organizations and institutions, and its 
own dominant nationalism. This is true however devoted 
to the cause of African unity the different leaders may 
be. "114 He advocates gradual functional co- operation 
between the sovereign states because it might lead to 
political co- operation. On the other hand he can 
conceive of cases in which political integration in a part 
of Africa can precede intensive economic co- operation. 
All these possibilities must be kept in mind.115 
Whichever path is taken, African governments must make 
political decisions about the implementation of African 
unity, a task made all the more difficult because Africa 
is not likely to be left to herself but will face constant 
interference by non -African powers. On the whole Nyerere 
seems to have the most flexible approach to African unity 
of all the leaders dealt with in this summary. 
I did not provide an analysis of "pan -African" 
ideas as expressed by African leaders in great depth. 
Such an undertaking would have required a full picture of 
the internal systems and problems of each country, a 
114. Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Oxford 
University Press, Dar Es Salaam, 1968, pp.210 /211. 
115. Ibid., p.214. 
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background which necessarily influences attitudes towards 
African unity of the states' respective leadership. It 
can be contended that all African leaders pay at least lip 
service to pan -African ideas in one way or another. They 
all believe that African unity, if it can be achieved, is 
a valuable goal. But, when it comes to taking the step 
from ideas to the implementation of them by means of 
concrete political decisions the achievements are meagre. 
When it comes to political unity on the continental level, 
as will be seen in the summary of inter -African politics 
from 1957 -1963, results are painful to reach. Even if 
the leaders of African countries could overcome their 
cleavages caused by different ideas and different national 
interests, the pressures from outside the continent exert 
a strong influence on the process of unification. It is 
not only the different nuances of pan- African ideology which 
hinder pan -African unity, but the whole problem must be 
seen also in terms of the political interaction amongst poor 
countries in the throes of nation -building, and in terms of 
r 
their dependent relationship to the richer nations. 
16 
4) Inter- African Relations 1957 -1963 
If we have to summarize the results of the ensuing 
paragraphs dealing with inter -African relations 1957 -1963, 
we may well contend that the perception of "strength in unity" 
116. see Robin Jenkins, Exploitation, London, 1971, 
especially chapter 6: "Relations between poor 
Nations." 
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shared by all African leaders did not make their 
negotiations any easier. A long series of meetings was 
necessary to prepare the ground for a conference "uniting" 
all African states - that is to say "uniting" them all at 
one conference table. The political splits still 
lingered, as the elites in power in the territorial states 
learned quickly that many a point of friction existed 
between them impeding the development of co- operation and 
mutual good relations among their states. The fact 
"that while the inter- territorial links of colonial times 
crumble, the practical achievement in the establishment of 
new links between the independent states - despite much 
talk - is still meagre " 7 indicates an ambiguous story 
with its ups and downs for that part of the pan -African 
movement which Saenz calls its "continental phase ".118 
In this phase, Pan -Africanism is no longer concerned with 
Pan -Negroism but with promoting African unity in the realm 
of the African continent. 
The fragile and recently established boundaries and 
nation -states appeared much more durable than anticipated. 
Scholars like Arnold Rivkin, however, suggested that 
Africa's inherited colonial boundaries would become "one of 
the richest sources of actual and potential controversy 
and conflict."119 Once territorial independence was 
achieved, the newly independent states cast their main 
117. Arthur Hazlewood (ed.), African Integration and Dis- 
integration, Case Studies in Economic and Political 
Union, London, New York, Toronto, 1967, p.3. 
118. Paul Saenz, "The Organization of African Unity in the 
Subordinate African Regional System ", in: African 
Studies Review, vol. 13, no. 2, September 1970, p.206. 
119. Arnold Rivkin, The African Presence in World Affairs, 
New York, 1963, pp.10 -11. 
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interest upon nation -building and tackling their most 
urgent social and economic problems in the framework of their 
states. The leaders were, nevertheless, keen on enhancing 
their countries' prestige by successes in the field of 
foreign policy. They welcomed their newly acquired place 
in the world of nation- states as a means of proceeding 
with their own foreign policy. Nkrumah greeted this 
opportunity of foreign- policy -making "which from the first 
was defined as a dynamic process concerned with broader 
ends than merely the search for aid. "120 Released into 
independence, the leadership of most countries experienced 
a sensation of isolation and insecurity. Thus apart from 
the quest for unity, it was this feeling which made them 
search for allies. The creation of alliances was a way 
of trying to increase the national power of the new states.121 
Many of the leaders - at least the more "radical" ones - 
thus hoped to make Africa less dependent on the two great 
power blocs by strengthening diplomatic, political, economic 
and cultural ties within the continent and furthermore by 
attaining co- ordination among the African states' policy 
in international organizations.122 
In the context of this study, I cannot enter really 
deeply into the discussion of the problems of foreign- policy- 
making of countries which are economically dependent on the 
120. W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957 -1966 
op.cit., p.28. 
121. I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, op.cit., 196b, p.17. 
122. Marion Mushkat, "Problems of Political and Organizational 
Unity in Africa' in: African Studies Review, Vol.13, 
No.2, Sept. 1970, p.271. 
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capitalist world and left with little autonomy. Catherine 
Hoskyns gives a brief summary of the most striking facts 
impeding or at least rendering political unity on the 
continental level extremely difficult. "But against this 
(i.e. the factors in favour of unity) one must set the 
instability of the new states - most of them were still 
dealing with serious internal problems; the tendency for 
national politics to be built round "heroes" jealously 
guarding their own power, and most important of all, their 
almost total economic dependence on the outside world, a 
fact which severely limited both their freedom of action 
and their economic usefulness to one another. "123 
What can be stated is that analyses of the earlier 
years of foreign relations among African states have been, 
on the whole, too "euphoric" about the possibilities of 
these countries. Although these studies did not 
generally overlook the fact of the interdependence of 
economic, social and political development124 they failed 
to treat the international relations as a reflection of the 
countries' internal situation and colonial legacy. On the 
other hand, case studies dealing with various countries 
have revealed how little room constitutional independence, 
if not followed by economic independence, leaves for 
123. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration", in: A. 
Hazlewood,African Integration and Disintegration, 
op.cit., p.359. 
124. I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, op.cit., p.X. 
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independent foreign policy -making. The margin is very 
small with "very little basic difference between so- called 
'moderate' and 'radical' strategies ".125 The essence of 
this, as of many other intrinsic African problems, lies in 
the persistence of the colonial -inherited framework. 
African leaders had to come to grips with this situation, 
analyzing the wide range of obstacles derived from the 
colonial legacy and then start a struggle in order to 
escape from the system. This is not to say that the 
majority of the leaders actually went ahead with such a 
struggle. They all worked more or less in order to 
"mask the realities ", with "pan- African manoeuvres as one of 
their devices."126 
These few statements can only hint at the enormous 
problems one encounters in any analysis of African foreign 
policy. Putting things that bluntly obviously failsto 
make allowance for all the shades of differences that, 
nevertheless, do exist. How could it be otherwise taking 
into account that one deals with an increasing number of 
newly independent states. As long as the interrelation 
of the problems is constantly recalled we might get away 
with not giving a comprehensive picture. Such an attempt 
would involve detailed research work, trying to find the 
internal and external explanations and ramifications for 
every decision taken by an African government at a certain 
time furthering or impeding inter -African relations.127 
125. I follow Catherine Picciotto's criticism of the Zartman 
book International Relations in the New Africa and 
Vernon McKay i s book, African Diplomacy, in: Journal of 
Modern African Studies, vol. ö, no. 1, April 1970, 
p153/154. 
126. Ibid_, p.154. 
127. According to Borella: "D'avril 1958 á décembre 1961 
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This is not feasible for mainly two reasons: Firstly, 
there is a lack of material and documents necessary for 
such a detailed analysis. Secondly, it would deviate too 
far from the main concern of this study. 
In the context of this study the following summary 
of inter-African relations serves the purpose of answering 
above all three main questions: Firstly, did Pan - 
Africanism become a real continental movement? In other 
words, was the gulf between former French and British 
colonies closed and did the Arabic North of the continent 
become involved in the struggle for African unity? 
There is secondly the intriguing question "whether region- 
alism or ideology is exercising the greater pull in 
determining the make -up and character of African groupings "128 
or as Catherine Hoskyns sees the problem: "...is it better 
in the interest of continental unity, to form 'partial' 
or 'universal' organizations ; i.e. is it better to form 
an organization consisting of a nucleus of ideologically 
et pour s'en tenir aux rencontres de caractre politique 
(c'est -á -dire exclusion faite des rencontres á objet 
technique) plus de 80 rencontres bi- ou multilatérales 
et conférences inter -étatique ont eu lieu entre chefs 
d'Etats, de government ou leurs représentants de 
l'Afrique indépendante:' Francois Borella, "Les 
Regroupements d'Etats dans l'Afrique Indépendante ", 
in :Annuaire Francais de Droit International, vol. VII, 
1961, p.788 index. If we add that "entre janvier 
1962 et mai 1963, le chiffre approximatif est de 70 
rencontres ", a comprehensive analysis of African 
policy in the years under consideration would become 
a mammoth undertaking. Seegßoutros- Ghali, 
L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, Paris, 1969, 
p.II, index. 
128. E. Kloman, op.cit., p.389. 
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similar states (likely to reach agreement and act) while 
hoping that other states will be attracted and join, or 
is it better to form from the beginning an organization 
which includes all shades of opinion, even though the 
compromises this involves may jeopardize effective 
action? "129 
Asking the questions as Kloman and Hoskyns do, 
leaves us with a lot of sub -questions and inconsistencies. 
The simple dichotomy of "regionalism" and "ideology" as 
a means of achieving some form of unity among African 
states clouds a number of important problems. Advocating 
the regional approach to African unity, i.e. the idea that 
geographically adjacent states should form sub -groups 
regardless of their different internal political systems, 
could in itself become an ideology. On the other hand, 
those who suggest that sub -units should be built according 
to ideological affiliations are confronted with the geo- 
political realities. How could countries as far 
geographically apart as Guinea and Tanzania, for example, 
link up on the grounds of fairly similar ideologies? It 
seems inconceivable that they would be able to take any 
practical steps towards co- operation which would promote 
their development. At the most they might be able to 
co- ordinate their policies as far as making joint statements 
on foreign and international policy issues are concerned. 
Inter -African policy -making in regards to reaching the goal 
of African unity in the years between 1957 -1963 will give 
ample evidence of the sort of problems indicated previously. 
129. Catherine Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and integration" 
in: A. Hazlewood, African Integration and Disintegration 
op.cit., p.360. 
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And finally there is a third question. How far did the 
provisions that are later made part of the OAU Charter 
already appear in resolutions and charters adopted at 
preceding meetings? 
The Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) 
convened in Accra in April 1958 is not only the first 
pan -African meeting on African soil but also the starting 
point for a whole series of conferences taking place in 
the ensuing years. The presence of English - and French - 
speaking countries as well as Arabic ones demonstrated 
that attempts were made to involve countries with 
different colonial and cultural legacies in the process of 
promoting some form of continental solidarity and unity. 
The Accra Conference which brought together Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia and the 
United Arab Republic,130 was a step in the right direction. 
It took place because of the success of the diplomacy of 
Nkrumah and his advisers. A major task was to overcome 
Nasser's objection against such a meeting. He pleaded for 
an All People's Conference. But Nkrumah insisted on a 
meeting of representatives of internationally recognized 
states; however, his idea of a summit meeting of the Heads 
of State did not materialize. Apart from Liberia's 
President Tubman no other country was represented by its 
Head of Government.131 Given Nkrumah's dynamic personality 
and the fact that he was the host, it was easy for him to 
dominate this conference. 
If we look at the resolutions adopted at the conference- 
130. Carol A. Johnson, "Political and Regional Groupings in 
Africa ", in: International Organization, vol.16, no.2, 
1962, p.426. 
131. H. Strauch, Panafrika, op.cit., p.83/84. 
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table, they reproduce an atmosphere of harmony which was 
present at this gathering, '...Great care was taken in 
drawing up the resolutions to make sure that nothing was 
included that would make it difficult for present or 
future members to sign. "X32 To quote some of the key 
sentences of the Joint Declaration: "We resolve to 
preserve the unity of purpose and action in international 
affairs which we have forged among ourselves at this 
historic conference to safeguard our hard -won independence 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to preserve 
among ourselves a fundamental unity of outlook on foreign 
policy so that a distinctive African personality will play 
its part, in co- operation with other peace -loving nations, 
to further the cause of peace. ... to recognize the right 
of the African peoples to independence and self - 
determination and to take appropriate steps to hasten the 
realization of this right. "133 This was altogether a 
tame declaration but it at least reflected the agreement 
among African independent states that some co- ordination 
of their foreign policy must be achieved in order to take 
action on the international level in helping the liberation 
of the continent. Principles written down in the 
resolutions reappear in one form or another in all the 
major forthcoming conferences and furthermore became part 
of the OAU Charter.134 This discrepancy between what the 
132. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.361. 
133. Reprinted in: C. Legum, op.cit., p.139. 
134. For text of resolutions see ibid., p.140. 
-48- 
African governments pledged themselves to do and the 
actual achievement of unity was hardly surprising: 
resolutions cannot implement themselves. Moreover, they 
are often not intended to be more than window -dressing. 
If we turn our attention to the institutional or 
organizational machinery built up during the conference the 
result must be qualified as meagre. A CIAS was to be 
held every second year. In between these meetings contact 
was to be maintained through the states' permanent 
representatives at the United Nations. Furthermore, 
should problems between African states arise, they were to 
be dealt with at ad hoc meetings of foreign ministers or 
experts.135 9ny attempt to assess the first CIAS and 
its importance for the development of African unity must 
distinguish - as Woronoff does - between an "overwhelming 
emotional triumph" and a "limited tangible success ". "For, 
although the feelings and words conveyed ample solidarity 
and oneness of views, it was impossible to obtain any real 
commitment from the various states. There was no 
willingness to sacrifice dearly won sovereignty in the 
cause of unity nor to create genuine machinery that might 
disapprove of the policy of a sovereign state or ask it to 
fulfill pledges made on the altar of unity. "136 
Owing to the mildness of the expressed political 
135. C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.428. 
136. J. Woronoff, opocit., p.85. 
-49- 
opinions, a split on ideological grounds at this first 
conference of independent African states was prevented. 
As long as they stated in very general terms what they 
intended to achieve, e.g. to promote the independence and 
self -determination of all African people, they found 
agreement. However, had they tried to indicate concrete 
steps towards this goal, the prevailing concordia would 
not have been sustained. 
The second CIAS took place in Addis Ababa in June 
1960. The membership of this meeting was enlarged 
compared with the first conference held two years ago but 
the result was basically marked by the same difficulties 
encountered at the first meeting. Taking into considera- 
tion that ideological splits had manifested themselves 
in the previous year, it is all the more surprising that 
the adopted resolutions were again able to bridge the gap. 
On the other hand no advancement in the question of 
organizing African unity was achieved.137 Resolution 
No. 7 "Promotion of African Unity" stated that "the CIAS 
requests the President of the CIAS to address a communica- 
tion to the Heads of these states to initiate consultations 
through diplomatic channels with a view to promoting 
African Unity. "138 The extremely delicate wording of the 
resolution strongly suggests that the conference did not 
dare to put any pressure upon the Heads of State. 
"Through the diplomatic channels" indicates that the African 
politicians in power did not set out on any "revolutionary" 
137. H. Strauch, Panafrika,...op.cit., p.93. 
138. Reprinted in C. Legum, op.cit., p.152. 
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path towards the promotion of unity. They were probably 
keen to demonstrate their ability as young states to handle 
their problems in the established way of international 
policy- making. 
The decision on an adequate framework for African 
unity had to be put off because no compromise between 
the partisans of the two extremes - federalists and 
functionalists - could be reached. The whole discussion 
culminated in an exchange between the Ghanaian 
representative Ako Adjei and the Nigerian Maitima Sule. 
Adjei appealed for "the complete political union of 
African states" while Mr. Sule maintained that "at this 
moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is 
premature. "139 Many of the moderate leaders were opposed 
to the methods with which the radicals tried to impose 
their form of union. 
Without going into a detailed analysis we can agree 
with Zartman's assessment that "the Second CIAS had little 
effect on African relations. "140 Although it helped to 
co- ordinate Africa's policy in the United Nations, it did 
not bring about any form of organizational frame for 
African unity. There was not even any mentioning of a 
United States of Africa or of a regional federation.141 
It suffices in our context to name but a few other attempts 
of promoting African unity before the end of 1960 when 
especially on the part of the newly independent former 
139. cited in: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.XII, 
1959 -60, p.ì7554. 
140. I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the new Africa, 
op.cit., p.27. 
141. C. Legum, op.cit., p.42. 
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French colonies the principle of universality was given 
up. Instead they aimed at forming organizations con- 
sisting of states sharing a certain level of common 
objectives and common attitudes.142 
The First All African Peoples Conference (AAPC) held 
in Accra in December 1958 with the participation of 200 
representatives of 50 African political parties, trade 
unions, student movements, and other organizations143 
was following the tradition of Nasser's Afro -Asian People's 
Solidarity Conference. The composition of participants 
suggests "that the grass -roots leaders, previously on the 
outside looking in, were also consulted about questions 
that affected them as much as the first -string leader - 
ship."144 Radical leaders like Nkrumah who were 
certainly disappointed by the mildness of the CIAS- 
Resolutions must have been satisfied by the more outspoken 
statements which were adopted at this conference. 
Colonialism and racialism were heavily condemned and 
tribalism and religious separatism designated as obstacles 
to the liberation and political development of Africa. 
The leaders pledged themselves to give more active support 
to the liberation movements. In the realm of African 
unity they blamed the artificial boundaries for impeding 
the realisation of unity on the continent. In its 
resolution on "Frontiers, Boundaries and Federations" it 
stated "that the Conference: a) endorses Pan -Africanism 
142. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
P.364. 
143. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 
p.16612. 
144. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.85. 
Vol.XII, 1959-60, 
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and the desire for unity among African peoples; 
b) declares that its ultimate objective is the evolution 
of a Commonwealth of Free African States." It further- 
more advocated that the goal of unity could be reached by 
means of regional federations provided that they "should 
not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan - 
African Commonwealth by hardening as separate entities. "145 
On the organizational side a permanent basis was 
given to the AAPC by establishing a professionally staffed 
All African Peoples Organization Secretariat in Accra.146 
(On the organizational side a permanent basis was given 
to the AAPC by establishing a professionally staffed All 
African Peoples Organization Secretariat in Accra.1 
On paper the AAPC seemed to have been much more 
successful in promoting African unity; after all, it 
explicitly mentioned the goal of a "Commonwealth of Free 
African States ", a concept never spoken of at the CIAS 
conferences.147 But no matter how unanimously the 
"radical" resolutions were adopted by the conference 
representatives, they lacked any form of coercion to enforce 
the implementation of these adopted political guide lines 
by the independent African states. Ghana and Guinea tried 
to do so, making themselves suspicious in the eyes of many 
of the other countries as they took charge of the AAPC 
organization.148 The AAPC can be seen as an endeavour 
"to conduct and determine intra- African relations on the 
basis of political organization, independent of state 
145. Reprinted in C. Legum, op.cit., p.230. 
146. A. Johnson, op.cit., p.431. 
147. C. Legum, op.cit., p.43. 
148. C. Hoskyns, "Pan-Africanism and Integration", op.cit., 
p.363. 
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action. "149 "Despite its more energetic program, the 
AAPO was actually less effective than the CIAS. "150 
What had emerged in the earlier years after Ghana's 
independence was a pattern which showed that any progress 
towards African unity rested primarily with the govern- 
ments of the independent states. The fact that there was 
a CIAS on one hand and an AAPC on the other showed that 
the independent African states wanted to distinguish them- 
selves from nationalist movements in colonial states, even 
though they sought to help their non -independent brethren. 
Those movements could not really be considered the political 
equals of sovereign states.151 They could not enter into 
binding inter -state agreements with the newly independent 
countries. 
The dominance of the independent states in policy - 
making was also apparent in the AAPC movement. These 
conferences were a meeting ground for three basic groups: 
African nationalists from non -independent countries "whose 
revolutionary ardor was often tactical and hence temporary ", 
leaders of "revolutionary" independent states "whose 
militancy was often tempered by the exigencies of diplomacy 
and the reality of world economic pressures", and radical 
opposition movements in independent African states. This 
last group was the most militant at the meetings but at the 
same time the least powerful. "While this third group 
149. I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa 
oD.cit., p.17: "The fact that government parties were 
frequently represented did not alter this characteristic, 
for the AAPO was to have its greatest activity - in the 
absence of any real effectiveness - among splinter 
groups opposing colonial or independent African 
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often dominated the conferences and gave the tone to the 
resolutions, it was the second group (the governments) 
that dominated the structure and held the purse strings. "152 
Progress on the path towards African unity depended on the 
readiness of the governments of the independent states to 
co- operate with one another. African unity was not to be 
the focal point that would rally revolutionary movements 
and states, but it was to be an alliance of the independent 
states.153 
Two attempts to come to grips with political union 
in Africa deserve to be listed in this short summary: the 
Union of African States and the Sanniquellie Declaration. 
The first was the unsuccessful action to merge into 
political union the independent states of Ghana, Guinea 
and Mali, three countries whose political leaders, after 
all, were "on full agreement" on a number of questions of 
foreign policy and shared a similar outlook as far as 
their internal policies were concerned. Even given this 
considerable "harmony" these leaders faced the dilemma 
governments." and see also C. Hoskyns, "Pan - 
Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., p.363: "The 
situation was not improved by the fact that the French 
African and Nigerian ruling parties were convinced 
that facilities established in Accra to assist the 
liberation movements were also being made available 
to the opposition parties in their own countries." 
150. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.89. 
151. I. Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity, op.cit., 
p.27. It is worthwhile reminding ourselves that a 
major breakthrough to this tendency came as late as 
the 1972 OAU summit meeting in Rabat. As The Times 
reported: "On the liberation front a great deal more 
respect than usual was paid to leaders of liberation 
movements. They were allowed to help in the drafting 
of resolutions concerning their countries and even 
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between commitment to interstate unification and the drive 
of nationbuilding. "The Pan -African ideology predisposed 
the leaders to think in terms of suprastate unification, 
while the exigencies of national unity forced them to pay 
a great deal of attention to domestic issues154 
On November 23, 1958, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré 
announced with vague terms the establishment of a union 
between their two countries. For Guinea the closer 
attachment with Ghana was a means to overcome the country's 
isolation and gain help from Ghana, while Nkrumah sought 
the opportunity to show his readiness to link his country 
with others in Africa.155 The two leaders conceived 
their "union" as a nucleus of a Union of West Africa. 
When the contents of the Union's structure was published 
in May 1959, it stated that "each State or Federation which 
is a member of the Union shall preserve its own individual- 
ity and structure. "X56 It was not more than an attempt 
to co- ordinate above all the foreign policy in matters 
concerning African unification of the member states. 
Giving up any sovereign rights was out of the question,157 
although the provision was made for gradually surrendering 
part of the sovereignty if agreed by the member states. 
admitted to a closed session of the summit when heads 
of delegations were allowed to bring only two advisers 
and hundreds of delegates were excluded." The Times, 
17 June 1972, p.5. 
152. I. Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity, op.cit., 
p.52. 
153. Ibid., p.42. 1544E. Welch, Jr., op.cit.,p.293. 
155. Ibid., p.299. 
156. Reprinted in C. Legum, op.cit., p.160. 
157. "Only in the economic field was there any hint of 
institutional links or eventual supranationality ": 
J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.90. 
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The reasons why this union was doomed to failure 
are manifold; in our context it suffices to list but a 
few. One of the most important factors was that both 
leaders had different ideas about their countries' role 
in the union.158 There was the fact that the two states 
were geographically non -contiguous. They had a 
completely different colonial history and legacy, with 
different languages and different governmental systems. 
Moreover, their level of development and modernization 
was uneven.159 In order to give the Union a greater 
chance of achieving something, provisions had to be made 
for greater policy co- ordination. No meetings of Heads 
of State were foreseen and the states were "represented in 
one another's capitals by relative nonentities as resident 
ministers." 160 Under these auspices it was not surprising 
that nothing was achieved. 
In April, 1961, Nkrumah, Sekou Touré and Modibo 
Keita signed a charter formally establishing a tripartite 
Union of African States.161 As its supreme executive 
organ a conference of Heads of State was formed aided by 
preparatory and economic committees. A permanent 
secretariat was not established.162 Again there was no 
question of abandoning sovereignty which the states had 
only acquired a few years ago but rather it was an action 
to promote the basis for a common policy which might, in 
the future, lead to a closer union. Even if the union of 
158. C.E. Welch Jr., op.cit., p.304. 
159. I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, op.cit., p.23. 
160. Ibid., p.127. 161. C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.443 
162. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.103. 
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African States caused no changes in the structures of 
their member states "the results of the Ghana- Guinea- 
Union and its successors must be sought in its effects on 
African Unity, not through a simple, but sterile, analysis 
of institutions. "163 Viewed under such an aspect, it 
can be stated that these attempts kept the quest for unity 
alive. But it made equally clear by its failure to 
achieve closer union, i.e. to merge the institutional 
set -up of three sovereign states, that closer inter - 
African co- operation can only be reached step by step. 
At the end of a long march there could be some form of 
institutionalized co- operation whose form is impossible 
to predict. The "step by step" approach does by no 
means indicate that there will be a flow of continuous 
achievements until the peak is reached. Set -backs are 
bound to occur. "Only the government of Ghana, as a 
result of the strong beliefs of her President, continued 
to support the concept of political unification as late as 
the Addis Ababa Conference ",164 while Guinea's and Mali's 
policy was much more pragmatic in this respect. 
Although the proclamation of the Ghana- Guinea 
Union was no more than a political gesture, it was enough 
to worry and alarm adjacent states, namely Liberia, whose 
President Tubman feared isolation and disliked a set -up of 
African union in which he had no part in designing.165 
163.C.E. Welch Jr., op.cit., p.326. 
164. Ibid., p.327/328. 
165. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.91. 
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Consequently, he invited his opposite numbers, Nkrumah 
and Sekou Touré, to meet him in the Liberian village of 
Sanniquellie in order to discuss views on African unity. 
Liberia's President was known to have strong reservations 
about political unification.166 
The three leaders conferred extensively for three 
days and reached a compromise on 19 July 1959, endorsed in 
the Sanniquellie Declaration. It contained a pledge to 
work together to achieve the formation of a "Community of 
Independent African States ".167 As could not have been 
expected otherwise, the Declaration is void of any supra- 
national characteristics as far as the "Community" is 
concerned. "Each State and Federation, which is a member 
of the Community shall maintain its own national identity 
and constitutional structure. The Community is being 
formed with a view to achieving unity among independent 
African States. It is not designed to prejudice the 
present or future international policies, relations 
and obligations of the States involved. "168 While some 
statements on political questions not directly related to 
African unity were reflections of the more militant 
positions of Nkrumah and Touré, as far as African unity 
was concerned the Declaration was a clear victory for 
166. Claude E. Welch Jr., op.cit., p.305. 
167. Carol A. Johnson, op.cit., p.445. 
168. Reprinted in C. Legum, op.cit., p.162. Another 
important point is the pledge to non-interference 
in the internal affairs of member states. 
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Tubman's "functionalist" approach to unification.169 He 
rejected Nkrumah's speed and manner of approach to African 
unity. 
The ensuing years leading to the foundation of the 
OAU show the importance of this Declaration, when it was 
made evident that "the Charter signed at Addis Ababa was 
essentially a triumph of the functional approach put 
forward by President Tubman of Liberia. "170 Sanniquellie 
was in a way the first major sign of defeat for Nkrumah's 
radical version of African unity. On the other hand it 
is significant that theSaüniquellie Declaration developed 
out of disagreement between Pan -Africanista over the best 
means for achieving unity in Africa. 
The years of 1960/61 saw a number of events and 
developments in Africa which brought to an end a 
situation in which, despite disagreements on a variety of 
political questions, the independent African states 
continued to share a common platform through the CIAS, 
their representatives at the UN, and through the AAPC. 
More or less antagonistic groups began to emerge.171 
In a sense, Africa resembled the rest of the world. "La 
societé internationale tout entire est victime de ce 
phénomene. Le régionalisme international, c'est -A-dire 
169. J.G. Liebenow, op.cit., p.20. 
170. Ibid., p.22. 
171. B. Boutros -Ghali calls it "double balkanization ", i.e. 
Africa was not only divided into numerous states but 
also became chopped up in rival groups. see: B. Boutros- 
Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.9. 
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le regroupement d'Etats sur des bases strictement 
objectives - géographiques - n'a pas resiste aux grands 
clivages politiques qui traversent les régions naturelles 
du globs "?72 In any event, among the major occurrences 
which interrupted the co- operation between Africa's 
independent states were the sudden independence of thirteen 
French African territories and the Congo crisis, i.e. the 
breakdown of the Central Government's authority in this 
territory. 
This survey's limited scope does not allow for a 
full discussion of these and other relevant phenomena. We 
are confronted with a kind of chain -reaction leading to the 
establishment of opposing groups. This development was 
encouraged by the politics of the former colonial powers, 
Great Britain and France, both of whom hoped that the 
formation of blocs of their own choice would enable their 
continued influence of developments on the continent. 
Britain, who supported Ghana's efforts of pan- African 
activities in the 1950's turned her back on Nkrumah and his 
revolutionary demands and approached Nigeria. This 
country, with her pro- Western policy a better suited 
partner, could count on London's assistance for the 
foundation of the Monrovia- Group.173 France tried to 
prevent the formation of an organization which incorporated 
the whole continent. When the foundering of the Communauté 
172. F. Borella, "Le Régionalisme Africain et l'OUA", in: 
Annuaire Francaiso de Droit International, vol.IX, 
17-6377777B39. 
173. R.J. Guiton, "Afrikas Streben nach Einigkeit 1962/64" 
p24, in: Europa- Archiv, Folge 1, 1965. 
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became evident and bilateral solutions did not seem to be 
the answer, France looked for institutionalized co- 
operation with her former colonies by means of associating 
them with the EEC. This secured her continuous influence 
in this group of African states.174 
The formation of the Brazzaville group or UAM, which 
grew out of a meeting held in Abidjan in order to discuss 
the possibility of mediation on the part of the former 
French African states in the Algerian conflict, introduced 
two new elements into African politics: only a restricted 
number of states were invited and secondly "a deliberate 
attempt was made to create a bloc of African states. "175 
Unity movements now took the "merely diplomatic and 
tactical form of 'bloc alliances' named after the capitals 
where they were formed."176 
The UAM was the first group to emerge; it is "une 
organisation de coopération politique, une union d'Etats. "177 
After the breakdown of the federations of French West and 
French Equatorial Africa and the Communauté a majority of 
the independent states were seeking a new identity, a 
structure to bridge the void and find a form of regrouping. 
Partial regroupings and bilateral relations between the 
African states or everyone of them and France - and through 
France with the EEC - seemed unsatisfactory to many of the 
174. Ibid.. p.25. It would require an elaborate study to 
prove the French influence and coercion in forming the 
UAM. But given France's interests such an interference 
is likely. 
175. C. Legum, op.cit., p.50. 
176. B. Davidson, op.cit., p.64. 
177. Guy Feuer, "Les Conférences Africaines et l'Organisation 
de la Communauté Africo- Malgache d'expression francaise" 
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leaders. "It was necessary both to secure all the 
advantages of federalism and to obviate its dangers - in 
other words to neutralize its centralizing and unitarian 
tendencies, which, even when they do not result in the 
hegemony of one state over the others, nevertheless, drain 
each associated state little by little of its internal 
autonomy. "178 
When the twelve former French colonies met in March 
1961 in Yaoundé, after two preceding preparatory conferences 
in Abidjan and Brazzaville, they formed the UAM which took 
the character of a group whose members were tied together 
by "ideological sympathies and common objectives rather 
than regional proximity. "X79 The diverse conventions 
signed rejected all ideas of supranationality and were 
based on a system of co- operation and harmonisation of 
policies. It was more than a "simple alliance" but less 
than a "confederation classique 
".180 
The main emphasis 
was laid on institutionalizing economic co- operation and 
co- ordinating development plans.181 In the field of inter - 
African relations everything was geared towards reinforcing 
the status quo which implied the protection of the 
sovereignty of states. "There was no commitment, even in 
the distant future, to African unity, and no support for 
in :Annuaire Francais de Droit International, vol. VII, 
1961, p.717. 
178. Gabriel d'Arboussier, "Developments in French Speaking 
West Africa ", in David P. Currie (ed.), Federalism and 
the New Nations of Africa, Chicago, 1964, pp.123 -124. 
179. C. Hoskyns, "Pan-Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.364. 
180. G. Feuer, op.cit., p.786. 
181. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.97. 
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Liberation movements." 
182 Nevertheless, the states kept 
their door open for other countries willing to join by 
accepting the charter. As far as the setting up of a 
permanent machinery went, the one political organ was the 
Conference of Heads of State and Government which was to 
meet twice a year. Provision was also made for an 
"administrative" secretary- general.183 Both institutions 
were to reappear in the OAU Charter. The Brazzaville 
group is the best example that ideological affinity and a 
common colonial legacy combined with a remaining strong 
pressure from the former mother country are greater pulls 
than regionalism. "The personal relations between the 
African leaders, largely of the same generation, background, 
and outlook, as well as of similar former links with France 
(and especially with General de Gaulle personally), were 
still too important in fact and potential for them not to 
seek some institutional form for their preservation. "184 
Since no other institutional and political alternative to 
establish a pan -African body had emerged, this seemed to be 
the most logical consequence. The Brazzaville states had 
to take advantage of the fact that a level of common 
objectives and attitudes prevailed amongst its leaders. 
182. C. Hoskyns "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.364. 
183. C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.435. 
184. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.96. 
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The dominant drive behind their policies was not pan - 
African but the desire to maintain friendly relations with 
France. Another important reason for their move was their 
feeling "that unless they joined forces they would be 
unable to make any impact either in Africa or on the inter- 
national scene, against the increasing criticism and in 
some cases actual threats of the other African states."185 
A case in which they felt that the voice of "moderate" 
Africa should be made known was the Congo crisis and this 
was one of the major purposes for convening a conference 
in Brazzaville. 
The answer to Brazzaville was Casablanca. Morocco, 
reacting against the sponsorship given to Mauritania by 
the Brazzaville group, took the initiative in calling a 
summit meeting. Again only a limited number of states was 
invited.186 Certainly each country was pursuing her own 
interest by accepting the invitation, but they shared the 
basic belief that Africa's independence could only be 
finally achieved and maintained through a successful end 
to the Algerian war, a defeat of the Congo separatists, and 
the building of a counterbalancing force against the 
influence of the Brazzaville group. 
Although no full account of the Congo crisis in its 
internal and international dimension is necessary in this 
185. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.364. 
186. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, The United Arab Republic, Libya, 
the host Morocco and the Provisional Government of 
Algeria took part. (Ceylon sent her ambassador in 
Cairo). see C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.437. 
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study, it is useful to look at it from the point of view 
of pan -African repercussions. It cannot be denied that the 
Congo problem was one of the causes which re- inforced the 
trend towards partial groups dividing the African continent. 
It revealed and intensified clearly the fissures existing 
among African states. The first experiment in practical 
pan- Africanism which - in Hoskyns' view - the Congo crisis 
provided for the African states unfortunately only 
accentuated their divisions.187 In the earlier months of 
the crisis it seemed as if Africa could avoid a split on 
this issue. In the early days of UN intervention there 
was a "heartening show of African unity at the UN".188 
But after the fissure in the Central Government between 
Kasavubu and Lumumba had occurred and Dag Hammerskôld 
refused to crush the Katanga secession with the help of the 
UN force, there was room for disagreement. The Brazzaville 
states sided more or less openly with Kasavubu, called for 
mediation and a round -table conference which would bring all 
the different Congo factions together, and rejected the idea 
of political intervention by African states in the Congo.189 
In the Casablanca group a pro- Lumumbist attitude prevailed. 
Nevertheless, although willing to co- ordinate their policies, 
they took different stands. The most "radical" headed by 
Guinea wanted to withdraw their contingents from the UN 
187. C. Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, January 1960 
to December 1961, Zondon, New York, Toronto, 1965, p.471. 
188. Vilest Africa, No.2274, 31 December 1960, p.1470,Vo, SFSf 
18g. ... "What is required in the Congo is that no other state 
intervenes in her domestic affairs through the inter- 
mediary of soldiers or diplomats." see C. Legum, op.cit., 
p.180. 
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forces in the Congo, a policy which Nkrumah resisted, and 
he was able to restrain the radicals.190 On the whole 
Africa's real influence in the Congo crisis was limited. 
"The Congo operation was run through the Security Council, 
where the great powers had a privileged position, and in 
the field through the Secretariat. Africa was largely on 
the sidelines. "191 Although some of the disagreement in 
the Congo crisis was polarized along the two blocs of 
Brazzaville and Casablanca, both groups harboured internal 
divergences. There were also countries not closely 
associated with either group. The Congo crisis had made 
it clear that there was disunity in Africa, but it would 
be false to assume that this was the only reason for the 
split. 
When we look at the Casablanca group and the different 
motives of its members in attending the conference, we must 
have doubts whether there was much cohesive substance to 
give the group a sustaining strength. The conference 
suited Nkrumah's desire "to build African unity, outwards 
this time, from a small nucleus of commited states. "192 
Looking at the suggestions on organizing African 
unity embodied in an "African Charter of Casablanca" it is 
obvious, in fact, that the assumptions upon which the 
structural framework on which the Casablanca group as a 
cornerstone for African unity was laid did not differ sub- 
stantially from those of the UAM. "What was different was 
190. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.61. 
191. ibid., p.62. 
192. C. Hoskyns, "Pan -Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
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the use to which Casablanca states put their organization, 
for while the UAivi states were essentially inward -looking 
and defensive, the Casablanca group was militant and 
determined to press its point of view in Africa and 
outside. "193 The "Charter" enunciated the need for 
vigilance against neocolonialism, pledged the signers to a 
policy of non -alignment and urged members to rid Africa of 
political and economic intervention and pressures. On the 
organizational side the main body was a permanent African 
consultative assembly, three permanent functional committees: 
political (Heads of State), economic (ministers of economic 
affairs) and cultural (ministers of education) as well as 
a joint high command were to be established.194 Nothing 
in this set -up indicates that it could bring about 
"unification" as opposed to mere co- ordination of policy. 
"What stood in the way of eventual joining this grouping 
by other countries were the principles rather than the 
loose organizational structure. "195 
Casablanca in its turn led to Monrovia. The 
conference was the largest single gathering of African states 
with twenty countries being represented.1g6 Although the 
split into rival groups gave evidence of increasing polar- 
ization in Africa, the efforts made by leading statesmen on 
the continent to reunite all African states in one pan- African 
organization never came to a halt. Monrovia was the attempt 
to enlarge the "moderate" alliance. "Such states as 
193. Ibid., pp.365/366. 
194. C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.438. 
195. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.99. 
196. Cameroun, Central Afr .Rep.,Chad,Congo(Brazzaville), 
Dahomey, Ethiopia, IvoryCoast, Liberia, Libya,Malagasy Repuhl i c, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,SierraLeone,Somalia, 
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Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Nigeria sought to avoid 
isolation, but did not feel at home among the radicals of 
Casablanca or the Gaullist Frenchspeakers of Brazzaville. "197 
In the aftermath of Casablanca leaders like Tubman, 
Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny and Tafawa Balewa prepared for a 
truly pan- African summit. They were not interested in 
creating a new group. All states apart from the Congo - 
Léopoldville and Algeria, the two main subjects of dis- 
cussion, were invited. One even succeeded in getting 
S. Touré's and M. Keita's agreement to join the more 
moderate leaders in sponsoring the meeting.198 Put under 
pressure by Nkrumah,X99 his partners, however, withdrew 
protesting the exclusion of Algeria from the conference 
table.200 For failure of being an "all African meeting" 
this conference "went down in the history as one more step 
towards the schism."201 
When the abovementioned twenty states assembled in 
Liberia's capital in May 1961, the conference limited its 
agenda to basic principles and scheduled a second meeting 
in Lagos to work out a concrete charter of African unity. 
The keynote of the speeches was on African unity with four 
major items under discussion: means of promoting better 
understanding and co- operation towards achieving African 
unity, threats to peace and stability on the continent, 
Togo, Tunisia and Upper Volta. see: C.A. Johnson, 
op.cit., p.439. 
197. I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, 
op.cit., p.30. 
198. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.99 /100. 
199. Nkrumah showed little enthusiasm to attend a meeting 
which promised not to be inclined to follow his political 
ideas about African unity. His fears were somehow 
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establishment of a special machinery for dispute - 
regulation in Africa, and Africa's possible contributions 
to world peace.202 The general view expressed in the 
resolutions was that any form of unity could only come about 
through a voluntary process. The goal of establishing a 
community of economic interest and social intercourse 
indicated a clearly functional approach. Among the 
principles to govern the relationship between African 
states were listed 1) absolute equality of states, 
2) non -interference in the internal affairs and 3) respect 
for the sovereignty of each state.203 As far as the 
settlement of inter -African conflicts was concerned, the 
peaceful settlement of disputes should be eased by the 
creation of a commission to which litigations could be 
submitted.204 On the burning problems in Africa, Algeria 
and the Congo, moderate resolutions were passed, calling 
for Algeria's independence through negotiations and con- 
demning the interference of African states in the Congo.205 
On the organizational side no step was taken to institution- 
alize the potential grouping of Monrovia. The door for the 
justified. The conference turned out to be a kind of 
"anti -Nkrumah" forum rejecting any idea of leadership in 
Africa by a single state. see: C. Legum, op.cit., p.53. 
200. Morocco abstained because of Mauritania's presence. 
see: I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, op.cit., p.71. 
201. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p100. 
202. C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.440. 
203. C. Legum, op.cit., p.198. 
204. Ibid., p.201. 
205. Ibid., p.199. 
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non- attending states should be left widely open. 
Leaving Nkrumah's extremist concept aside, a com- 
parison between the principles of African unity as expressed 
in Monrovia and those laid down in the "Casablanca Charter" 
reveals that the gap between the two groups was minimal.206 
The fundamental obstacle to the early institutionalization 
of Pan -Africanism was not so much disagreement on the 
desirability and nature of African unity as it was the 
cumulative effect of disputes and disagreements which had 
little to do with incompatible approaches to African unity. 
But it is a fallacy to try to separate the two issues, i.e. 
institutionalization of Pan -Africanism and controversial 
political attitudes and ideologies concerning the wide 
range of internal and international policies. 
The final step on the road to Addis Ababa was taken 
in January 1962 when again twenty states met in Lagos. 
The moderate leaders were in the same position as in 
Monrovia. Azikiwe told the conference that the Casablanca 
powers had to give public avowal to the principles governing 
the relationship of African states as confirmed in Monrovia 
in order to bridge the ideological gap between the two 
camps.207 Based on the ideas of non -interference and 
strict limitations in the field of functional co- operation, 
a draft charter providing for the following three principal 
206. With the exception that the Lagos charter did not make 
room for supranational organs like the proposed African 
consultative assembly in the Casablanca Charter. 
207. They were the same countries with the exclusion of Libya 
and Tunisia but with the inclusion of the Congo- Leopold- 
ville and Tanganyika. The Casablanca group abstained 
again because the Algerian Provisional Government was 
not invited. see: C.A. Johnson, op.cit., p.442. 
-71- 
organs: 
1) an assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
2) a council of ministers and 
3) a secretariat headed by a Secretary -General with 
clearly delineated responsibilities208 
was presented by Liberia and approved by the conference. 
However, it was only to be ratified after intensive dis- 
cussions with the Casablanca powers. It was hoped that 
all African states would adopt the charter eventually. 
When this could not be achieved, in December 1962 the 
Monrovia states met again and adopted the charter for their 
"Inter- African and Malagasy Organization ". 
It can be stated that the conference in Addis Ababa 
leading to the foundation of the OAU was finally made 
possible in May 1963 for three major reasons: 
1) there was not much difference between the structure of 
the three groupings: Casablanca, Brazzaville and 
Monrovia; 
2) the primarily political Casablanca group crumbled, when 
some of the causes which led to its establishment faded 
away. Casablanca was never more than a timely limited 
political front and not a real organization. In the 
long run such countries as Morocco and Libya were not 
prepared to follow the same political line as Ghana and 
the United Arab Republic; 
208. Ibid., pp.442/443. 
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3) with Algeria's independence and the end of the first 
Congo crisis two major reasons for splitting Africa 
into opponent political camps had disappeared. 
When advocates of reconciliation began to rise in both 
camps and Nkrumah joined their efforts, the summit 
conference was only a question of time. "After three 
years of strife, Africa had come back to the starting- point. 
It had learned a lot in the meantime. And it was willing 
both to sacrifice - and compromise - for unity. 
"209 
The years gone by had given evidence that there is 
no such thing amongst African states as a "natural harmony 
of things' 
210 
The African politicians did not only need 
to fight against the odds of a colonial legacy but also 
against additional barriers which very quickly emerged 
among the states. Only if they could find a common 
denominator would they be able to erect some form of 
institutional framework for their co- operation. They would 
be undoubtedly spurred into action by pan-African ideas. 
However, the first part of this chapter gave some indications 
that Pan-Africanism is not a clearly defined concept 
interpreted in the same manner by all those who claim to 
adhere to this tradition but rather a diffuse conglomeration 
of ideas. To find some form of organizational framework 
for co- operation is a political task of statesmanship in a 
search for a common denominator. 
The system of international relations in Africa is 
209. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.123. 
210. ibid., p.121. 
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one of mobility. Alliances and counteralliances are of 
little longevity. A shift in the leadership of one 
country can trigger off a change in the system of inter- 
national relations as can changes in the international 
political climate. There is yet no such thing as a 
permanent bloc system that splits the African states 
making political co- operation on a continent -wide basis 
impossible. I do not want to belittle the difficulties 
African leaders are facing in their struggle to find some 
form of co- operation. The following chapters bear evidence 
of the difficulties, shortcomings and pitfalls involved in 
the problems of setting up an organization and in tackling 
the questions of conflict settlements. Although there are 
some constant quantities like the colonial legacy, the 
problems of underdevelopment, the low degree of power avail- 
able to individual states and the interference of non - 
African forces into the politics of the continent, other 
factors change. Therefore it is best to base any general 
assumptions on concrete case studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
When the thirty Heads of State and Government 
finally met in Addis Ababa1 everything was overshadowed 
by the will to overcome the split among the African states. 
That this was by no means an easy undertaking was revealed 
during the sittings of the conference where the differences 
of opinion as to the character of African unity were 
difficult to smooth over. 
I do not propose to give a detailed account of the 
preceding preparatory conference of the foreign ministers 
or of the summit meeting in Addis Ababa as such. The main 
interest in this chapter will be focused on certain aspects 
of the adopted charter of the OAU, mainly those relevant 
in our analysis of inter -African conflict solutions in the 
context of the formulated objectives for the OAU. Other 
ideas and actions forming part of the Charter and the 
Organization and its machinery are only touched on as far 
as they help to explain the importance given to inter - 
African political co- operation. The OAU provides Africa 
with an institutional framework and forum for interaction 
in order to promote co- operation and resolve problems of 
mutual interest.2 
1. Morocco only sent an observer and the Togolese President 
Grunitzky was refused membership. see H. Strauch, 
Panafrika, op.cit., p.153. 
2. P. Saenz, op.cit., p.222. 
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The unifying strand running through this chapter 
is the question: what sort of a "tool" is the OAU as 
regards her role as a "peace- maker" in inter -African 
conflicts? The answers to these problems provide us 
with the second pillar - the first one being the ideas 
and history of Pan- Africanism and African unity as dealt 
with in the first chapter - on which to base our final 
assessment of the OAU's failures and achievements in 
mediating in inter -African conflicts. 
Some other questions that must be asked and 
answered will be: Does the OAU reaffirm most of the 
historical goals of Pan- Africanism as still worthy of 
realization? Many objectives came to the forefront 
during the historical development of the pan- African move- 
ment as has been shown in the first chapter. In Saenz' 
words they can be summed up as: "1) complete independence 
for the entire continent, 2) development of a fraternal 
alliance of Africans based on a loyalty which would 
transcend all tribal and territorial affiliations, 3) 
creation of a united Africa based on a federation of sub - 
regional groups within which there would be a limitation of 
national sovereignty, and 4) noninvolvement by Africans 
as partisans in international power politics, "3 - which 
could mean that the African states try to stay aloof from 
the Cold War and international antagonistic blocs, trying 
to follow a policy of non -alignment in international affairs. 
Other questions are those concerning the relationship 
between the OAU and the United Nations. Has the OAU taken 
3. Ibid., p.206. 
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up responsibilities that were so far exclusively the 
prerogative of the world organization? Into the same 
category belongs the question about the organizational 
pre- eminence of the OAU vis -á -vis the other all -African 
organizations. In so far as it will help our understanding 
of the concepts incorporated in the Charter I will deal 
with some legal problems. Can the OAU Charter be looked 
at as a code of pan- African law or just as a document 
based on the traditional international law? Which are 
the basic principles of conduct which the African states 
rely upon in their relationship with one another as 
specified in the Charter? 
1) Prelude to Addis Ababa 
The Addis Ababa Conference was an act of foreign 
policy making. If it were to end with any concrete 
results, it was necessary for the statesmen who participated 
to grasp what was possible and not to be carried away by 
wishful thinking. Keeping this in mind and remembering 
the preceding abortive attempts to found an all -African 
organization it is not at all surprising that "the OAU 
is not the highwater mark of Pan -Africanism, nor is it a 
culmination of it. The OAU was above all a compromise 
between warring states (figuratively speaking, of course) 
with a tinge of Pan- Africanism - a redefinition of a modus 
vivendi whose interest was best served by the maintenance 
of the status quo. "4) The ensuing paragraphs try to 
4. Samuel Chime, "The OAU and African Boundaries ", in: 
Carl Gustav Widstrand, (ed.), African Boundary Problems, 
Uppsala, 1969, p.67. 
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examine more closely whether this is an appropriate 
contention.5 
That divisive factors were submerged to the extent 
of making an all African meeting possible was due to the 
tireless efforts of some African leaders - foremost Haile 
Selassie and Sekou Touré6 - using formal and informal 
diplomatic channels to promote a basis of rapprochement. 
"Because African high level policy is largely the policy 
of personalities, the basis of any rapprochement lies in 
direct talks between Heads of State during their mutual 
visits. "7 The fact that relations between individual 
members of the Monrovia and Casablanca group were much 
more cordial than in the recent past eased the reconciliation 
at this particular period. Guinea was on good terms with 
Nigeria. Senegal no longer quarrelled with Mali as an 
aftermath of the unsuccessful attempt of the Mali Federation. 
5. Given that there is no consensus amongst students and 
politicians on the importance of the OAU - although the 
majority tends to believe it to be relatively 
unimportant - any such generalizations are difficult to 
defend. In our case, anyway, we are not concerned with 
an overall assessment of the OAU's performance in its 
various fields but only with the aspect of its useful- 
ness as a "peace- maker ". This must be kept in mind. 
see M. Mushkat, "Problems of Political and Organizational 
Unity in Africa," op.cit., p.265. 
6. Leslie Rubin, "The OAU: Machinery, Problems and Prospects," 
in: S. Okechukwu Mezu (ed.), The Philosophie of Pan - 
Africanism, Washington, 1965, p.63 and H. Strauch, 
Panafrika, op.cit., p.145. 
7. Z. Cervenka, The OAU and its Charter, London, 1969, p.l. 
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Relations between Ghana and Togo had been improved to such 
a degree as to be no longer an obstacle to rapprochement.8 
After lengthy preparations it was agreed that a 
summit conference should take place in Addis Ababa on 
May 23, 1963, preceded by a preparatory meeting of the 
foreign ministers to set up the agenda of the main event.9 
Ethiopia's capital as a meeting -place was acceptable to 
both groups. It carried symbolic connotations; Addis 
Ababa was, after all, the capital of Africa's oldest 
independent country. 
The foreign ministers began their work on May 15, 
1963. In order to frame a charter and to draft various 
resolutions and recommendations to serve as working 
documents for the forthcoming Heads of State conference, 
two committees were constituted. One had to deal with 
drafting a charter and the other one was concerned with 
general political questions. Although quite a few 
controversial issues had been put aside10 the remaining 
problems nevertheless left room for disagreement. The 
results of the lengthy debates in the committees were 
meagre. Tricky questions like the participation of the 
new government of Togo were left to the Heads of State. 
8. West Africa, no.2398, 18 May 1963, vol. XLVII, p.537. 
9. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.2. 
10. Among those issues excluded from discussion were "Israel, 
the Common Market Association, atomic tests in the 
Sahara, and the Somali claim ". J. Woronoff, op.cit., 
p.127. 
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The fact that some ministers came to the conference without 
mandates from their governments to commit themselves to 
any text also hampered the adoption of any charter of 
African Unity.11 
The result of the work in the two committees can be 
summarized as follows: As far as African unity was 
concerned the outcome of the discussions was very much 
along the line of previous meetings. The ministers had to 
content themselves with the recommendation that the Charters 
of Lagos and Casablanca should be replaced by a charter for 
an all African organization. The task of doing so was 
shifted to the Heads of State who should take the submitted 
Ethiopian draft "as a basis for discussion ".12 This 
draft "tenait compte des textes antérieurs, notamment des 
chartes de Casablanca et de Monrovia et de l'existence 
de situations et de groupements différents dans le 
continent africain. "13 The ministers furthermore stated 
that this document should be "transmitted to all Member 
Governments to enable them to submit their comments and 
amendments before the meeting of the Foreign Ministers' 
Conference, to be held before the end of the year 1963 at 
Dakar. "14 A provisional Secretariat set up in Addis Ababa 
11. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.4. 
12. J.Woronoff, op.cit., p.128. 
13. B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.13. 
14. see Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.4. 
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was to see that one would proceed along these lines. 
Compliance with these recommendations would have meant 
a delay for the establishment of the OAU. "No matter 
how well founded the hesitations15 if the Heads of State 
did nothing more than confirm the Ministers' decisions 
and return home the long awaited summit would have been 
a failure. 
"16 
The somewhat disappointing results of the first 
committee were, however, made up for by the fact that the 
resolutions prepared by the second committee were approved. 
Especially the Draft Resolution on Decolonisation17 found 
unanimous approval without any major change. 
Despite this euphoric agreement, the bulk of the 
work still remained to be done when the Heads of State and 
Government assembled. This was actually a renewal of the 
CIAS interrupted by the establishing of opponent groups.18 
The work consisted mainly in bringing about an organisa- 
tional set -up and thereby providing the African states with 
an institutional framework within which they could settle 
their political differences and conflicts. In other words 
in the future inter -African conflicts could be dealt with 
15. "Nous ne sommes pas des sorciers, on n'a jamais vu une 
charte internationale adoptée en une seule conférence," 
was Doudou Thiam's comment of the results of the foreign 
ministers' conference. see B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, 
op.cit., p.19. 
16. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.128. 
17.This included a "programme d'action en 15 points qui 
allait servir de toile de fond toutes les résolutions 
adoptées ultérieurement par l'OUA en matiére de lutte 
anticoloniale." B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.18. 
18. Morocco did not take part for the same reason, already 
mentioned. No agreement was reached on the question of 
Grunitzky's participation, because of strong opposition 
from Nigeria and Guinea. See H. Strauch, Panafrika, 
2E2.211., p.153 
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in an organizational frame "subject to a number of ground 
rules for keeping intra- African disputes on a manageable 
level.19 Whether they would be, is a different matter. 
2) The Addis Ababa Conference 1963 
The world -wide publicity given to the summit 
conference in Addis Ababa revealing on the whole pessimistic 
attitudes in the comments about the expected results of the 
meeting, made the African leaders feel that they had to 
crown their efforts with success. They had to find these 
"ground rules" and prove their words by action in order to 
show that African politicians are capable of more than just 
"prevarications and palaver ".20 They had to sink their 
differences. They could not afford to leave Addis Ababa 
without concrete achievements. It was no use waiting 
for the day when all differences between African states 
might have disappeared. The developments in the previous 
years made it clear that this was not to happen anyway. 
On the contrary, splits were likely to persist even if the 
lines of division shifted, no longer following the Monrovia - 
Casablanca pattern. 
The result of the Addis Ababa meeting was a curious 
mixture of principles and purposes trying to satisfy the 
expectations of leaders as different as Nkrumah and 
Houphouët- Boigny. They all wanted to have something to go 
19. I.W. Zartman, International Relations, op.cit., p.34. 
20. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.128. 
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home with, something that coincided with their beliefs 
and satisfied their ambitions. 
Speeches 
Although the agenda of the Conference covered a 
wide field of topics I will concentrate my survey on the 
two dominating subjects: African Unity and Decolonization 
of Africa. 
In the speeches which were delivered by all the 
Heads of State, the commitment to African Unity dominated 
and the spirit of conciliation as well as the "African 
personality" and Africa's glorious history were invoked.21 
Yet it became evident that "Pan- Africanism is a rallying 
cry whose cohesive qualities are more effective on the 
emotional than on the practical level. "22 The actual 
bargaining for compromise between functionalists and 
federalists took place behind closed doors. But the clash 
came to the forefront in a vehement exchange of arguments 
between Mkrumah on one side who proposed a "Union govern- 
ment" for Africa and Tafawa Balewa who became the spokes- 
man of the great majority of states which rejected any 
such plans. Nkrumah only found substantive backing from 
Obote and lukewarm agreement from Algeria, Mali, the UAR 
and Tanzania. 23 It was Tafawa Balewa who gave expression 
21. see exerpts of speeches in B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, 
op.cit., pp.27 -30. 
22. Nora McKeon, "The African States and the OAU ", in: 
International Affairs, v0141 'II , no . 3, July 1966, 
p.390. 
23. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.10. 
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to what emerged as the opinion of most of his colleagues 
in saying: 
"Nigeria's stand is that, if we want unity 
in Africa, we must first agree to certain 
essential things. The first is that 
African states must respect one another. 
There must be acceptance of equality by 
all the states. No matter whether they 
are big or small, they are all sovereign24 
and their sovereignty is sovereignty." 
Nigeria's Premier, like most of the leaders, favoured a 
gradual approach to unity starting with limited forms of 
co- operation. Nkrumah's plans were not only rejected 
because of his general view but also because of the 
vagueness and the fact that these plans would take 
considerable time to implement. Not all arguments 
against Nkrumah were, of course, based on rational assess- 
ment. There was personal antagonism between him and 
other leaders who could not help feeling that the idea 
of a United States of Africa amounted to some sort of 
'Ghanaian plot'. The efforts to find a compromise 
regarding the concept of establishing some form of machinery 
seemed again made in vain. The old split that had 
bedevilled African unity arose anew. At this frustrating 
moment Ben Bella in a rousing speech reminded his 
colleagues that the main task of the independent African 
countries is to help their fellow -Africans still under 
colonial oppression to fight for their freedom. 
24. reprinted, ibid., pol0. 
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}'....This Charter will remain a dead letter 
if we do not give Angola, South Africa and 
Mozambique the unconditional support which 
these peoples under colonialist rule have 
the right to expect from us. ... African 
Unity depends largely on an efficient 
solidarity with those who are still fighting 
for freedom." 25 
This urge for action did not fall on deaf ears. 
Here was an object for which the pan -African organization 
could serve as a tool. "Such was the impact of Ben 
Bella's speech ...that the proposed Charter was being 
interpreted as a common weapon for the liberation of 
Africa. "26 A common denominator was found. It was 
tempting to externalize the problems and to unite against 
a common enemy. Nkrumah and his allies were prepared to 
give in and accept the Ethiopian draft Charter. With only 
a few amendments, the new Charter of the OAU was in its 
substance the same as the Lagos Charter.27 The Charter 
was a victory for the moderate functionalists, the 
radicals for their part had to be satisfied with strongly - 
worded resolutions. 
Resolutions 
It is worthwhile to have a look at the resolutions 
that were adopted because they reveal something of the 
spirit in which the OAU Charter was agreed upon. 
25. Reprinted in a pamphlet: Algeria at Addis Ababa: speeches 
delivered by Pres. Ben Bella at Addis AbaTa on 24th May, 
1963, published by the Ministry of Information, Algiers, 
1963. 
26. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.13. 
27. T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the OAU ", in: The American 
Journal of International Law, vol.59, No.2, 1965, p.245. 
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The wording of the resolutions about Decolonization, 
Apartheid and Racial Discrimination and Africa, Non - 
Alignment, and the UN and General Disarmament put them 
very much in line with the "revolutionary" approach to 
these problems advocated by the Casablanca states.28 
The first resolution on Decolonization with its urge for 
action followed Ben Bella's appeal in its straightforward - 
ness. The African leaders pledged themselves to make a 
co- ordinated and intensified effort to help those African 
people who are fighting to free their countries from the 
yoke of colonial domination.29 What was amazing was that 
the declaration did not only contain the principles but 
also the means to help the struggling people. The Heads 
of State committed themselves to an active campaign of 
decolonization which no longer excluded the use of force. 
In the case of racialist white minority government in 
Rhodesia they pledged themselves to "lend their effective 
moral and practical support to any legitimate measures 
which the African nationalist leaders may devise for the 
purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the 
African majority. "30 Concrete steps were demanded to be 
28. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.15. 
29. The resolutions are reprinted in: Africa Report, vol.8, 
no.6, June 1963, pp.9 -11. In this context it is per- 
haps worthwhile recording that the Emperor pledged his 
country to help those parts of Africa still under white 
domination in their fight for freedom. But he vehemently 
opposed the idea of applying the principle of self - 
determination in the context of border -disputes with 
Somalia. see Mushkat, "Problems of..." o . cit., p.237. 
This is a problem to be looked at in the o owing 
chapter. 
30. see Africa Report, vol.8, no.6, June 1963, p.9. 
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taken such as breaking off diplomatic relations with 
Portugal and South Africa and boycotting the foreign trade 
of both countries. Furthermore a co- ordinating committee 
was formed with headquarters in Dar Es Salaam, responsible 
for harmonizing the assistance from African states for the 
freedom fighters and responsible for managing the Special 
Fund to be set up for this purpose.32 The developments 
31 
during the ensuing years, however, led to considerable 
controversies among the members of the OAU about the question 
of which liberation movements should be recognized and 
supported.33 
In their resolution on Apartheid the Heads of State 
expressed their conviction that every effort had to be 
taken "to put an end to the South African Government's 
criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out racial discrim- 
ination in all its forms." They launched an appeal to all 
31. Consisting of Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, United Arab 
Republic, Tanganyika, Congo- Léopoldville, Guinea, 
Senegal and Nigeria. 
32. Africa Report, vol.8, no.6, June 1963, p.9. 
33. A new development seems to have been initiated at the 
1972 Summit in Rabat. As reported in The Times, 
"the liberation movements have gained the significant 
part of their support by direct contact with the 
donors. They have won military support from Communist 
backers, and humanitarian support from the West, notably 
the Scandinavian powers. Only as they prove themselves 
moving towards victory are the liberation movement 
leaders taken seriously by the African states. At 
Rabat for the first time the liberation movements' 
representatives were allowed to participate in the dis- 
cussions or admitted to a closed meeting of the heads 
of state." 
see The Times, June 20, 1972, p.15. 
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governments "to break off relations and to cease any other 
form of encouragement for the policy of apartheid. "34 
Apartheid was one of the regular problems on the agenda 
of the meetings of the OAU's main bodies. But the 
events over the years revealed that the OAU had no 
coercive power other than launching appeals. The fact 
that all African states with the exception of Malawi 
have broken diplomatic relations and most of them are 
boycotting South African goods only had very little effect 
on the Apartheid- regime.35 With the admission to the 
OAU of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland three states were 
made members which agreed with the basic principles and 
aims of the OAU but are neither able nor willing to 
implement resolutions and sanctions against South Africa. 
They denied that force was a solution to the problems.36 
Here again the OAU was not able to maintain a policy of 
unanimity. Advances by various African leaders for some 
kind of dialogue with South Africa became more numerous.37 
34. Africa Report, vol.8, no.6, June 1963, p.10. 
35. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.376. 
36. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.308. 
37. Here again we can only hint at the problem. Houphouët- 
Boigny proposed direct talks with South Africa and "a 
move by black Africa to begin trying to live with South 
Africa." See The Guardian, April 29, 1971, p.2. 
At the Council of Ministers' meeting in June 1971 in 
Addis Ababa there was a heated debate on the question 
of a dialogue with South Africa. The 37 ministers 
present revealed their disarray when five walked out of 
a debate on an Ivory -Coast resolution advocating dia- 
logue and five favoured some form of talks while the 
remaining 27 were strongly opposed to any such ideas. 
see Colin Legum in: The Observer, 20th June 1971, p.4. 
But none of the more complacent countries are prepared 
to follow Dr. Banda who paid an official state visit to 
South Africa. They are only ready for dialogue if the 
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In a third resolution on Africa's relation with the 
outside world the leaders expressed their "dedication to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, 
and (their) acceptance of all obligations contained in the 
Charter. "38 Although the heading of this resolution 
contained the word "non- alignment ", no special reference 
was made in it concerning this principle. Resolution 
no. IV was on general disarmament and stated that Africa 
should remain denuclearized. In it there is an appeal 
for an end of military bases and nuclear tests on the 
African continent. The "disentanglement of African 
countries from military pacts with foreign powers "39 was 
not only seen as a prerequisite for Africa's independence 
and unity but it was likewise the only principle embodied 
in the resolutions which bore direct reference to the 
principle of non -alignment. Whether or not there was more 
discussion on the controversial issue of non -alignment 
policy in the closed sessions is not known. 
Although by adopting this resolution all states had 
paid lip- service to the doctrine, a strict implementation 
of the principle could not be enforced. Anyway the 
resolutions did not contain any outright condemnation of 
those countries with foreign bases on their territory. 
In any case these states could only act in compliance with 
regime in Pretoria is willing to discuss how apartheid 
can be changed. see The Observer, 22nd August 1971, 
p.6. 
38. Africa Report, vol.8, no.6, June 1963, p.10. 
39. Ibid., p.10. 
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resolution no. IV if they would agree to a complete 
reversal in the relationship between them and their former 
colonial powers. Looking at the existing pattern of 
relations especially between francophone Africa and 
France shows that this was not done. On the whole any 
affirmation of a policy of non -alignment has thus 
remained fairly meaningless.40 
In a critical assessment of the resolutions one 
cannot deny that the "radical" leaders scored some success 
which enabled them to reconcile themselves to the fact 
that the demand for unity on the continental level found 
its only manifestation in the name given to the newly 
established organization. In that sense the resolutions 
helped to create an atmosphere which led to a willingness 
for compromise on the organizational question. 
It is difficult to say whether the radicals were 
carried away by a feeling of success after the adoption 
of the resolution. Such euphoria would be hard to 
believe. Political leaders are more realistic than to 
think that the adoption of resolutions could make an 
organization into an effective political body. In the 
course of this chapter I will dwell further on the binding 
force of resolutions in connection with the organs of the 
OAU. 
40. The Legon Observer, vol.41, no.18, 1 -14 Sept. 1967, 
p.4. 
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3) The Charter of the Organization of African Uniti 
The signing ceremony which took place in the small 
hours of Sunday, May 26,1963, was a visible symbol that the 
Heads of State and Government did not follow their foreign 
ministers' recommendations only to adopt a draft that 
would be sent back for further discussion to a meeting of 
the foreign ministers. They signed a binding charter 
immediately. 
When the African leaders faced the problem of 
putting forward the basic principles to which they would 
adhere in the context of the OAU, it was not sufficient to 
pay homage to the old pan- African principles of freedom and 
independence. They had to take into account the new 
phenomenon of "l'étatisme ".41 They were not primarily 
confronted with the legal task of setting up a charter which 
regulates the intercourse between sovereign states.42 
But it was a political challenge to find principles which 
would rule interstate relations and could be agreed upon 
by all states who form the organization. This was the one 
side of the coin, the other being the task to set up an 
organizational framework efficient enough to cope with all 
the problems for whose settlement the organization was set up 
in the first place. 
A look at the Charter proves that a stronger emphasis 
has been put on the principles reaffirming the status quo, 
i.e. the existence of at least legally independent states 
anxious to safeguard their position than to the Utopian 
objectives of pan- African unity. "It made it clear that 
the Pan- African movement would henceforth involve relations 
41. S. Bonzon, op.cit., p.22. 
42. Bernard V.A. R5 ing, International Law in an Expanded 
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between sovereign states. "43 There are some adherences 
to pan -African ideas in the Preamble and the more 
important article III on principles, but the bulk of 
principles in this article deals with interstate relation- 
ships. The fact that the preamble took nearly half the 
time the leaders were to spend drafting the Charter44 
might be an indication how difficult it must have been to 
balance the insertion of some pan- African ideas with the 
purposes for which this inter -state organization was set 
up. The sentence of the preamble talking about the 
"determination to strengthen understanding and co- operation 
among our states in response to the aspirations of our 
peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a large unity 
transcending ethnic and national differences "45 is the 
only reference not only in the preamble but also in the 
whole Charter to the concept of unity going beyond the co- 
operation among states.46 
Principles 
Those principles listed in article III which are the 
basis of inter -state relations and thereby bound to 
influence the settlement of disputes on the continent talk 
about 1) the sovereign equality of all member states, 
World, Amsterdam, 1960, p.XI, also ibid., p.106. 
43. J.S. Nye, op.cit., p.244. 
44. T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the OAU;' op.cit., p.246. 
45. Africa Report, vol. 8, no.6, June 1963, p.11. 
46. It seems thereforeexaggerated to say: "The primary goal 
of the Addis Ababa Charter - the unity of the African 
continent - is evidently clear." Such a contention 
cannot be based on the text of the Charter. see B. 
Boutros -Ghali "The Addis Ababa Charter ", in: Inter- 
national Conciliation, no.546, Jan.1964, p.26. 
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2) non - interference in the internal affairs of states, 
3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of each member state and for its inalienable right to 
independent existence 4) peaceful settlement of disputes, 
5) unreserved condemnation of subversive activities on 
the part of neighbouring or other states, 6) absolute 
dedication to the total emancipation of the African 
territories which are still not independent,47 and 7) a 
policy of non -alignment with regard to all blocs.48 
The principles indicate clearly the hand- writing 
of the Monrovia group, but furthermore, as Cervenka argues, 
the first four principles are not only "recognized 
principles of present internationallaw but they also re- 
affirm the corresponding principles embodied in the UN - 
Charter ".49 Analysing article III on similar lines 
Borella talks about a division between judicial and 
political principles; however, the judicial principles 
have equally strong political connotations. The political 
47. The fulfillment of the pledge given in this principle 
requires that all possible means including force should 
be taken by African states against the white rulers. 
In other words, the rules guiding relations among 
African states - such as the peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes - cannot be equally applied if it comes to dealing 
with African territories under white domination. See 
Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.37. 
48. Africa Rye ort, vol.8,no.6, June 1963, p.12. Principle 
" as been frequently reiterated in international 
treaties but to the knowledge of the author, never as 
bluntly as here." B. Boutros- Ghali, "The Addis Ababa 
Charter ", op.cit., p.28. 
49. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.34, UN- Charter articles 2 (1); 
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stipulations (5, 6 and 7) to him are "plus spécifiquement 
africains".50 Arguing that the first four principles 
are generally recognized principles of present inter- 
national law, however, does not mean that they can just 
be taken at face value. They leave open the question as 
to when an issue might move from one of domestic concern 
to one of pan -African intervention.51 In this respect 
they incorporate all the inadequacies of international law. 
Those last two stipulations, i.e. 6) and 7), bear 
the handwriting of the "radical" states. As to the last 
principle basically all African states, whether or not they 
had broken completely with their former colonial powers, 
took it as an expression of their wish "to be the masters 
of their own destinies ".52 
According to the interpretation given to this 
clause in article III in a resolution adopted at a meeting 
of the Council of Ministers in February 1964, the states 
were asked to annul any military agreement with non -African 
countries. This was even regarded as a precondition for 
joining the OAU.53 It was feared that an alignment with 
any powerful state would signify the acceptance of a state 
of inequality and subordination for the African partner in 
50. F. Borella, "Le Régionalisme Africain et l'OUA", op.cit., 
p.853. 
51. V.B. Thompson, op.cit., p.186. 
52. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.443. 
53. B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.90. 
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such an alliance,54 and would moreover narrow the 
possibilities of getting aid from all sides. How the 
policy of non -alignment could be enforced upon the members 
was not indicated in the Charter. "Each state was 
allowed to choose its friends and allies abroad and to look 
after its own non -alignment. Since the options varied 
widely the OAU could scarcely lay down a hard and fast 
line as to what sort of mix was necessary to remain non- 
aligned and any criticism of a member's policy would only 
have led to friction. "55 The Charter did not indicate 
what a policy of non -alignment meant in practice. In 
any case as long as there was no direct intervention or 
threat from outside Africa, the OAU's influence with 
regard to its members' foreign policy decisions was very 
limited. 
Purposes 
The objectives for which the OAU was established as 
indicated in its Charter (art.II) fall into six broad 
categories: 1) international affairs, 2) racial -colonial 
affairs, 3) political affairs (this category includes all 
inter -African political issues, such as peaceful settle- 
ment of conflicts) , 4) economic affairs, 5) military defence 
affairs, and 6) educational, scientific and cultural 
affairs.56 
54. see Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.35. 
55. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.445. 
56. P. Saenz, op.cit., pp.208 -211. 
-95- 
Although the objectives classified in these 
categories are all interdependent, I limit my approach to 
the discussion of the problems involved in the third 
category, especially to the specific objective of peace- 
ful settlements of disputes. Following Boutros -Ghali's 
classification based on 164 resolutions adopted by the 
Council of Ministers of the OAU between August 1963 and 
February 1968, the majority of resolutions concerned the 
anti -colonial struggle, followed by resolutions on 
economic and social co- operation. Financial and admini- 
strative problems are listed third with resolutions con- 
cerning conflict regulations taking fourth place.57 
It is, however, difficult to interpret anything from 
the number of resolutions alone. As Manigat's approach 
to the problem suggests, not all resolutions are 
qualitatively equal. In a closer analysis she shows that 
resolutions on conflict regulations are more important 
than its fourth place on the scale would indicate. This 
being the case for a number of reasons. The resolutions 
in the first categories "ont un charactére de répétition 
trés marquée en raison de l'insistance avec laquelle les 
membres de l'OUA en soulignent la n'cessité" and further- 
more the resolutions on inter -African conflicts "reviennent 
en permanence á l'ordre du jour des réunions."58 
57. B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.113. 
58. Mirlande Manigat, "LOUA" in: Revue Francaise de 
Science Politique, vólXXI, No.2, April 1971, p.383. 
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The numerical pre - eminence of anti- colonial 
resolutions is easy to explain. On the one hand, the 
anti- colonial struggle was the common denominator and a 
great rallying point among African states. On the other 
hand, the adoption of resolutions helped to camouflage the 
inactivities of the OAU in this field. The high ranking 
of resolutions concerning the realm of economic and social 
co- operation contrasts with the smallness of concrete 
achievements.59 It conveys the feeling that something 
was done as manifestation of co- operation and co- ordination. 
That resolutions falling into the category of financial 
and administrative issues rank prominently is simply due 
to the fact that in the founding years of the OAU many 
problems concerning its structure and organizational frame 
pre- occupied its members. Taking all these factors into 
account, the questions of inter- African conflict regulations 
hold a much more prominent place in the OAU affairs than a 
prima facie analysis would indicate. 
An examination of some of the principles which 
describe the purposes of the OAU reveals that they contain 
some striking contradictions. They sharply disclose the 
dilemma in which the African politicians operate. The 
fact that the African leaders are determined to safeguard and 
consolidate the territorial integrity of their states 
suggests that the politicians might not agree with any out- 
come of conflict resolution detrimental to their countries' 
59. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.387. 
-97- 
sovereignty and integrity. This is a sign of the limits 
in which African peace -makers operate. The same state- 
ment is repeated in article II of the Charter summarizing 
the purposes of the organization: The Organization shall 
have the purpose of defending the sovereignty, the 
territorial integrity and independence of the African 
states.ó0 The practical application of this principle is 
of direct implication to the problem of African frontiers 
as will be seen in the third chapter of this thesis. 
Boutros -Ghali contends that the "modification of boundaries 
was ruled out though not specifically mentioned in the 
Charter. There may have been fears that the mention of 
this principle would not receive unanimous approval, or 
that it might be said that the Addis Ababa Charter was an 
explicit ratification of the Treaty of Berlin. "61 All 
purposes as expressed in this article are very vague and 
declaratory. There is talk about the task of promoting 
unity and solidarity and co- operation in all fields. 
However, nowhere in the Charter is it implied that certain 
purposes hold a priority over other purposes,62 nor is 
there any reference to political union of any kind. 
60. See article II, lc of the Charter. 
61. B. Boutros -Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter ", op.cit., 
p.30. 
62. Z. Cervenka, o .cit., p.32. Manigat gives some 
indication of ow come to something like a list of 
priorities. See footnote 58. 
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The Charter as far as its principles and purposes are 
concerned is open to wide interpretation. In this respect 
the OAU Charter is not different from other international 
charters, e.g. the UN Charter. Susan Bonzon stresses the 
inherent shortcomings of any codification of rules guiding 
international co- operation. The stipulations of the OAU 
Charter demonstrate its limitations and insufficiencies. 
This price had to be paid in order to make the text of the 
Charter acceptable to all states.63 
In this connection it is, nevertheless, interesting 
to point out that the Charter says nothing about whether 
or not the acts taken by the OAU are legally binding on its 
member states.64 Neither does it indicate what should be 
done if a member state defies the implementation of policies 
requested by the resolutions and decisions taken by any 
organ of the Organization. There is no judicial machinery. 
"Presumably the obligations of the Member States include 
their abiding by the resolutions and decisions of the Assembly. 
However, any express provision to that effect, which would 
clarify the position of each state vis -a -vis the resolutions 
and decisions adopted by the supreme organ of the OAU, is 
missing."65 The ensuing years did not see any attempt to 
remedy this shortcoming. What did happen was that some 
postulates laid down in the Charter received further 
63. S. Bonzon, op.cit., p.25. 
64. F. Borella, "Le Régionalisme Africain et l'OUA", op.cit., 
p.852. 
65. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.43. 
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elaboration, e.g. the question of boundaries. 
One remark about the membership of the OAU seems 
relevant. The provision that a member must be an 
independent sovereign African state66 excludes provisional 
governments of the dependent territories, national 
liberation movements,67 as well as any country whose 
government is opposed to the rule of "one man one vote ". 
4) The Organs of the Organization of African Unity 
Pointing to a certain gap in the Charter, Borella 
contends that "les objectifs et les principes de l'organ- 
isation sont déterminés avec une assez grande précision,68 
les institutions de l'organisation son parfaitement 
décrites, mais le lien entre les premiers et les secondes 
n'est pas déterminé. "69 The structure of the institutions 
did not slavishly imitate the UN's but reveals a more 
hierarchical character, the principal organs not being 
equal in prominence.70 
The Conference of Heads of State and Government 
is the supreme organ with the Council of Ministers ranking 
second, acting as a "cabinet" to the Assembly. 
71 
The 
Secretariat in its turn is subordinate to the Council to 
66. See Article IV of the Charter. 
67. It will be recalled that they were admitted to the con- 
ference table in closed session at the 1972 Rabat OAU 
meeting. See footnote 33 of this chapter. 
68. I have my reservations about this part of his contention. 
69. F. Borella, "Le Régionalisme Africain et l'OUA", op.cit., 
p.852. 
70. B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.103. 
71. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.49. 
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which it is directly responsible. On the other hand the 
question of relationship between the Specialized Commissions, 
assigned for various purposes, with the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Abritration taking a place 
distinguishable from the other Commissions, was not 
"satisfactorily clarified "?2 Some Commissions refused to 
become subordinate to the Council of Ministers insisting 
that they are only answerable to the Assembly. The 
Charter codifies what had become the practice of inter - 
African policy -co- ordination in the preceding years. The 
Heads of State had played a primary role in African affairs.73 
The Foreign Ministers' task was to prepare the summit 
meetings and to hold further meetings in the interval between 
summit conferences.74 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
The fact that the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, which convenes at least once a year, was given 
the supremacy as organ indicates that the leaders "intended 
to govern the Organization as they governed their states. "75 
They are the top decision -makers thus providing the 
organization with authority. This institutional con- 
struction can be explained by a number of factors. The 
Heads of State have played a primary role in inter- African 
politics ever since the first CIAS. Throughout these years 
they had established personal links of friendship and it was 
only a logical consequence of this development to base the 
OAU on this ground -work. Due to the weakness of bilateral 
African diplomacy, the channels of possible decision -making 
72. see ibid., p.77 for this problem. 
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were reduced and left for the highest level of political 
intercourse which was the summit meeting. This structure 
with the Heads of State as supreme decision -makers means 
that it is vital that the highest number of leaders possible 
attends each summit conference if the OAU wants to act 
efficiently. This is the first prerequisite and all the 
others are directly related to it. "Perhaps ultimately 
most damaging to the OAU, however, has been the absence of 
heads of state for if the organization has little authority, 
it is at least generally accepted that some effectiveness 
and authority does reside in the personal contacts of the 
leaders at the annual meetings. "76 However, it is not 
only a question of numbers. If some of the key -figures 
remain absent from a meeting which is bound to discuss 
problems in which they hold important parts and views, then 
a fruitful discussion is in jeopardy no matter how high the 
figure of those who attend might be. In other words, 
although it is perfectly in line with the Charter if the 
73. The reamble opens with "We, the Heads of African and 
Malagasy States and Governments" rather than "We, the 
Peoples of the United Nations ". See B. Boutros -Ghali, 
"The Addis Ababa Charter ", op.cit., p.25. 
74. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.155. 
75. Ibid., p.158. 
76. W. Scott Thompson and Richard Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority in the OAU ", in: African Studies Review, Vol. 
XV, no.1, April 1972, p.37. The Addis Ababa Conference 
in 1963 was the high water -mark when all states sent 
their Heads of State or Government with the exception 
of Rwanda. The number of Heads of State and Government 
who attended the subsequent meetings went up and down. 
The smallest number turned up at the summit in 1971 with 
only 10 Heads present. See Keesings Contemporary 
Archives, vol. XVIII, 1971 -1972, p.24738. A year later 
-57117675Fa number of 22 Heads came to the conference. 
Ibid., p.25371. 
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Heads of State and Government are represented by their duly 
accredited representatives, the political function and 
importance of the body will suffer, to say the least, if 
the summit becomes a gathering of "accredited representa- 
tives". 
Any analysis of the power of the Assembly must 
distinguish between the Assembly's relation to the lower 
organs of the OAU and those between it and the member 
states. Its supremacy was only brought to bear upon the 
other organs of the Organization. The Assembly by its 
right to "review the structure, functions, and acts of all 
the organs and any specialized agencies which may be 
created in accordance with the present Charter "77 was given the 
powers of a truly supreme organ with the right to direct and 
guide the other bodies. Its competence is not limited to 
any particular aspect of the OAU's purposes. 
A look at the Assembly's political powers towards 
the individual states reveals that its competence is 
"primarily deliberative ".78 Everything can be debated as 
at any other diplomatic conference, but when it comes to the 
implementation of adopted resolutions not even the combined 
power of the leaders can enforce them.79 The stumbling- 
block was the principle of unrestricted sovereignty of the 
states as explicitly laid down in the Charter. Nothing 
could be done about a state which violated or dissented from 
77. See article VIII of the Charter. 
78. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.44. 
79. "Each Head of State had unusually broad powers in his own 
government but even all of them together could not take 
decisions binding on any one." J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.159 
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the adopted policy. In other words resolutions adopted by 
the Assembly are not more than recommendations. Only those 
resolutions with reference to the structure and operation 
of the OAU would be binding on the members;80 this is, of 
course, the first prerequisite for institutional survival 
of the OAU. 
The African leaders were not unaware of the dilemma 
of responsibility and power. Although they abandoned the 
rule of unanimity and replaced it by majority decisions in 
order to bypass the possibility of vetoing the decisions, 
they nevertheless tried to adopt resolutions which were 
approved of by all the leaders and to find the broadest 
consensus. There was hope that the unanimously adopted 
resolutions, if not being binding, would at least put the 
African governments under such moral, political and public 
pressure as to prevent them from acting against the 
resolutions. Given the fact that African leaders disagree 
upon many points, unanimity could only be achieved at the 
cost of watering down resolutions, making them tame, 
depriving them of any strong political impact and thus 
rendering them purely declaratory statements without 
enough political significance to bring about any change 
on the continent. 
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers composed of foreign ministers 
or such other ministers as are designated by the governments 
80. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.45 -46. 
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of member states meeting at least twice a year "acts as 
a cabinet to the Assembly, in that it is specifically 
charged with the implementation of the Assembly's 
decisions ".81 However, that does not imply that the 
Council is responsible to the Assembly in any parliamentary 
sense. Decisions taken in the Council by simple majority 
are mere recommendations for the Assembly. They are left 
to them for approval or rejection.82 The two chief tasks 
of the Council are "the responsibility of preparing 
conferences of the Assembly" and "the implementation of 
the decisions of the Assembly ".83 This latter assignment 
- given that the Assembly resolutions are not binding on 
member states - can only consist of "supervising or just 
noting the implementation of resolutions voluntarily by 
the member states and the reporting back to the Assembly. "84 
Furthermore, the Council has to work as the main channel 
through which the Assembly exercises its control over the 
organization. The Council is the main instrument for 
co- ordination of inter -African co- operation. It tries to 
promote such co- operation by co- ordinating the committees' 
work and assessing its priorities.85 
81. Ibid., p.49. 
82. In the Rhodesian case the Council adopted unanimously 
a resolution demanding the breaking of diplomatic 
relations of every member state with Britain in the 
event of Rhodesia's UDI. However, most African states 
repudiated such a move. 
83. OAU Charter, Art.XIII. 
84. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.163. 
85. Ibid., p.163. 
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A prima facie analysis of the role of the Council 
as stipulated in the Charter is likely to underestimate 
the role of the Council in relation to the _assembly. 
To the Council applies what Woronoff emphasizes for the 
Charter as a whole, namely that it was soon an "unrecog- 
nizable or misleading image of the Organization. Real 
insight could be gained only from a study of both the 
theory and the practice of its function. "86 Althou h g 
the Assembly was "supreme" vis á -vis the Council the 
latter managed to influence decisions of the Assembly. 
The Council through its ability to convene quickly in 
urgent cases, "assumed its role as the one body within 
the OAU that immediately responds to emergencies through 
suddenly erupting crisis. "87 The decisions taken in these 
cases were looked at as the official policy of the OAU 
until the next summit when they could be approved or 
rejected by the Assembly. 
The exact relationship between the Assembly and the 
Council was not clearly defined. Both were concerned 
with the same vast variety of issues.88 In the course of 
the OAU's existence the Council grew in importance 
especially in the field of political questions. The 
ministers met more frequently and had more time to spend 
on matters concerned with non -alignment, decolonization and 
peaceful settlement of disputes. They discussed special 
problems regardless of whether or not they had been 
referred to them by the Assembly. Inevitably, the Heads 
86. Ibid., p.157. 
87. John Markakis, "The OAU: a Progress Report ", in: 
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.4, no.2, October 
1966, p.145. 
88. See J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.164. 
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of State and Government were influenced by the results of 
such discussions. Very often the Assembly based its 
decision on draft resolutions presented to it by the 
foreign ministers. It can be assumed that the ministers 
arrived at their meetings well instructed by their 
Presidents and Prime Ministers as to what line they were 
supposed to take in certain matters. But a conference 
has its own "inner life "; and in the course of the debates 
the ministers might be carried away by the effort of coming 
to grips with problems. Hence, they might be tempted to 
go beyond what would be politically acceptable to their 
governments. They were especially prone to do so, because 
they often met in a climate of acute crisis with all the 
pressure involved in such a situation. 
The relationship between the Assembly and the 
Council could not remain without conflict. The Heads of 
State bearing more political responsibilities than their 
often younger ministers, were liable to act more cautiously 
and, as had been pointed out earlier on, the necessity to 
find a two -thirds majority demanded less radical decisions. 
After embarrassing cases of dissent between decisions of 
the Council and the Assembly such as on the Rhodesian 
question and the Israel -Arab problem it was decided by an 
Assembly meeting in Algiers in 1967 that all Council 
resolutions require official approval by the Heads of State 
and Government. It was a matter of both organs becoming 
aware and assessing realistically their powers and 
responsibilities.89 
89. Compare with J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.167. 
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The General Secretariat 
The third organ listed in the Charter is the 
General Secretariat. By the very name given to its 
highest official, namely Administrative Secretary- General, 
it was made obvious that the African leaders did not want 
him to become politically influential. The limits of his 
scope of political action were closely delineated. The 
other main concern was with his true independence from 
influence by any member country.90 Reminded of the 
experience of Dag Hammarskóld's strong position in the UN 
and his role in the Congo crisis they wanted to make sure 
that the OAU's top official should not be elevated to such 
a position. They rejected the idea of " a dynamic 
Secretary -General who could cast a shadow on their own role" 91 
He lacked the right of his UN counterpart who could draw 
the attention of the Security Council to matters which 
threaten the world peace and international security (art. 
99 UN Charter). The Secretary- General of the OAU would 
definitely be exceeding his powers by taking a comparable 
move, i.e. convening a meeting of the Council or the 
Assembly.92 
90. "Ainsi la crainte que le Secrétariat général ou le 
Sécrétaire général de l'OUA puisse être utilisé comme 
un instrument d'intervention par certains états 
africains contre d'autres demeure a la base de 
l'attitude méfiante de l'Afrique é, l'égard de sa 
propre organisation administrative" B. Boutros -Ghali, 
LOUA, op.cit., p.119. The Heads of State were not 
concerned by the fact that they were copying Art. 100, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the UN Charter in Article XVIII, 
paragraph 2 of the OAU Charter. 
91. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.184. The Afro- Malagasy states 
also had some experience with an ambitious UAi Secretary - 
General. 
92. M. Manigat, "L' OUA ", op.cit., p.394. 
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No wonder therefore that long debates were held on 
this subject at the Addis Ababa Conference.93 The 
Charter in its articles XVI, XVII and XVIII dealing with 
the General Secretariat leaves many blanks which are 
partly filled by the Regulations governing its functions and 
numerous other agreements.94 One could give an impressive 
list of the Secretary -General's rights and duties, but 
nevertheless, he is "directly responsible to the Council 
of Ministers for the adequate discharge of all duties 
assigned to him. "95 Formally, his is a purely executive 
office. His task of co- ordinating the activities of the 
various organs of the Organization in preparing and 
implementing reports and sessions necessitate his acquiring 
a thorough knowledge of the activities of the institutions. 
Although his legal position is weakened because ex officio 
he has no right to take part in the meetings of the other 
organs of the OAU96 this deficiency is counterbalanced by 
the fact that he was present at most of the meetings of 
the principal organs.97 
The impact a Secretary- General of the OAU can make 
depends very much on two variables: firstly there is the 
personal factor of the quality and dynamism of the office- 
93. B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.115. 
94. The first meeting of the Council at Dakar in August 1963 
approved of these regulations under the heading of "Func- 
tions and Regulations of the General Secretariat." 
95. Rule 7, Functions and Regulations of the General Secretariat, 
reprinted in: J. Woronoff, o .cit., p.658. From the duties 
were omitted the implementa ion o political decisions. 
96. The Charter stipulates nothing of this sort. There is 
only reference made to this problem in rule 9 of the 
"Functions and Regulations ": "The participation of the 
Administrative Secretary -General in the deliberations of 
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holder and secondly he relies heavily on the good -will of 
the member countries' governments to supply him with 
maximum information on all relevant problems. This is 
what Boutros -Ghali calls "la difficulté classique que 
rencontre chaque organisation ".98 Through the Annual 
Report the Secretary has to prepare each year on the 
activities of his organisation he could infuse his own 
assessments on the accomplishments and necessities of the 
work of the OAU. Also, through his various duties he 
must be the best informed man in the OAU Headquarters and 
African politicians would certainly consider his advice as 
worth listening to. 
The success of the Secretary's work not only depends 
on the amount of support he receives from the African 
governments and the other sources but also on the efficiency 
of help he gets from his colleagues in the Secretariat. 
He was given four Assistant Administrative Secretaries - 
General. But nothing was said about how they should contri- 
bute to the work of the Secretary -General. They were 
chosen by taking into account an even geographical and 
political distribution of offices. While the first 
Secretary- General was a Guinean his assistants came from 
Algeria, Dahomey, Kenya and Nigeria.99 Since the bulk of 
the Assembly, of the Council of Ministers, of the 
Specialized Commissions and the other organs of the 
Organization shall be governed by the provisions of the 
Charter and by the respective rules of procedure in these 
bodies." See J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.658. 
97. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.66. 
98. B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.119. 
99. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.185. 
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OAU activities are carried out on the conference and 
meeting level it is in this realm that the work of the 
Secretariat is most essential. 
To my knowledge no comprehensive survey has been 
made on the administrative operation of the Secretariat. 
By the same token it is thus impossible to assess the 
climate of co- operation or non -co- operation amongst staff 
members and the amount of help Diallo Telli was able to 
get from his colleagues. 
An assessment of the practice of the Secretary - 
General of the OAU can only really amount to a comment on 
the performance of its first incumbent, Diallo Telli.lOO 
It seems that his was a post not particularly sought after. 
After all, in 1968 when he had to face the test of re- 
election, only one candidate from Rwanda offered himself 
as an alternative, despite the fact that there was con- 
siderable opposition against Telli. His re- election was a 
painful procedure, and several ballots were necessary 
before this was secured. Thompson and Bissell call this 
a "profound commentary on the authority of the 
Secretariat,"101 and I dare add its Secretary -General. 
Having very strong political ideas, Diallo Telli must have 
found it difficult to refrain from a politically more 
100. His successor, Nzo Ekangaki, was only elected at the 
summit meeting in June 1972 in Rabat. He has not had 
enough time to make an impact yet. 
101 W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority... ", op.cit., p.32. 
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active role. His critics, however, accused him all the 
same of playing politics. He made the press conference 
his chief weapon; thereby invoking public opinion to bear 
pressure upon the member states. While he risked dis- 
agreement with member states in his first period of office 
by more outspoken statements and energetic moves, he was 
likely to tame his political energies in the second term of 
incumbency. "This might well please the majority of the 
member states. But it did not obviate the necessity for 
the Organization to develop a distinct personality and 
create a noticeable presence on the continent. More than 
ever it required a trusted and dynamic person to give it a 
new impulse. "102 Cervenka comes to a judgement very much 
in favour of the first office -holder: "Diallo Telli's 
unequivocal adherence to the principles of the OAU 
Charter and the fervour with which he insists on the 
implementation of the OAU's resolutions and decisions, have 
greatly facilitated his difficult task of steering the 
Organization through the frequent crises it has been forced 
to overcome during the short period of its existence. "103 
Staffing and Financial Resources 
It has been stressed earlier that the efficiency of 
the OAU as an instrument of inter- African co- operation 
depends ultimately on the willingness of the political 
102. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.192. 
103. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.67. 
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leaders to work out a common policy. This is the basic 
prerequisite for the OAU to operate successfully. But 
even if this pre- condition has been fulfilled a good 
performance of the Organization then hinges upon two major 
factors; the first is the provision of adequate staffing 
and the second is financial resources available to the Organ- 
ization. According to Thompson and Bissell the OAU's record 
of coping with its task was most satisfactory in the first 
year of its existence. Institutional stability lasted 
only as long as the OAU offices were staffed by Ethiop- 
ians.104 After the arrival of the first Secretary- 
General the Ethiopian staff was partially replaced by 
officials from all over Africa. This turned out to be a 
slow process. Suitable candidates were difficult to find 
given the general shortage of appropriately trained man- 
power. Although there was the financial incentive of a 
salary scale comparable to that of international 
organizations,105 there were other factors which made 
African civil servants reluctant to seek employment with 
the OAU. The UN certainly holds greater attraction for 
African officials. And secondly, they might have rejected 
the idea of being removed from the centre of influence in 
their own capitals. Working for the OAU had not acquired . 
enough prestige to make up for these shortcomings. 
104. W. Scott Thompson and R. 
Authority ... ", op.cit., 
105. See J. Woronoff, op.cit. 




At a Council of Ministers meeting in Nairobi in 
February 1965 it was agreed that the staff should 
ultimately reach the number of 250 members, two- thirds of 
whom would be attached to the headquarters in Addis Ababa. 
Woronoff believes that given the OAU's "broad and 
ambitious program, 250 would still be only a skeleton 
staff. ,106 Whether or not that is the case is difficult 
to assess. It ultimately depends on the skills of the 
civil servants. Given the fact that the officials come 
from countries with different administrative traditions 
and speak different languages, to organize an efficient 
apparatus would be extremely difficult. The lack of an 
adequate communication network on the African continent 
hampered the task further. "After the first phase of the 
organization's business, when complex matters had to be 
negotiated on which there was no immediate concurrence, 
the problems of security, mail, and telephone service 
complicated matters enormously."107 Generally speaking 
what the organizational problems amount to was to create 
a sophisticated machinery in the midst of underdeveloped 
societies. If it was difficult to staff the Organization 
properly it was certainly no easier to provide it with 
adequate financial resources. In the period from May 1963 
to February 1964 when Ethiopia was responsible for supplying 
106. Ibid., p.189, According to the pamphlet "Organization 
of African Unity. What it is, How it Works, What it 
does ", published by the OAU Press Information Division, 
Addis Ababa, 1971: "300 Staff members of whom 71 of the 
professional category from 32 independent African 
countries and Angola, work both at headquarters and in 
the Regional and Subregional offices." p.6. 
107. W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
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the manpower needed it also paid the expenses which 
amounted to 200,000.108 The Charter stipulates that 
the member states should make contributions to the budget 
"in accordance with the scale of assessment of the UN, no 
member state shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty 
percent of the yearly regular budget" (Art. XXIII). 
Budgetary matters caused extreme difficulties in the first 
years until they were sorted out. The first budget 
amounted to 4,500,000.109 Less than half of the 
assessments were actually paid, twenty -four countries 
failing to meet their dues.110 Appeals could only be 
launched to urge the countries to pay their share. The 
Charter does not provide for any sanctions against those 
countries who failed to pay their contributions. If the 
OAU wanted to escape the dilemma of financial collapse it 
had to cut down its expenses which amounted to a cut on 
services on all levels. This was what was done giving the 
OAU a slightly better record in the ensuing years.111 
committee was set up in order to review the financial 
situation. The committee members recommended that the 
number of specialized committees should be reduced and that 
fewer ad hoc bodies were to be established in the future. 
Authority...", op.cit., p.32. 
108. Ibid., p.32. 
109. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.633. 
110. P. Saenz, op.cit., p.217. 
111. W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority.... ", op.cit., p.33. 
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The contributions the member states had to pay should not 
only be made in accordance with the scale of assessments 
of the UN but should also be based on the national product 
and income of each country.112 In November 1967 an 
austerity budget of W1,700,000 was adopted. Four years 
later the budget stood at about W3,000,000.113 Even if 
one takes into account that Africa is poor, Woronoff 
believes that the OAU is not too heavy a financial burden 
for the member states. "Quibbling about budgetary expenses 
probably represents less an inability to pay than hidden 
disapproval of purposes for which the money was spent. 
This was more a way of expressing general dissatisfaction 
and disapprovements with the OAU. "114 The Specialized 
Commissions which were to be set up following Article XX 
of the OAU Charter illustrate very well the inadequacies 
of staffing and financing. Their meetings had to be 
frequently cancelled for want of a quorum. Those 
Commissions which did secure the necessary quorum often 
came out with over -ambitious plans which paid little heed 
to the financial reality. The Commissions "became a burden 
on governments which had too many burdens, and too few men 
to deal with these, fax closer to home. "115 A more 
detailed discussion - necessary as it might be for an over- 
all assessment of the OAU's record of success - is not 
112. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.634. 
113. OAU Pamphlet, op.cit.,p.6. 
114. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.636. 
115. W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority...," op.cit., p.33. 
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required in our context. 
The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration 
The last of the four principal institutions of the 
OAU - not to be confused with the Specialized Commissions - 
is the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration. This institution was certainly made part of 
the Charter in order to assure a maximum of efficiency in 
applying Article I1I,4 ( "peaceful settlement of disputes 
by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration ") 
of the Charter. This document does not reveal anything 
about this organ other than the pledge for its establish- 
ment. The first Ordinary Conference of Heads of State 
and Government in July 1964 adopted a "Protocol" of the 
Commission defining its membership and its tasks. The 
Commission thus became an integral part of the Charter.116 
Yet another year had to pass before the members of the 
Commission were designated in Accra in October 1965. And 
it was only in December 1967 that the Commission met for 
the first time.117 
The Commission was constituted as an autonomous 
organ independent of the Council and the Assembly. 
118 
It 
116. J. Woronoff, o .cit., p.176. The institutionalization 
of the Commission istinguishes the Charter of the OAU 
from that of the UN which also imposes an obligation 
for peaceful settlement of their disputes on its members 
(Article 23, UN Charter), but does not create an organ 
to deal with conflicts. It is conceivable that by 
creating such a Commission the African leaders wanted to 
compensate for the less active role given officially to 
the OAU Secretary- General. 
117 J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.181. 
118. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.392. 
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is not a judicial organ. The Commission consists of 
twenty -one members, mostly jurists, who are elected by 
the Assembly of Heads of State for a period of five years. 
No two members shall be nationals of the same country 
(Art. II,2). It is a permanent body, headed by a 
President and two Vice -Presidents who should reside in 
Addis Ababa while the other members take up their position 
whenever required. The strict regulation that the Com- 
mission shall have jurisdiction over disputes between states 
only (Art. XII), excludes conflicts between member states 
and the OAU, between member and non -member states and 
between member states and individuals.119 The Heads of 
State would resent any inroads being made on their 
prerogatives by widening the competence of the Commission.120 
Any conflict can be referred to the Commission by 
one or both opponents, by the Council of Ministers, or the 
Assembly. In case of refusal by one party to submit to 
the jurisdiction, the case can be referred to the Council 
which can recommend but not enforce a legally binding 
solution, on the antagonist who refuses to bring the dispute 
before the Commission (Art. XIII).121 Whatever the out- 
come of any dealing of the commission no ruling could be 
119. B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., pp.122 -123. 
The limitation follows the usual international pattern; 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
is also limited to states. See B.S. Murty "Settlement 
of Disputes" in: Max S#rensen: Manual of Public Inter- 
national Law, London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1968, p.701. 
120. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.177. 
121. Reprinted ibid., p.652. According to Elias, it has been 
a point of much controversy whether the jurisdiction of 
the Commission should be compulsory or optional. The 
member states would not have accepted a compulsory 
solution. T.O. Elias, "The Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration", in: British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1964, p.343. 
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enforced upon the state and there was no provision made 
for the exclusion of a non -abiding state from the OAU.122 
A brief look at the methods of peaceful settlement provided 
for in the Protocol seems appropriate. The opponents are 
free to choose either of the procedures (Art.19). 
Mediation 
One or two members of the Commission who are 
appointed by the President have the task to try and 
reconcile the views and claims of the disputants by means 
of written proposals. In case of acceptance of these 
proposals by both parties they become the basis of settle- 
ment between them.1 3 This method is very similar to the 
procedures of "good office" meaning that a third party 
brings the two parties to the dispute together to 
negotiate.124 Both methods are diplomatic procedures. 
Conciliation 
This is also a diplomatic procedure albeit with 
slightly greater influence of the conciliator on the 
parties. If a dispute is to be settled by means of 
conciliation a commission must be set up whose task is to 
elucidate the facts and to write a report containing 
122. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., pp.86 -87. This problem, however, 
was discussed but it seemed inappropriate to include 
such a provision in the Protocol when no such clause 
exists in the Charter. 
123. Art.XX,XXI of the Protocol, reprinted in: J. Woronoff, 
pp.653 -654. This procedure follows exactly 
the Definition of Mediation as codified in Art.4 of 
the Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of Inter- 
national Disputes, See Murty, op.cit., pp.675 -676. 
124. The less formal procedures of good office and negotia- 
tion are not included in the Protocol. But there is 
reference to negotiation in Art.III,4 of the Charter. 
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proposals for a settlement. Conciliation is not 
judicially binding. "In the strict sense conciliation 
is an investigation into disputed facts coupled with a 
report on legal responsibility, sometimes embodying 
recommendations for settlement. Applied more loosely the 
expression has served to describe not only inquiry and 
good office. "125 r report but also mediation and o 
It is not possible to give a clear -cut conceptual 
demarcation between mediation and conciliation. In the 
case of mediation the mediator shall be confined to 
reconciling the views and claims of the parties. Con- 
ciliation goes a little further. Conciliators may under- 
take inquiries or hear any person capable of giving 
relevant information concerning the dispute. 
The stipulations in the Protocol of the Commission 
of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration provide that if 
one or more parties wish to submit a dispute to a settle- 
ment by conciliation they should do so by sending a 
petition to the President of the Commission explaining the 
grounds of disagreement, Art. XXII. Upon receipt of the 
petition a Board of Conciliators of whom one should be 
chosen by each of the parties will be set up. The Board 
by considering all relevant questions shall then try to 
bring about an agreement between the parties upon mutually 
acceptable ternis (Articles XXIII and XXIV). The parties are 
represented by agents. Although the procedure of con- 
ciliation is more formal, the Board has no means to enforce 
any settlement. The parties in any case have the final 
say as to what the agreement should be.126 
125. See D.J. Letham Brown, Public International Law, London 
1970, pp.66 -67. 
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Arbitration 
The third form of procedure is a judicial one. 
But it must be said that though in principle it is an 
adjudicative method, "international arbitration is closely 
akin to diplomacy".127 Arbitration means the termination 
of a difference between states through application of law 
by one or more arbitrators or a tribunal other than the 
International Court of Justice. The parties can make 
their own choice of law which should be applicable to the 
case. Although the award of the arbitrators is legally 
binding, political compliance is not always obtained in 
the absence of a coercive force above the states' authority. 
To begin with parties to a dispute cannot be forced to fall 
back on arbitration to sort out their conflicts. 
The regulations for arbitration as laid down in the 
Protocol are as follows: Each party designates one 
arbitrator among the members of the Commission, who on their 
part choose a third man to become chairman of the tribunal. 
If they fail to agree on the person of chairman, he will be 
appointed by the Bureau of the Commission. All three must 
have legal qualifications. It is obvious that they should 
not be nationals of either of the disputing parties 
(Article XXVII). Recourse to arbitration shall be regarded 
as submission in good faith to the award of the arbitral 
tribunal (Article XXVIII). 
126. B.S. Murty, op.cit., p.697. 
127. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.179. 
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Before the tribunal can start its task, the 
parties have to find a compromise which, among other things, 
specifies the kind of law to be applied by the Tribunal. 
Although in keeping with international law, this provision, 
nevertheless, makes allowance for the attitude of African 
states regarding principles of international law which 
they distrust, on the grounds that it is a law formed in the 
period of imperialism and mainly a product of Christian and 
European creation. "They (the Africans) are unwilling to 
have their disputes settled by these standards (international 
law), but are prepared to have them settled by standards to 
which they have themselves agreed, in new conventions. "128 
If no specific provisions are made regarding the application 
of law, the dispute shall be decided according to treaties 
concluded between the parties, internationallaw, the 
Charter of the OAU, the Charter of the UN and if the 
parties agree, ex aequo et bono (Article XXX).129 All the 
hearings and meetings proceed in camera (Article XXXI). 
The sentence of the Tribunal is final and not open to 
revision.130 After this description of the constitutional 
set -up of the Commission, the question remains: How useful 
128. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.91. See also J. Woronoff, 
op.cit., p.180: Therefore treaty- regulated settlements 
seeseeme to be more likely in the future rather than 
settlements based on rules of customary international 
law. 
129. et aequo et bono - meaning equitable settlement of a 
dispute in disregard, if necessary, of existing law. 
A case is decided based upon this principle, if there 
is no rule of law among the categories listed, which 
might be applicable to the case. See B.S. Murty, 
"Settlement of Disputes ", op.cit., p.691. 
-122- 
could an instrument like it be in the realm of African 
dispute settlement? Although we may well anticipate 
an assessment of the Commission's importance in stating 
that so far it has not functioned131 and African states 
had recourse to other procedures than those envisaged in 
the Protocol, we, nevertheless, have to wait for an 
analysis of special cases as will be given in the following 
chapters in order to show the Commission's shortcomings. 
A few remarks, however, seem appropriate. The fact that 
by the means of relying on the ex aequo et bono principle 
the judicative procedure of the Commission can be by- passed 
indicates that the African countries prefer not to follow 
the techniques of traditional international law. "Il 
nous semble que, parmi les techniques de solutions offertes 
aux Etats africains pour régler leurs différends, le 
procédé du réglement judiciaire et arbitral correspond le 
moins á l'état actuel de la conjoncture continentale. 
L'Afrique des patries est encore au stade des négociations 
diplomatiques. "132 Given the abovementioned unwillingness 
to use the instrument of the Commission why were the 
African states so keen to establish it in the first place? 
The African leaders were aware that conflicts were liable 
to arise among their states. They needed a body able to 
deal with the expected border disputes and qualified to 
130. Nigeria, in particular, opposed the idea of excluding 
the possibility of revision or appeal. See B. Boutros- 
Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.127. 
131. Ibid., p.121, also M. Nlanigat, op.cit., p.393. 
132. B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., pp.128 -129. 
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interpret treaties and conventions. If they had no tools 
to cope with their conflicts, political disorder would be 
the result. A divided Africa would thus become an ideal 
playground for external intervention. As Mazrui sees it 
Africa's aspiration was to be its own policeman.133 
Consequently he interpreted the purposes of the Commission 
as a modest step towards a "Pax African, asserting that 
peace in Africa is to be assured by the exertions of 
Africans themselves.134 To achieve this goal, they 
preferred more flexible rather than the pre -set binding 
means offered in the Commission.135 This, however, does 
not explain why the Commission was set up in the first 
place. Perhaps the African leaders wanted to prove that 
Africa was capable of setting up a sophisticated legal 
body. institution could increase Africa's inter- 
national reputation. They wanted to become independent 
from international legal tribunals, because they distrusted 
them as "alien" institutions based on a Western value 
system. "The last straw was the inability of the Inter- 
national Court of Justice to rule in Africa's favour on the 
South West Africa case. "136 The main stumbling blocks to 
an effective Commission are summarized very appropriately 
by Woronoff: 
133. A. Mazrui, op.cit., p.213. 
134. Ibid., p.203. 
135. M. 1Vlushkat, "Problems of Political....", op.cit., 
p.275. 
136. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.180. 
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"Even with an African commission whose 
rulings were usually not binding, it was 
not certain whether the independent states 
would relax their grip on sovereignty 
sufficiently to permit the Commission to 
function. Although the member states 
had pledged to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means, this did not necessarily 
imply that they would have recourse to 
the Commission. In many cases they might 
well prefer direct negotiations or good 
offices through another state or the OAU 
itself. This was certainly the only way 
in which they would handle political 
disputes and for sometime almost every 
dispute might seem politically loaded. 
At most they would come before the 
Commission when an agreement had nearly 
been reached so as to present it as a 
victory of African unity." 137 
As long as national sovereignty is the supreme principle 
in the international relations of the African states no 
machinery no matter how perfectly constructed can settle 
disputes which are after all political problems if there 
is no means of coercion. One might speculate that in 
cases where countries felt that they could settle a dis- 
pute peacefully, they could just as well do it "privately" 
rather than through the Commission. Where they could not 
settle it easily they probably would not accept the 
Commission's ruling. 
5) The Or anization of African Unit and other Organizations 
Looking into the principles, purposes and machinery 
of the Charter the question arises - what sort of instrument 
in inter -African dispute settlements the OAU might be. As 
all the African states are members of the United Nations 
137. Ibid., pp.180-181. 
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and a majority of them also adhere to subregional 
groupings, organizations which on their part offer 
institutional frameworks for conflict solutions, the 
question has to be asked about the relationship between 
these different types of international organizations and 
the OAU. An analysis of these relationships provides us 
with an answer to the striking fact that "en cas de 
différend les interessés ou leurs collègues saisissent 
plus facilement à l'OUA que l'ONU ou tout autre organe 
sub -regional." 
138 
The Organization of African Unity and the United 
Nations 
The Preamble of the OAU Charter contains one state- 
ment which is of relevance for the OAU -UN relationship and 
thus implicitly for inter -African conflict solutions. The 
African countries adhered to the UN Charter which provides 
"a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co- operation 
among states. "139 In other words the UN seems to serve the 
same purpose albeit amongst a world -wide group of states as 
the OAU. As all African states which are members of the 
OAU are at the same time members of the world organization 
the problem of pre- eminence occurs. Which of the two 
organizations, and for what reasons, ought to be the forum 
for peacemaking in any African conflict? Since 1963 the 
only problems that were brought both before the OAU and the 
138. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.384. 
139. See Preamble of the OAU Charter. 
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UN at the same time were those which involved non -African 
countries or countries not to be regarded as African like 
Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. The Congo crisis 
is the outstanding example where Africa did not manage 
to keep the dispute confined to African mediation. The 
Stanleyville case demonstrated that the Security Council 
is not willing to give the OAU an exclusive right of 
intervention reserving to itself the role of a pure 
institution of appeal. "L'existence seule de l'OUA et le 
perfectionnement de ses capacités pour maintenir la paix 
entre ses membres n'est donc pas encore une garantie 
suffisante pour éviter toute intervention extra -africaine 
et pour finalement bannir la guerre froide du territoire 
africain."140 The main question that emerges is formu- 
by Manigat as follows: Is there an incompatibility 
between the principles of the OAU and those of the UN 
which makes the African states prefer their organization 
as a machinery of conflict settlement? How fax is it an 
aspect of the everlasting conflict between universalism 
and regionalism ?141 Perhaps the African states feel more 
like being among friends in the OAU. As far as the 
relationship between the OAU and the UN is concerned there 
is not much allusion to the UN Charter in the Charter of 
the OAU, apart from the direct reference in the Preamble. 
140. "Les Relations entre l'OUA et l'ONU ", in: Revue 
Francaise d'études Politi.ues Africaines, No.22, 
o'er , p.55. 
141. M. Manigat, «L'OUA ", op.cit., p.385. 
142. Excerpts in B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., pp.25 -26. 
c 
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However, quite a few African leaders referred to the 
similarities in the goals of the OAU and UN in their 
speeches in Addis Ababa.142 The Addis Ababa Charter 
specifically adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights defining its principles as parallel to those of the 
UN. The OAU Charter is silent about whether the OAU 
should be considered as a regional organization within the 
terms of chapter VIII of the UN Charter. A speech 
addressed to the Assembly of Heads of State in Cairo in 
July 1964 by U Thant confirmed that the top UN official 
perceived the OAU in those terms.143 The rules governing 
the relationship between the two bodies and its organs are 
on the whole incorporated in the World Organization's 
Charter. "Ce sont les régles de la Charte de l'ONU 
relatives aux accords régionaux qui sont déterminantes. "144 
Two concepts require notice. Firstly, there is according 
to articles 33 and 52 (2) of the UN Charter an obligation 
for regional organizations to use their regionally avail- 
able machinery for settlement of disputes first before 
referring conflicts to the Security Council. Regional 
organizations can count on the encouragement given to their 
procedures by the Security Council, Art. 52 (3). These 
provisions, however, do not affect the competence of the 
Security Council to investigate any conflict that might 
occur under Article 34 of the UN Charter. 
143. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.109. 
144. "Les Relations entre l'OUA et l'ONU," op.cit., p.43. 
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Secondly, there is organizational pre -eminence of 
the UN vis-a-vis the OAU. If a conflict arises between 
the competence of the UN and the OAU it is the authority 
of the world organization which predominates according to 
Article 103 of the UN Charter.145 Furthermore, the 
superior position of the UN is maintained by Article 54, 
which gives the S.C. the right to be kept fully informed 
of the activities of the regional institutions and by 
Article 103, which gives the obligations under the Charter 
priority over those under the constituent treaties of 
regional institutions.146 
To summarize, it can be contended that following 
the judicial prescription of the UN Charter the tradition 
of the OAU to confine dispute settlement to the African 
machinery is based on safe legal grounds. But this is 
surely not a satisfying explanation why the African states 
tried to keep the UN out of Africa whenever possible. The 
behaviour of the African states is first of all an 
affirmation of a deliberate political option.147 
Secondly the African states are anxious to solve 
their problems in the fraternal context of their own 
organization, as mentioned before. They are afraid that 
conflicts limited in their scope might become a dangerously 
increased threat by means of non -African involvement and 
145, "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the members of the UN under the present Charter, and 
their obligations under any other international agree- 
ment, thair obligations under the Charter shall prevail" 
B.V.A. Roling, op.cit., p.108. 
146. see B.S. Murty, op.cit., p.727. 
147. M. I ianigat, op.cit., p.386. 
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interference. "Il vaut mieux ne pas rechercher une 
'internationalisation de la paix' dans le cadre des 
Nations Unies, qui pourrait déboucher sur une "internation- 
alisation de la crise' par la mise en jeu antagonique 
d'interéts extérieure au continent ".148 But ultimately 
the OAU and the African states have no levers they can 
use against the determination of foreign powers to intervene 
in Africa.149 It remains to be seen in the following 
chapters why some countries ran against this main -stream 
of attitudes by trying to involve the UN in a conflict 
waiting for solution rather than conform with the majority 
attitude to try to solve the problem in a purely African 
framework. 
The Organization of African Unity and African 
Subregional Groups 
A final problem requires some consideration. It 
is the relationship between the OAU and subregional 
groupings. The first Council of Ministers meeting in 
Dakar in August 1963 was dominated by the problem of 
regional groupings and the pre -eminence of the OAU vis -5.- 
vis these groups.l50 The approach adopted regarding this 
relationship depends to a great extent on the general 
attitude towards African unity. Although everybody seemed 
to agree that the founding of the OAU made the existence 
of the Monrovia and Casablanca groups obsolete, there was 
no general consensus between those who advocated that all 
148. Ibid., p.387. 
149. C. Hoskyns, "Trends and Developments in the OAU ", in: 
The Yearbook of World Affairs, vol.21, 1967, p.173. 
150. S. Bonzon, op.cit., p.25. 
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organizations which were not strictly based on geographic 
realities and economic necessities had to be disbanded and 
those who did believe that the establishment of groups 
should not be limited to such purposes. The line of 
division did not simply leave all Monrovia states in one 
camp and all Casablanca states in the other. The matter 
was more complicated. However, it was clear that the UAIVI 
was the main bone of contention. As the Charter neither 
contains any reference which would make the OAU the supreme 
African body nor any requirements to compel the integration 
of other bodies into the Organization the abovementioned 
Council meeting had to take some decisions on regional 
groupings. 
Regional groupings should be restricted to non- 
political activities; this seemed to be the only logical 
conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the OAU was 
founded because the African leaders sincerely wished to end 
the existence of political divisions that had split the 
continent into rival blocs. The ministers did not agree 
on an outright dissolution of all groupings with political 
ties, advocated by such "radical" states as Ghana and 
Guinea but also by such a "moderate" one as Nigeria.151 In 
an atmosphere of tension and emotion the Council meeting's 
discussion focused on the question of the existence of the 
UAM. The members of this organization might have been 
willing to give up the status of a political group but they 
151. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.588. 
-131- 
clearly refused to disband their organization altogether. 
As Thompson and Bissell point out the UAM was serving a 
useful purpose for its members. They were not prepared 
to sacrifice it "in the name of a myth in whose history 
they had played no part. "152 Why should they make the 
sacrifice if those countries who are members of the Arab 
League were not asked to do the same. They furthermore 
argued that the UAM states had acquired great experience 
in co- operation among African states "and its cadres could 
serve as a base for that all- African co- operation which 
had not yet been achieved. "153 At the end of the debate a 
carefully worded resolution was adopted stating that 
regional groupings should be in keeping with the OAU 
Charter and be concerned with the co- ordination of economic, 
social and cultural activities.154 But the actual 
relationship between the OAU and the regional organizations 
was not determined. By 1967 when it had become evident 
even to the greatest enthusiasts that the OAU machinery was 
weak and its Specialized Committees could not fulfill an 
appropriate role in facilitating co- operation the Kinshasa 
meeting adopted a resolution which strongly recommended the 
formation of regional economic groups to fill the gap which 
the OAU had been proven incapable of doing.155 But the 
problem of co- ordinating the activities of all the existing 
groups remained one of the most complicated task in 
152. W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority.... ", op.cit., p.22. 
153. Ibid., p. 23. 
154. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.589. 
155. Ibid., p.590. 
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inter -African policy -making. 
How did the African states adapt to the new 
situation called for at the Dakar Council of Ministers 
meeting? In the cases of groups like the Ghana- Guinea- 
Mali Union, the AAPO, the Casablanca and Morovia groupings 
no dramatic decisions had to be taken, they were either 
very weak or had already died. The more successful groups 
on the other hand had to start to sort out their status in 
the future. Clearly within the meaning of the Dakar 
stipulation the UAM dropped its political functions in 
order to become a purely economic and cultural organization, 
Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique 
( UAMCE), in March 1964. Thus the survival of the 
Brazzaville group was guaranteed under the cover of a 
regional grouping in the technical sense. But only a year 
later, in February 1965, UAMCE was replaced by the 
Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) . The 
Congo crisis had once again been the main reason for the 
formation of a political group, i.e. OCAM, in Africa. The 
members wanted an organization which they could use for 
political purposes. They wanted OCAIVi to be a body which 
could co- ordinate their political activities, a body 
"within the context of the OAU to reinforce co- operation and 
solidarity between African states and to speed up their 
oli tical, economic....development. "156 The word 'political' 
was no longer omitted from the charter of a regional 
organization. However, simply mentioning 'political 
development' in a charter does not make the organisation a 
156. Z. Cervenka, op. cit. , p.146. (My italics) . 
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'political' group in any active or inter -state sense. 
Real co- ordination of policy-making requires a united 
political will. If OCAM would succeed to reactivate its 
political functions it could become a threat to the pre- 
eminence of the OAU as a political organization. 
The area in Africa where movements towards regional 
federation have always played a part in political con- 
siderations was East Africa. These ideas were particularly 
lively around 1963. But oddly enough, East African 
federation was not discussed in Addis Ababa.157 Only a 
week after the summit conference in the Ethiopian capital 
the federal tendencies in East Africa reached a focal point 
when Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika signed a Declaration in 
Nairobi announcing their intention to federate by the end 
of the year. This step immediately aroused sharp criticism 
from Ghana.X58 Nkrumah felt that "federation was not in 
accord with the Addis resolutions on African unity," 159 
while Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere emphasized that their 
move must be seen as being in line with the "spirit of Pan - 
Africanism and following the Declaration of African unity 
at the recent Addis Ababa conference. "160 The ensuing 
months and years revealed that Nkrumah attacked a lame duck. 
157. J.S. Nye, op.cit., p.195. 
158. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., pp.150 -151. 
159. J.S. Nye, op.cit., p.195. 
160. Quoted from the Nairobi Declaration, reprinted in: 
Z. Cervenka, op.cit., P.151. 
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The project of federation never got off the ground. What 
was achieved was a functional approach to co- operation 
which did not threaten the OAU's pre- eminence in political 
issues. In June 1967 Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere signed 
an agreement for an East African Community which was to be 
a kind of 'common market'.161 
It can be concluded that as long as regional groupings 
are based on a functional approach to co- operation and are 
not partial political organizations the political pre- 
eminence of the OAU is not in jeopardy. The logical con- 
sequence would be that the OAU can act as the dominant 
peace -maker in inter -African political disputes. Its 
efficiency in this realm is, however, hampered by a number 
of facts as I have suggested in this chapter. How great 
an impediment will the deficient machinery of this 
organization be? Some of these deficiencies are due to the 
conditions of underdevelopment prevailing in Africa while 
others are inherent problems faced by any international 
organization trying to combine political and legal means to 
set up a peace- keeping machinery. The power of the OAU 
can be increased by the amount of prestige it will be able 
to get in the international political community. Its 
importance is undoubtedly enhanced by making it an 
organization within the constitutional framework of the UN. 
U Thant's frequent attendance of summit meetings was an 
additional encouragement to the African leaders. 
Ultimately, however, its success depends on the willingness 
of the sovereign states to co- operate and the readiness of 
161. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.607 -608. 
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the non -African powers to abstain from interference into 
the affairs of the African continent. "La collaboration 
interétatique est la source de leur énergie, le 
nationalisme et l'affirmation individuelle des interéts 
sont des freins á leur efficacité. "162 As far as the 
historical goals of Pan -Africanism go the OAU reaffirms 
only some of them. They are those the African leaders 
can openly adhere to without jeopardizing their countries' 
independence and sovereignty. 
162. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.401. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
AND AFRICAN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
This chapter focuses on an analysis of the two major 
boundary disputes the OAU has been involved in so far. 
The main purpose of this study will be to illustrate by 
means of two case studies the general problems the OAU 
is facing as a peacemaker in territorial disputes. 
1) Legal and Political Problems of Territorial Disputes 
To begin with it seems useful to provide some 
background material on the political and legal problems 
and arguments which every study on territorial conflicts 
must take into consideration. Yet in such an approach 
one must make allowance for two difficulties arising 
immediately. Firstly, a distinction between legal and 
political arguments, as Akehurst points out, is not easy 
to achieve because they are often used side by side and 
thereby hard to distinguish.1 Secondly, the absence of 
binding rules of international law that can be applied 
for solution and the fact that every dispute has its own 
history and background gives every conflict its 
uniqueness and makes comparisons a difficult enterprise.2 
1. Michael B. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to 
International Law, London, 1970, p.194 
2. Carl Gasta Widstrand, "Some African Boundary Problems; 
A Discussion ", in: C.G. Widstrand, (ed.), op.cit., 
P.168 
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Having said this, I do not attempt in the first paragraph 
to do more than examine some principles and terms that 
crop up in the discussion about border conflicts. 
Perhaps the most important single cause of war 
between states in the past two or three centuries is rooted 
in disputes over territory.3 A factor that aggravates 
the problems is that there is no such thing as a 'natural' 
boundary.4 The qualifying adjectives 'artificial' or 
'unnatural' applied to existing borders have bedevilled 
the discussion about boundaries. Although there is 
nothing inherently 'natural' or 'unnatural' about the 
geographic limits given to political entities these terms 
have become part of the "rhetoric of territorial revisionism ".5 
The criteria for classification of boundaries as 
'natural' developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries when a doctrine of natural borders came about 
maintaining "that a nation's territory should extend to a 
designated river, mountain, lake, desert or some other 
natural barrier to population movement. "6 
3. Evan Luard (ed.), The International Regulation of 
Frontier Disputes, London, 1970, p.7 
4. "The expression 'natural boundary' has too many 
connotations, gives incorrect associations and has a 
far too variable content and significance during 
different periods. Since every boundary divides 
people and not geographic units, all boundaries must 
in one sense be considered artificial." Sven Tagil, 
"The Study of Boundaries and Boundary Disputes ", in 
C.G. Widstrand, op.cit., p.24. 
5. Ravi L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited 
Boundaries in Africa," in: World Politics, vol.18, 
no.4, July 1966, p.659 
6. A.O. Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in 
International Law, Manchester, 1967, p.16 
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Those frontiers which do not fulfill these conditions can 
be classified as 'unnatural' or 'conventional'. This 
group includes "conventional lines upon the earth's 
surface, parallels of latitude, meridians of longitude, 
straight lines between fixed points and boundaries 
defined by reference of existing provincial, tribal or 
local government boundaries... "7 Terminological 
difficulties loom large, especially as far as international 
law is concerned.8 However, the key problem is the 
"adaptation of boundaries to the factors of human occupation 
and use of the earth and to the development of different 
cultures and customs. "9 As Kapil sees it, it is the 
conflict which is created when boundaries are imposed 
without due consideration of "the interactions of the 
sociocultural system on the one hand and the political 
system on the other. " 10 
Self- Determination 
Another unsurmountable difficulty lies in the fact 
that claims for the same territory can often be based on 
different but equally valuable criteria.11 
7. Ibid., p.16 
8. Ibid., pp.16 -26 for further details. 
9. Ibid., p.25 
10. R.L. Kapil, op.cit., p.658. This is the basic problem 
bedevilling Africa's territorial disputes as will be 
seen below. 
11. E. Luard, op.cit., p.14. He names the example of 
Alsace- Lorraine. It could be claimed by France on the 
basis of culture, and by Germany on the basis of 
language. 
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That leads us straight into the discussion of the one 
principle most frequently invoked to justify boundary 
changes and that is self -determination. It was widely 
used after the First `Ab rld War in Europe as a justification 
to change borders in Eastern Europe in order to make them 
conform as closely as possible to ethnic realities. In 
this respect the otherwise heavily criticised Versailles 
Peace Treaties of 1919 allowed for territorial adjustments 
in Europe that came to be the "nearest approach ever 
achieved to demarcating the boundaries of States in 
accordance with the principle of self -determination. "12 
However, even without going into historical details 
it can be said that the realization of this policy was far 
from being perfect. Whatever the specific impediments in 
each case might have been the reason for the failure can 
be easily pinned down to two major difficulties. For one 
thing, the principle of self -determination - simple and 
clear -cut as it seems to be at first sight - defies an 
unequivocal legal, political or socio- cultural definition 
which would rule out any misconceptions. In Emerson's 
words: "The principle of self- determination derives from 
a familiar set of doctrines, whose apparent simplicity 
conceals a multitude of complications. "13 
12. D.J.L. Brown, op.cit., p.89 
13. Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, The Political 
Awakening of Africa, (ed.) Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
1965, p.297 
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I cannot give an exhaustive catalogue of the 
problems involved because that would require an elaborate 
thesis in its own right. If it is agreed with Emerson 
that "self- determination constitutes formal recognition of 
the principle that nation and state should coincide ... " 14 
which it does not in most cases in Africa and elsewhere - 
the old problems of definition of nationhood which were 
dealt with in the first chapter arise again. The 
application of the principle of self -determination is only 
possible if it could be decided who the entity is that 
forms the 'self,. This is as will be seen later a task 
open to disagreement in the African context. 
Taking the discussion back to those major difficulties 
involved in the implementation of the principle of self - 
determination, it can be stated that it is so vague a 
concept that there is little question of any positive legal 
content.15 Self- determination is not a right which found 
or finds place in international law.16 That is to say, 
although it was incorporated in the UN Charter as a principle 
which should guide international policies, it cannot be an 
incontestable principle on which to base unequivocal rights 
fought for in international law courts. One must distinguish 
between 'self -determination' as a political maxim and as a 
legal axiom. 
14. Ibid. , p.299 
15. B.V.A. R81ing, op.cit., p.78 
16. R. Emerson and M. Kilson, op.cit., p.303 
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The fact that international law is foremost law of 
and between states and therefore must accept the state 
implies that only such rules as the nature of the state 
and the strengthening of the status quo will allow are 
likely to become part of its code. The principle of 
self -determination proved to be anti status quo in the 
bulk of cases. 
In 1920 a Committee of Jurists appointed by the 
Council of the League of Nations reported that self - 
determination was not recognized by positive international 
law. They argued: "In the absence of express provisions 
in international treaties, the right of disposing of 
natural territory is essentially an attribute of the 
sovereignty of every state. "17 To grant the right of 
withdrawal from a given territory by minority groups 
seemed to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea 
of the state as a territorial entity.18 
After the Second World War it was admitted that 
the principle of self -determination of peoples should 
underlie international law and politics. The way in 
which the principle of self- determination was invoked in 
various UN resolutions points out that most states accept 
that self- determination has become an international right.19 
17. Quoted in: A. M azrui, op.cit., p.10 
18. Report of a League of Nation Commission, 1921, see 
ibid., p.9 
19. A.C. McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa, 
Oxford, 1971 
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But the concept was given a specific interpretation. The 
definition which would make the idea of self- determination 
a worthwhile principle, namely that the people "should be 
able to choose whether to remain under the government of a 
state controlled by persons of another culture, or to 
establish home rule, or to assume complete independence, or 
even to have their territory merged with another state ",20 
was regarded as too extensive an interpretation. The 
application of the principle was narrowed. Self- determination 
came to be the equivalent for 'independence'. "Sovereignty 
was always given within existing boundaries, however 
illogical, from an ethnic or linguistic point of view, 
these might be, and however much they might conflict with 
self -determination in the normal sense.n21 The UN Charter 
(article 1,2) which emphasizes the right of self- determination 
as a political right and one of the bases of friendly 
relations between nations sees it mainly as a right to 
fight a government - if necessary with force - which is 
oppressive or colonial.22 
20. D.J.L. Brown, op.cit., p.160 
21. E. Luard, op.cit., p.14 
22. See K. Skubiszewski, "Use of Force by States. 
Collective Security. Law of War and Neutrality ", 
in: M. Sorensen, op.cit., p.771 
"Despite the appearance of the principle of self - 
determination in the Charter, however, there were 
grave doubts as to whether it represented anything 
more than a mere exhortation, or whether it possessed 
a legally binding content." A.C. McEwen, op.cit., 
P.32 
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In order to avoid UN rulings on non -self -governing 
territories, Portugal made her colonies in Africa part of 
Portugal calling them 'Overseas Provinces' in 1951. 23 
She denied that Angola, Mozambique and Guiné are under 
colonial status. Even if the UN would accept the 
Portuguese interpretation, the principle of self - 
determination would still remain valid as a maxim to 
fight an oppressive regime. However, the fact is that 
the UN refused to accept Portugal's ruling and in 1960 
called for devolution of independence for the Portuguese 
colonies.24 Once independence in a given territory is 
reached the majority of countries are interested in 
preserving the territorial status quo, not in allowing 
changes in frontiers which might grant the right of 
self -determination in the sense applied in Europe after 
the First World War. Nevertheless, there are countries 
interested in annexing other people's countries as well. 
Africa holds examples. These incomplete remarks on 
self -determination must suffice for the moment; I will 
come back to it later on in this chapter. 
23. Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and 
the United Nations ", in: International Conciliation, 
No. 545, November 1963, p.9 
24. Ibid., pp.12-13 
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Terminological Problems 
In the foregoing discussion, terms like boundary, 
border, frontier, demarcation and delimitation were used 
more or less indiscriminately. It seems to be helpful 
for any further discussion to give some definitions which 
these terms have acquired in the literature on boundary 
conflicts. Although the words 'boundary' and 'frontier' 
are often applied as though they are synonymous, a 
fundamental distinction took shape in the discussion about 
these terms. Whereas a frontier means a zone or region 
having width as well as length, a boundary denotes a line.25 
"In effect, a boundary girds a frontier and, more often than 
not, it is the expansion of a frontier owing to pressure 
from within which, so frequently renders a boundary 
necessary." 26 In the contemporary international system 
frontiers have become obsolete while boundaries "are the 
prevailing fashion and are sanctioned by current notions of 
political legitimacy internationally as well as encouraged 
by modern communications and techniques of map -making. "27 
25. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., p.11; also Peter Lyon, 
"Regional Organization and Frontier Disputes ", in: 
E. Luard, oo .cit., p.111. In my case studies I 
will use the term border as a synonym for boundary 
and territory as a synonym for frontier. 
26. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., p.11 
27. P. Lyon, op.cit., p.112 
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The terms of 'delimitation' and 'demarcation' 
concern the two main processes in boundary -making. 
Delimitation describes the diplomatic process of 
determining a boundary line in a treaty. Once the mutual 
agreement on the border line is reached, it becomes 
necessary to fix its position on the ground by such means 
as marking posts or pillars. This is referred to in the 
literature as the process of demarcation.28 The 
delimitation of boundaries between states is a visible 
act of recognition of each others sovereignty on either 
side of the border. The concept of sovereignty is thus 
closely tied up with international boundaries. However, 
international law does not indicate that the complete and 
final delimitation of its borders is a prerequisite for 
the recognition of the sovereign existence of a new 
state.29 "Inasmuch as the boundary of a state is 
prima facie evidence of the limits of its sovereignty, a 
fixed boundary will be relevant to the status of a state 
only as a corollary to its territorial sovereignty. The 
delimitation of international boundaries is itself an act 
of sovereignty. "30 The close relationship existing 
between sovereignty and territorial questions make states 
assert frequently "that we must strengthen our borders ".31 
28. Ibid., p.112 and A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., p.27/28 
29. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., p.30 
30. Ibid., p.31 
31. Ibid., p.90 
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The international community of states made it clear in 
article 11,4 of the UN Charter that it regards any 
deliberate attempt to change the existing territorial 
make -up in this world of nation -states as a threat to 
international security. 
State Succession and the Principle of uti possidetis 
It seems useful to conclude this paragraph on 
general features concerning boundary problems with a few 
remarks on state succession and the principle of 
uti possidetis since in the African context nearly all 
boundaries are colonial inherited ones. The change from 
colonial status to independence brought with it a change 
of subject of international law. The independent African 
state succeeded the colonial power. What implication 
does such a succession have as far as boundary problems 
are concerned? How far is the successor state bound by 
treaties ratified by the former mother country? Generally 
speaking, a party is not bound to perform a treaty in the 
case of a fundamental change of circumstances since the 
conclusion of the original treaty. In order to make 
evasion of inconvenient treaty obligations more difficult 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in article 62 
stipulates that "2. A fundamental change of circumstances 
may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the treaty. a) if the treaty established 
a boundary."32 
32. Quoted in M.B. Akehurst, o.cit., p.179. See also, 
James L.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations, London,1968, 
PP. 57 -58: "Where title to territory even of a whole 
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The problem that is involved in the state succession or 
more appropriately speaking in the African context by state 
evolution in the process of de- colonization is often 
tackled in 'devolution agreements'. By this device not 
only constitutional rights and obligations are transferred 
to the new state but also international rights and 
obligations previously subsisting between the metropolitan 
powers and third states or other bodies.33 While France 
concluded devolution agreements with her former colonies 
in Africa34 Great Britain did not do so in all cases. 
It is particularly interesting that no such agreement 
exists between Britain and former British Somaliland.35 
The Somalis were reluctant to bind their hands in any legal 
way as far as the acceptance of their borders was concerned. 
The case study in this chapter will elucidate some of the 
reasons. 
The working of devolution agreements where they 
were concluded was not met with success. Some countries 
confined the application of the agreement by statements 
country has been acquired.... by grant of independence 
the extent of the territory acquired and the date and 
terms of its acquisition are usually so precisely 
known that no dispute can arise, though it must not be 
forgotten that such a transfer of title to territory 
will carry with it any adverse claim with which the 
territory was already burdened." 
33. Nkambo Mugerva, "Subjects of International Law ", in: 
M. S¡drensen, op.cit., p.300 
34. Ibid., p.300 
35. Ibid., p.301 
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made after attainment of independence.36 All in all it 
seems that recourse to provisions of international law 
fails to clarify the problems with which a new state is 
confronted. International law might help to sort out the 
problems of state succession but it is incapable of 
settling subsequent disputes which arise over boundary 
questions. Ultimately the revision of boundaries is a 
political issue. The outcome of negotiations concerning 
territorial disputes depends among other things upon the 
readiness of the opponents to find a compromise. Valuable 
legal provisions can surely ease the process of getting 
over obstacles but they cannot impel the parties to come 
to a successful settlement. 
Nevertheless, some general rules have been established 
in theory and by state practice as far as boundary treaties 
are concerned. After ratification the treaty "becomes 
executed and thereafter operates as a kind of conveyance."37 
A successor state therefore adopts the boundaries of its 
territory rather than the treaty itself.38 Boundary 
agreements are not "ordinary contractual arrangements" but 
"create an objective judicial situation." No provision 
36. Ibid., pp.301 -303 
37. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., pp.104 -106: see also 
A.C. McEwen, o .cit., p.19: "... boundary treaties 
pass from contract to conveyance, and the transaction 
is unaffected by the fact that the original parties 
have changed." 
38. A.P. Lester, "State Succession to Treaties in the 
Commonwealth ", in: International and Comparative Law 
uarterly, vol.12, April 1963, p.492 
-149 - 
of international law or international policy -making hinders 
any independent state to enter into negotiations with the 
objective to modify its borders. However, "the fact 
remains that at the 'critical date' of independence neither 
of the new states was in any doubt that her domains were 
the same as they stood in the hands of the parent country. "39 
The mentioning of the 'critical date' in the 
foregoing quotation leads on to one last principle which 
deserves to be considered as "akin to, if not a prolongation 
of the concept of State Succession, namely 'uti possidetis'. "40 
This concept of Roman law, uti possidetis, ita possideatis 
means "as you possess, so you may possess. "41 It was 
applied in Latin America in the nineteenth century during 
the liberation of the former Spanish colonies stating that 
the boundaries between Latin American states should correspond 
to the administrative borders which existed in the Spanish 
Empire. The adherence to that principle although it did 
not entirely exclude the eruption of disputes helped to 
limit their scope.42 As will be seen this doctrine was 
not without influence on the African politicians when it 
came to the formulation of general principles which were 
to determine their attitudes towards their inherited 
39. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., p.108 
40. Ibid., p.112 
41. P. Lyon, op.cit., p.122 
42. Ibid., pp.122-123 
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boundaries. 
2) African Views on Territorial Problems 
After this introduction to general problems 
involved in any discussion of territorial disputes, I 
will examine briefly some of the ideas of Africa's 
politicians in regard to boundary conflicts in statements 
and the Charter of the OAU. As fax as possible something 
will be said about the relationship between regional 
organizations and the settlement of frontier and boundary 
disputes 
Provisions of the OAU Charter and Resolutions 
The main conclusion we have drawn in analysing the 
Charter of the OAU and its organs was that they essentially 
provide for an association of independent states. 
Although constant lip- service is paid to the final goal 
of reaching continental unity, the OAU strengthens the 
status quo. This attitude must have repercussions for 
the mode of thinking concerning African boundaries and 
territorial questions. In this respect the Addis Ababa 
Conference with its statements on border problems was a 
visible turning point in the attitude towards the legitimacy 
of inherited boundaries. The widespread rejection of 
colonial borders gave way gradually to the almost complete 
acceptance of the existing division lines as part of the 
colonial heritage by nearly all the new states. Once 
43. "There is a considerable literature about frontiers 
and about regional organizations considered separately, 
but very little which is concerned with their mutual 
interaction." See P. Lyon, op.cit., p.136 footnote 
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African nationalism ceased to be mainly anticolonial in 
its outlook, the briefly held ideal of eliminating all 
boundaries was no longer perceived as desirable or 
feasible to put into reality for that matter.44 The 
borders of African states, on the day of their independence, 
constituted a tangible reality. H.. Une fois l' indépendance 
étatique acquise, les anciens postulats anticolonialistes 
s'avérérent inapplicables.,45 
The postulate that 'Balkanized' Africa should 
abolish her arbitrarily imposed borders was contained in 
a strongly worded resolution of the AAPC in Accra 1958, 
this being probably the most publicized re j ection. 46 The 
resolution states inter alia that the AAPC 
"a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by 
imperialist powers to divide the peoples 
of Africa, particularly those which cut 
across ethnic groups and divide people of 
the same stock; b) calls for the abolition 
or adjustment of such frontiers at an early 
date, and c) calls upon Independent States 
of Africa to support permanent solution to 
this problem founded upon the true wishes 
of the people. "47 
44. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.625 and Christopher M. Mulei, 
"The African Boundary Disputes, the OAU and 
International Law ", in: East Africa Journal, vol.VII, 
No. 10, Oct. 1970, p.28 
45. Romain Yakemtchouk, "Les Frontiéres Africaines ", in; 
Revue Générale de Droit International Public, vol.74, 
No. 1, 1970, p.51 
46. Saadia Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", in: 
International Organization, vol.XXI, No. 1, Winter 
1967, p.102 
47. re- printed in C. Legum, op.cit., p.231 
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In the light of what has been said earlier in this 
chapter, it is not without significance to underline 
that it was a People's Conference with the bulk of the 
delegates representing organizations rather than states. 
They were less concerned with the sovereign existence of 
the state and of the state system as inherited by the 
colonial parent countries. Whether this call for 
adjustment was ever meant to be serious is doubtful, 
because the AAPC- resolution has not been repeated at 
later conferences. That is to say other than AAPC- 
Conferences, because the Tunis -Conference 1960 saw a 
repetition of the statements concerning border adjustments 
made in Accra.48 
Looking at the Charter and the speeches delivered 
at Ababa and ensuing meetings, no such commitment 
to the alteration of borders as given at the AAPC- 
Conference re- occurs. At Addis Ababa there was awareness 
amongst the leaders that frontier and boundary disputes 
could endanger the peace they sought.49 How could it 
have been otherwise? After all the absence of King 
Hassan II of Morocco from the conference and the address 
of the Somalian President, who gave reference to the 
territorial disputes of his country with Kenya and 
Ethopia, thus provoking a sharp reply from Ethiopia's 
48. Ibid., p.231 
49. T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the OAU ", oT.cit. p.249 
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Prime Minister, helped to remind the leaders present that 
those conflicts would loom large in further relations 
among the independent African states.50 Somalia's 
President, Abdullah Osman declared: 
"It has been suggested by some that any 
attempt to adjust existing boundary 
arrangements would aggravate rather than 
ease the situation, and for that reason 
matters should remain as they are. We 
do not subscribe to that view for several 
reasons. It would amount to us condoning 
actions and policies which we know very 
well are wrong. .. It would show that 
we are shortsighted to think that African 
Unity can be achieved by side -tracking the 
contentious issues that are the realities 
of the African scene. .. The Somali 
Government, therefore, must press for self - 
determination for the inhabitants of the 
Somali areas adjacent to the Somali 
Republic. "51 
That Osman expressed views not shared by the vast 
majority of the leaders present was made clear in 
Houpho'ct- Boigny's (chairman) remarks of regret that a 
territorial dispute should have been mentioned in open 
meeting.52 Modibo Keita's declaration was more in 
keeping with the majority view: 
"Si vraiment nous sommes les uns et les 
autres animés de la volonté ardente de 
faire l'unité africaine il faut que nous 
renoncions aux prétentions territoriales 
si nous ne voulons pas instaurer en 
Afrique ce qu'on pourrait appeler 
L'impérialisme noire, l'unité africaine 
50. S. Touva', "The OAU and African Borders; op.cit., 
p. 103 
51. Reprinted in Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies in African 
Diplomacy: II, "The Ethiopia- Somali -Kenya Dispufe 
1960 -67 ", Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, 1969, 
PP. 32 -33 
52. Keesing's Contemporary Archivent vol.XIV, 1963 -64, p.19465 
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exige de chacun de nous le respect 
intégral de l'héritage que nous avons 
reçu du systéme colonial, c'est -á -dire 
le maintain des frontieres actuelles 
de nos Etats respectifs ".53 
Although Keita and other speakers adhered to the 
principles of uti possidetis in their speeches, we must 
wait until the first Conference of Heads of State and 
Government in Cairo in 1964 for an authentic interpretation 
of article 111,3 of the OAU Charter as far as border 
conflicts are concerned. No direct allusions to the 
principle of uti possidetis are included in the Charter 
or any of the adopted resolutions of the Addis Ababa 
summit meeting. The chief reason why that was the case 
is that "it was felt that opinions on the subject were 
too sharply divided. As the participants of the 
conference regarded the adoption of the Charter as their 
prime objective, nothing was done which could have 
prevented its unanimous approval. "54 
The resolution on Border Disputes adopted in 1964 
stipulates that the Assembly: "Solemnly declares that all 
Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers 
existing on their achievement of national independence."55 
This is not only a clear indication that Africa's leaders 
have agreed on the principle of uti possidetis with the day 
53. B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.49 
54. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., 
p.104 
55. Reprinted in: Ian Brownlie, Basic Documents on African 
Affairs, Oxford, 1971, p.361 
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of attainment of independence as the 'critical date' but 
also that "the search for a legitimising principle to 
consolidate the existence of African States, converged 
in the legitimation of the status quo. "56 The solemn 
declarations of adherence to the uti possidetis principle 
has not impeded the leaders from maintaining individual 
claims for border revisions whenever such a claim could 
be met with success.57 
However, the impact of the resolution was hampered 
by three basic factors. One was that Somalia - the 
country which strongly resisted the uti possidetis doctrine - 
in a formal communication dated from July 24, 1964 made it 
publicly known that she disagreed with the interpretation 
of article III,3 of the OAU Charter given in the resolution.58 
Morocco had made it known that she attached to her 
signature of the Charter no recognition of the existing 
boundaries. Her adherence "ne saurait aucunement étre 
interprétée comme une reconnaissance expresse ou implicite 
des faits accomplis jusqu'ici refusés comme tels..."59 
The two other weaknesses were inherent in the text 
of the resolution. Firstly, the resolution cannot be 
applied to demarcation problems and it is doubtful whether 
or not the resolution is relevant to border disputes which 
56. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.94 
57. See the long list of border incidents given by H. Strauch, 
"L'OUA et les Conflits Frontaliers ", in: Revue 
Francaise d'Etudes Politiques Africaines, no.22, 
October 1967, pp.67 -73 
58. B. Boutros -Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.52 
59. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.389 footnote 
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existed before the colonial intervention. For example 
Ethiopia, Morocco and Liberia could claim additional 
territory which they had possessed in the pre -colonial 
era.ó0 Secondly, no reference whatsoever is made to 
the principle of self -determination. "A logical corollary 
of the resolution would be that attempts to change the 
status quo by groups claiming the right of self- determination 
are to be rejected. "61 
Self- Determination in the African Context 
It seems appropriate at this point of this analysis 
to pick up the thread of discussion about the principle of 
self -determination and have a closer look at its ambiguity 
in the African context. It is apparently the most 
illuminating single problem in any discussion of border 
issues in Africa. It is not necessary to repeat the 
history of the partitioning of Africa among the European 
colonial powers who did not consider African grievances 
although borders were not drawn in complete disregard of 
African realities as Touval points out in one of her 
articles.62 I am more concerned with the question of why 
60. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Boundaries ", op.cit., 
p.125 
61. Ibid., p.125. Touval mentions an interesting 
communique issued by Haile Selassie and Nehru in 1965 
in the context of the Kashmir dispute which says 
inter alia that "the principle of self- determination 
should apply only to colonial territories which have 
not yet attained independence and not to parts of 
sovereign or independent states." Ibid., p.125 
footnote 
62. This is a controversial point on which scholars disagree. 
As will be seen later in this chapter, some African 
rulers - such as Menlik II of Ethiopia - played an 
active role in border delimitations. 
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contemporary leaders in Africa in a great majority accept 
borders as they are. what prevents them from making 
adjustments when it is so apparent "that their present 
location does not represent the territorial culmination of 
locally generated political processes "263 
Generally speaking the uneasiness felt about the 
doctrine of self- determination in Africa stems from the 
factor which influences attitudes towards so many other 
problems in this continent: the lack of achievement of 
internal stability and cohesion inside the individual 
states. It only seems natural that the little internal 
unity that they did manage to reach should not be put in 
jeopardy by any changes in the territorial make -up following 
an invocation of the principle of self -determination. 
Certainly it would be idle to expect African leaders to 
consider that some kind of stability inside the state might 
be easier to achieve if they would allow an ' irredentist' 
minority to form its own separate sovereignty by adjusting 
the borders. 
Is it legitimate to talk about a "new attitude of 
African states towards the concept of self-determination"?" 
It has been repeatedly stated that a sense of 'nationhood' 
is still embryonic in a majority of African states.65 
63. R.L. Kapil, op.cit., p.659; Saadia Touval, "Treaties, 
Borders and the P artition of Africa ", in: Journal of 
African History, vol.VII, no.2, 1960, pp.279 -292 
64. C.M. Mulei, op.cit., p.28 
65. Saadia Touval, "The Sources of Status Quo and Irredentist 
Policies ", in; C.G. Widstrand, op.cit., pp.102 -103 
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Those political leaders who have adhered to the status quo 
attitude associated the 'self' with the state and the state 
was defined by its inherited boundaries.66 In some cases 
the gain of adjacent regions and tribes which would increase 
the weight of a tribal group inside a country might upset 
the tribal balance just as much as the breaking away of a 
group and a territory. The gain of territory could thus 
be a rather mixed blessing for the country's ruling tribal 
group or groups. These attitudes are the somewhat logical 
consequence of many leaders' interpretation of 'self - 
determination'. In Africa most nationalists chose to view 
the right of self -determination as applicable to the 
colonial territories as a whole within the given boundaries. 
"Once such a people has come to independence, no residual 
right of self -determination remains with any group within 
it or cutting across its frontiers. "67 Africa could not 
follow 'Versailles'. It would have meant the breakdown 
of the territorial make -up of the continent. Africa did 
not allow for ethnic self- determination but rather for 
'pigmentational' self- determination.ó8 The fight for 
independence was directed against the white overlords. The 
identity amongst the Africans was a racial rather than an 
ethnic one. 
66. Ibid., p.105 
67. Rupert Emerson, cited in: C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in 
African Diplomacy: II, op.cit., p.7 
68. A. I azrui, op.cit., p.14 
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The main conclusion that comes to mind after the 
discussion of some aspects of the principle of self - 
determination is that no formula which could cover its 
interpretation or establish ground -rules for its application 
can be found. To base a claim on this principle still 
holds strong emotional impact. Invoking it may even be 
of great political consequence as the example of 'Biafra' 
demonstrated, but its legal implications are almost nil. 
The interpretations and connotations given to the doctrine 
must be looked at in the context of a given time, place 
and circumstance.69 However, in discussing problems in 
relation to territorial questions one should be careful 
not to interpret them on ' tribalist' grounds alone. In 
many cases, it is convenient to invoke the dangers of 
'tribalism' in order to veil the real issues at stake. 
'Tribalism' is a dirty word in African. politics. The 
real bones of contention are very often political and 
economic interests. 
69. See E. Lofoli, "Le Principe de l'Autodétermination des 
Peuples et des Nations et son Application en Afrique ", 
in: Etudes Congolaises, vol.XII, no. 3, July-Sept. 1969, 
p.35. "La plupart des membres de l'ONU ont été 
d'accord que premiérement le droit de l'autodétermination 
est universel, que deuxiémement le mot 'peuple' signifie 
la population dans tous les pays et territoires, 
indépendants, sous tutelle ou non autonomes et que, 
troisiemement, il faut comprendre ce terme dans le sens 
le plus général et qu'il n'y a aucune nécessité d'en 
donner une définition précise, car les questions 
concernant l'autodétermination doivent 'tre tranchées 
concrétement dans chaque cas pris r. part." 
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The OAU and Territorial Problems 
There are three main factors which make it a 
challenge to search for some institutional devices which could 
ease occurring boundary troubles: 
1) the complicated problems involved in any territorial 
dispute 
2) the absence of clear -cut legal or political principles 
which could be applied without provoking heated debates 
of whether or not a specific principle is applicable in 
the case under dispute and 
3) the incompatibility existing between the status quo 
attitude and the revisionist approach to inherited 
boundaries in Africa. 
To put it in more straightforward terms: What use can a 
regional organization be for the settlement of boundary 
conflicts? It is impossible to provide an answer to so 
general a question. As Lyon points out: "... the 
relevance or irrelevance of regional organizations to any 
particular boundary dispute obviously can only be at all 
adequately seen in relation to the particular facts of the 
particular dispute."70 In the African context, however, 
some general statements can be made. As long as every 
independent African state is a member of the OAU, all 
boundary disputes between these entities can be dealt with 
in its framework. The second chapter of this paper shows 
that the OAU - although its institutional set -up might 
70. P. Lyon, op.cit., p.110 
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not be without shortcomings and loopholes - is designed by 
its founding fathers and by the role given to it as a 
regional organization in the wider frame of the UN to cope 
with disputes arising amongst its membership. One effect 
of the existence of the OAU not to be brushed aside is its 
possible restraining influence.71 If the OAU could really 
achieve its primary goal, namely to promote co- operation and 
an increasing degree of unity among African states, it might 
help to reduce the actual and potential significance of 
boundaries as division lines between political entities and 
thereby lessen the explosiveness of territorial controversies. 
Given the frequently mentioned sovereignty of the independent 
states, no force can compel parties to refer any dispute - 
territorial or other - to the regional organization. Even 
if this is done, the influence the organization can exert 
upon the disputants is limited by the lack of coercion which 
is at the disposal of the organization. A final assessment 
of the role of the OAU will be given after the case studies 
have provided us with empirical material. However, until 
full access to all the records and documents is possible any 
comparative analysis of the OAU's handling of the two 
conflicts discussed in the next part of this chapter remains 
necessarily provisional and open to revision in the light of 
further evidence. 
71. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., 
P.126 
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3) The Algerian - Moroccan Territorial Conflict 
It was only a few months after the foundation of 
the OAU that it had to deal with the first serious 
territorial dispute at a time when its institutional 
apparatus was not yet fully set up.72 In a sense the 
conflict between Algeria and Morocco can be said to be the 
first major test for the Organization's ability to tackle 
such problems. In order to understand the difficulties 
every peacemaker in the Algerian - Moroccan frontier 
dispute would encounter some background material about the 
issues at stake is necessary. It is only by knowing the 
origins of the dispute that one is able to measure the 
success or failure of the OAU. 
Historical and Political Background 
What historical and political facts lay 
conflict? The fact that the border between Algeria and 
Morocco with the exception of the northernmost part had 
never been delimited let alone demarcated was the direct 
cause of the dispute. Morocco referring to the idea of 
a 'Greater Morocco' tried to regain parts of her former 
territory.73 By the same token the Moroccans denied 
72. Above all the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration - the most appropriate organ to deal 
with such problems - was not established. Furthermore 
the conflict erupted at a time when both opponents had 
not yet ratified the Charter of the OAU. See: "Les 
Relations entre L'OUA et l'ONU", op.cit., p.51 
73. The exact area claimed by Morocco is not clearly 
defined. See map for an indication of the area 
under disputes p. / 62 
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Mauritania the right of existence as an independent 
state74 and claimed parts of the Sahara now being Algerian 
territory which this country refused to cede. 
Prior to the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 
North Africa did not know borders as fixed delimitation 
lines as we perceive them today. Furthermore, an 
"Algerian state in the European sense, or an Algerian 
consciousness" did not exist.75 In those precolonial 
days a vast, ill- defined territory which included parts 
of Algeria, and all Mauritania was ruled in the name of 
the Sultans of Morocco . 
76 
This large area only knew 
natural barriers and traditional frontier zones. The 
arrival of the French saw a clash between Western and 
traditional religiously orientated concepts of such terms 
as 'nation', 'territory' and 'boundary'. Geographical 
and political factors did not enter into the Islamic 
concept of territory.77 The Islamic rulers never felt 
it necessary to delimit their realms. "It was a community 
of believers (Umma), neither static nor exclusive, rather 
than a definite territory.. Their neighbours were of 
74. As will be remembered Morocco did not attend the 
Addis -Ababa Conference because it did not want to sit 
at the same conference -table with the representatives 
of a country whose sovereign existence they refused 
to recognize. 
75. Alf A. Heggoy, "Colonial Origins of the Algerian - 
Moroccan Border Conflict of October 1963 ", in: 
African Studies Review, Vol.XIII, no.1, April 1970, 
p.17 
76. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.336 
77. Patricia Berko Wild, "The Organization of African Unity 
and the Algerian - Moroccan Border Conflict ", in: 
International Organization, Vol.XX, no.1, Winter 1966, p.19 
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similar origin, and of the same religion. They were all 
engaged in expanding dar al Islam, the world of Muslim 
faith... 
"78 
The community of Believers does not consent 
to the confinement of any boundary, especially not those 
which are imposed by non -Islamic powers, which impedes the 
expansion of the Dar al Islam (the House of Islam).79 
This was the background which the French colonialists 
encountered when they concluded a number of treaties 
concerning territorial questions with the sovereign Moroccan 
Government in order to delimit the division line between 
Morocco and Algeria.80 In the Treaty of Lalla Marnia 
signed in 1845 between France and Morocco only the above 
mentioned northernmost boundary (approximately 100 miles) 
was defined in detail forming the division line between 
Morocco and Algeria from the Mediterranean coast to 
Teniet- el- Sassi.81 South and south -west from this point 
reaching the Sahara no territorial limit was established. 
The two sovereignties in this area were defined by reference 
to specific tribes which had their grazing grounds in this 
region, thus creating frontier zones instead of well 
78. Anthony S. Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundaries: 
A Factual Background ", in: Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol.I, no.3, 1963, PP315 -316 
79. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.19. As Zartman points out, "In 
a nomadic society such as that from which Muslim legal 
ideas spring, the notion of territory is subordinate to 
the concept of people." I.W. Zartman, "The Sahara - 
Bridge or Barrier ?", in: International Conciliation, 
1963, No.541, p.42 
80. In this short outline we will only mention some of the 
treaties relevant for our understanding. 
81. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.19 
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designated border lines.82 When, in the course of the 
nineteenth century, French expansion in Algeria conflicted 
with tribes from Morocco there was an attempt to establish 
a better delimited frontier further south by means of various 
agreements. 
In 1912 Morocco became a French protectorate. In 
the same year the so- called Varnier Line was unilaterally 
drawn by France establishing an administrative 'boundary' 
between Teniet -el -Sassi and the town of Figuig in Morocco. 
This line was never intended to be an international boundary. 
Another unilaterally created administrative delimitation 
was the Trinquet Line, 1934, which was drawn at the watershed 
of the Draa Valley. It is important to emphasize that 
Morocco has not been a party to any of the treaties which 
effected her territory directly.83 These lines were drawn 
for administrative purposes. In the attitude of the French 
the Sahara was uninhabitable and thus made delimitation 
superfluous. Therefore no agreement resulted on the 
delimitation of the zone between the Hammada du Guir and 
the Spanish Sahara.84 
After 1912 the frontier question became merely one 
of the limits of the authority of the French administrations 
in the two territories. The inconsistency of official 
French maps helped to confuse the situ ation.85 From what 
82. A.S. Reyner, op.cit., p.316 
83. A.A. Heggoy, op.cit., p.20 
84. A.S. Reyner, op.cit., p.317 
85. Ibid., p.316 
-167- 
has been said so far it would be tempting to lay the entire 
blame at France's door and describe the difficult territorial 
problems between Morocco and Algeria as a result of colonial 
policy of France. France did nothing to leave behind clearly 
defined international boundaries rather than administrative 
divisions. But as Heggoy rightly points out the situation 
with which France was confronted was complicated by the fact 
that unreconcilable concepts of Western and traditional 
Islamic law concerning territorial questions did exist.86 
When Morocco regained her independence in 1956 she 
had only partially defined borders. Nevertheless, France 
pledged herself in a Joint Declaration issued on March 2, 
1956 "to respect, and to see to it that others respect, 
the integrity of Moroccan territory, as guaranteed by 
international treaties . " 87 Attempts of a joint French- 
Moroccan commission to enter into negotiations in order to 
define borders were not met with success.88 Morocco 
withdrew from the_ commission arguing that the only authority 
competent to deal with these questions concerning the 
Moroccan -Algerian border would be the Algerian Provisional 
Government (GPRA) . Morocco approached the Algerians. 
However, "to avoid embarrassing the GPRA in the midst of the 
86. A.A. Heggoy, op.cit., p.17 
87. Text reprinted in: American Journal of International 
Law, vol.51, no.3, July 1957, p.676 
88. See I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, op.cit., p.110 
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struggle for independence, these demands were not made 
publicly. "89 Nevertheless, a secret agreement was 
concluded on July 6, 1961 between the GPRA represented by 
Ferhat Abbas and Morocco represented by King Hassan II. 
This agreement included Algeria's recognition that the 
cause of the territorial problem lay in France's arbitrary 
delineation. Furthermore Algeria agreed that "this 
problem will be resolved through negotiations between the 
Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of Independent 
Algeria. "90 When Algeria eventually gained independence 
this promise was not fulfilled. Algeria disputed any 
rights claimed by Morocco based on historic grounds. The 
Algerians maintained that they inherited all the territories 
of French colonial Algeria.91 They strictly denied the 
existence of any frontier problems.92 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that 
the regimes in Rabat and Algier drifted more and more apart 
ideologically.93 The border problems led to a clash 
between two countries with different national interests. 
The discovery of mineral resources in the territories under 
dispute compounded the problem. The new prospect of 
wealth and industrialization made an ending of the hot 
dispute more urgent. As Zartman points out the causes 
89. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.336 
90. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.336 
91. A.A. Heggoy, op.cit., p.17 
92. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.336 
93. S. Chime, op.cit., p.68 
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for demands on neighbouring territories can be manifold. 
It is very difficult to prove the 'real' causes, in other 
words to distinguish between "public justifications" and 
"private motivations ".94 
In the years after independence both Algeria and 
Morocco experienced internal tension. It has been widely 
contended in the literature that both regimes welcomed the 
territorial disputes as issues in which they could find 
scapegoats and try to divert the attention of their peoples 
from domestic grievances.95 Algeria was in trouble 
because of the dissident Kabyles who threatened the unity 
of this country. Morocco's internal stability was not 
only bedevilled by those people who looked with much 
sympathy towards the Algerian radical policies in contrast 
to their own country's autocratic regime but also by 
claims from nationalist, irredentist groups like the 
Istiglal Party of Allal al- Fassi. The King came under 
pressure. The _breakdown of national solidarity which 
had been forged in the years of struggle for Morocco's 
independence left no other choice for Hassan II but to 
adopt the irredentist policy which "provided a simpler 
device for the purpose of blurring political differences 
and stimulatin g patriotic feelings." 
96 
Apart from 
94. I. William Zartman, "The Foreign and Military Politics 
of African Boundary Problems ", in: C.G. Widstrand, (ed.) 
op.cit., p.86 
95. S. Chime, op.cit., p.69 and P.B. Wild, op.cit., pp.22 -23 
96. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.22. Zartman sees the "sentimental 
attachment to irredentism" as the major theme in Morocco's 
African relations between 1958 and May 1963. I.W. 
Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West 
Africa ", in: Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.3, 
110.21 August 1965, p.164 
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domestic difficulties other motives for Morocco's demands 
were economic and strategic. The country was particularly 
interested in the area around Tindouf which was not only 
the centre of rich iron ore deposits but also a vital 
strategic point to control the route through to Mauritania. 
The Search for a Peacemaker 
Given all the above mentioned circumstances it did 
not require much to make the 'tinderbox' explode. Minor 
skirmishes occurred right after Algeria attained independence 
when both countries sent troops to occupy positions in the 
areas under dispute. Tension built up in August 1963 
after both sides expelled nationals from the other country. 
Charges provoked countercharges. Moroccan spokesmen 
repeatedly alleged that Algerian troops had made incursions 
into Moroccan territory. The Algerian Government accused 
Morocco of massing forces on the border. 
When bilateral attempts to come to a negotiated 
solution of the, problem and to work out a troop withdrawal 
failed to achieve positive results an escalation of 
hostilities began which eventually led to fighting and 
threatened to develop into a full -scale war. On September 
30, 1963 President Ben Bella faced with an uprising by the 
Kabyles against his regime alleged that Moroccan army units 
had been sent to the frontier area to support the Kabyles. 
He accused the Moroccan Government of making common cause 
with Algeria's internal rebels.97 
97. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.24 
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A meeting between the Algerian and Moroccan Foreign 
Ministers in Oujda on October 5, 1963 remained without 
results. A normalization of relations between the two 
countries was not achieved. In the beginning of October 
both sides occupied and held posts each accusing the other 
army of military attacks. Large scale fighting broke out 
on October 14, 1963. Algeria declared that her territory 
had been invaded by a large force and announced general 
mobilization. Morocco sent more troops.98 Both sides 
soon realized that they could not gain from protracting 
the war. It was after the breakdown of peace talks 
between Algeria and Morocco which took place on October 
15 -17, 1963 that both antagonists had to think of other 
channels and means to overcome the deadlock. 
The questions at issue were about the form of peace 
negotiations, the possible participation and identity of 
mediators, and the venue of a conference. Morocco's 
preference was no doubt for direct negotiation with Algeria - 
an approach which was not surprising. The Moroccans saw 
their only chance of territorial gains in forcing Algeria 
into an agreement on Moroccan terms, provided that Morocco 
could operate from a superior military position. 
Both parties were members of three international 
organizations whose principles of pacific settlement of 
disputes had been obviously violated by the outbreak of 
armed hostilities. For that matter any of the three 
98. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.337 
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organizations i.e. the Arab League, the UN and the OAU 
could be chosen as a forum for different but equally 
strong reasons.99 Also, there was the possibility of 
mediation by third parties and individual African and 
Arab statesmen. The paramount questions are, what 
criteria influenced the choice of certain mediators and 
why were some mediation attempts more successful than 
others? 
Let us first consider Morocco's position and 
argumentations. It has already been indicated that her 
first preference was that of bilateral negotiations with 
Algeria. The Arab League could not be Morocco's option 
as a mediator, since it was said to be biased against 
this country. 100 Being aware of her diplomatic and 
political isolation in and rejecting the OAU's 
status quo attitude towards the territorial legacy of 
this continent, Morocco must have been reluctant, to say 
the least, to seek an OAU settlement of the dispute.101 
Although Morocco had signed the OAU Charter on September 20, 
1963 it will be recalled that she made it clear that this 
act could not be interpreted as a recognition of existing 
99. B. Boutros- Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.53. The articles 
in the respective charters of the three organizations 
advocating peaceful settlement are: article 5 of the 
Pact of the Arab League, articles 2 and 3 of the UN 
Charter and articles III and XIX of the OAU Charter. 
100. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.26 
101. It could not have escaped Morocco's knowledge that 
"l'Algérie révolutionnaire et á peine sortie d'une 
longue guerre coloniale avait su canaliser a son profit 
tout un courant de sympathie de comprehension et meme 
d'appuis agissants (en Afrique) ." M. Manigat, op.cit., 
P.390 
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borders or a renunciation of her rights. It is thus not 
surprising that for these various reasons Morocco's choice 
was the UN. The Moroccans expected to encounter among 
the members of the UN and the Security Council an atmosphere 
less hostile to their cause than in the OAU. However, 
Morocco never got any further than lobbying at the UN and 
refrained from requesting officially a meeting of the 
Security Council. According to Wild and Manigat the main 
reason for this retreat was Morocco's failure to secure 
for herself the support of the United States and France.102 
Both states hoped not to become involved in the conflict 
and both advocated a settlement within the African 
framework.103 This must have been the ultimate reason 
why Morocco eventually consented, albeit reluctantly, to 
an 'African' solution of the problem. 
All the facts which have been listed to explain 
Morocco's hesitation towards African mediation - especially 
OAU interference - encouraged Algeria to appeal to her 
African 'brothers' for help in a cause which she 
considered just. 
"L'Algérie avait intérét , maintenir le 
débat dans un cadre africain, en se 
retranchant derriére la toute nouvelle 
jurisprudence établie par l'OUA, qui 
gelait les frontiéres issues de la 
102. Although the Security Council did not deal with the 
problem, the General Assembly debated the situation 
and U Thant offered his good office. J. Woronoff, 
op.cit., p.455 
103. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.28 and M. Manigat, op.cit., 
p.388 
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colonisation, tout en s'accordant le 
bénéfice moral de passer pour honorer 
l'esprit et la lettre de la Charte d'Addis 
Abéba." 104 
This is why Algeria in a note of October 19, 1963 appealed 
to the OAU requesting an extraordinary meeting of the 
Council of Isiinisters.105 Because of the failure to get 
Morocco's accord for OAU intervention in the conflict at 
that stage such a meeting could only take place at Addis 
Ababa on November 15 -18, 1963.106 
In the meantime, following the "spirit of 
Addis Ababa ", pacification - though no solution - had 
been achieved with the help of African politicians who 
offered their good offices. While mediation efforts by 
Bourguiba and Nasser1o7 broke down because neither was 
acceptable to both parties, Haile Selassie's and Modibo 
Keita's exertions met with success. Haile Selassie who 
happened to be on a state visit to Morocco when the 
fighting broke out started his work as a mediator on the 
spot.108 After Algeria's demand for an extraordinary 
meeting of the Council of Ministers the Emperor's hands 
were strengthened. He played a leading role in the OAU 
as his country was entrusted with the Provisional Secretariat. 
Haile Selassie could now continue his mediation assignment 
both in his personal capacity and also on behalf of the OAU. 
104. M. Manigat, 
105. J. Woronoff 
106. S. Touval, 





, op.cit., p.338 
"The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.108 
no doubt that she was backing Algeria and 
sent troops. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.453 
108. "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
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That the two warring parties eventually accepted 
the invitation to come to Bamako was due to the fact that 
both sides were satisfied with the choice of Haile Selassie 
and Keita as mediators. I do agree with Woronoff that 
they were both suited to the task. There was ideological 
affinity between the Mali and Algerian leader which moved 
Algeria to accept Keita's good office. Morocco's 
acceptance of Keita was encouraged by the fact that Mali 
was dissatisfied with her Saharan borders which made her 
leader a less stubborn believer in the principle of 
uti possidetis.109 On the other hand, the Emperor opposed 
any redrawing of African boundaries and had rejected 
Somalia's claims which made him sympathetic to the Algerians 
while his conservatism made him suitable for the job in 
Morocco's eyes.110 Haile Selassie must have been 
especially interested to influence the outcome of a 
settlement which might set a favourable example as a 
precedent to other such disputes. 
The Bamako Meeting and the First Extraordinary Session 
of the Council of Ministers 
The Bamako meeting (October 29 -30, 1963) provided 
the first indication that the African leaders were heading 
for an African settlement. In the short run the most 
109. In February 1963 at a meeting between Modibo Keita of 
Mali and Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania an agreement 
was concluded about an exchange of territories. For 
some details see: I. William Zartman, "A Disputed 
Frontier is Settled ", in: Africa Report, vol.8, no.8, 
August 1963, pp.13 -14 
110. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.338 
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important agreement reached in Mali's capital was on a 
cease -fire beginning on November 2, 1963 which was to be 
followed by a gradual return to the status quo ante. 
A demilitarized zone should be created, the limits of 
which should be determined by a commission of officers 
from Algeria, Morocco, Mali and Ethiopia with Malian and 
Ethiopian officers in charge of supervising the observance 
of the demilitarized agreement.111 
These above mentioned steps were to halt the war -like 
activities. The most important clause of the agreement 
was contained in paragraph 4 because it provided for some 
means to try and rule out any recurrence of fighting. It 
said that Han early meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers 
was requested in order to establish an arbitration commission 
which would be charged with a) ascertaining the responsibilities 
for the outbreak of hostilities and b) examining the border 
problem and admitting recommendations to Algeria and 
Morocco for the definite settlement of their dispute."112 
Both parties to the dispute had achieved something to go 
home with, although the result was more favourable for the 
Algerians. Algeria welcomed the withdrawal of troops to 
the lines of the status quo ante. Morocco found the 
dispute recognized as such and got the promise that there 
would be a search for a settlement. "The Emperor and 
Modibo Keita were eager to have the OAU intervene, possibly 
111. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders", op.cit., 
p.107 
112. Ibid., p.107 
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as a precedent for an African handling of other border 
disputes...11113 It remains to be seen whether their 
expectations were satisfied by the way the OAU handled 
this problem. 
The Council of Ministers was convened in extra- 
ordinary session in Addis Ababa on November 15 -18, 1963 
to consider the Bamako cease -fire agreement. The 
ministers present must have been aware of the significance 
of their meeting; after all, it was the first serious task 
which the OAU had been given. The fact that the Commission 
of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration though planned 
in the Charter was not yet set up meant that the ministers 
had to start from scratch. They had no precedents from 
which to draw examples. Their guide lines in their task 
could only be general principles of Charter and the 
provisions made in the Bamako agreement. It was not 
surprising that it took them three days to come out with 
a final resolution. What kind of commission should they 
set up? Accepting an arbitration commission would imply 
that the parties recognized from the start the binding 
nature on themselves of the arbitral judgement that would 
be delivered. Whatever form the commission would be given 
there was no guarantee that both parties would defer to 
its decision. Haile Selassie tried to create the right 
atmosphere when he expressed his satisfaction that thanks 
to the existence of the OAU an African conflict could now 
113. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.339 
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be resolved in an African framework.114 The discussions 
were held behind closed doors. The facts that have 
become known to the public about the procedures are 
important to note. The Bamako agreement was adopted as 
the sole basis of discussion. The foreign ministers thus 
complied with the Moroccan request to withdraw the letter 
of October 23, 1963 submitted by the Algerian Government, 
in which called for an OAU meeting, because it was 
superseded by the Bamako agreement . 1 15 
While the ministers and their representatives 
present reserved their opinions on the dispute, both 
parties involved reiterated their positions, and each 
accused the other side of agression. Morocco stated that 
it had been put on record that she expressed reservations 
with respect to her territorial boundaries from the very 
day of her independence. The country, however, had agreed 
to postpone the solution of the problem until after 
Algeria's independence. Algeria had pledged herself in 
the Ferhat Abbas -Hassan II agreement of July 1961 to enter 
into direct negotiations with Morocco on that matter. 
Morocco furthermore contended that her claims were based 
on a number of treaties and emphasized the historical 
right over certain territories. Algeria was accused of 
having permitted intervention of a third country, i.e. 
Egypt. 
114. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.29 
115. Ibid., p.29 
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The Algerian Foreign Minister, Mr. Bouteflika, 
replied for his country. He made Morocco responsible for 
all border incidents and found her guilty of expansionist 
adventures. He declared that the aims ran counter to the 
principles of international law sanctioned by the OAU . 
"To wish to impose unilaterally the least revision of the 
Algerian- Moroccan border is without doubt to create a 
precedent or an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future 
of many African states... +116 From all that has been 
said so far in this thesis considering the African attitude 
towards borders, the great majority in the Council must 
have endorsed Algeria's position. But as the delegates 
refrained from discussing the conflict their attitudes were 
not known officially. 
The Council confined its task to the objectives 
assigned to them in the Bamako agreement. The results of 
the meeting were laid down in a resolution which presents 
an admirable summary of the political and legal principles 
accepted by the Council in considering the Algerian-Moroccan 
case."117 The most important clause in the resolution with 
consequences for African settlement of disputes beyond this 
case affirmed "the imperative need of settling all 
differences between African states by peaceful means and 
within a strictly African framework." This principle is 
endowed with great significance by being repeated in 
another clause in the same resolution, which pledges African 
116. Ibid., p.30 
117. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.30 
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states to find solutions to their differences by negotiations 
"within the framework of the principles and the institutions 
prescribed by the Charter of the OAU. t1 18 This declaration 
is in tune with the prevailing conception of primacy of the 
OAU over the UN in matters concerning cases of breach of the 
peace in Africa.119 
The OAU ad hoc Commission and the Cease -Fire Commission 
The Council managed to set up some kind of commission 
whose status raises some questions. "Considering that the 
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, 
provided for in article 10 of the Charter has not yet been 
set up; (the Council) decides therefore to create an 
ad hoc Commission provided for in article 4, of the joint 
Bamako Communique... The terms of reference of this 
ad hoc Commission... are those laid down in article 4, 
sub -paragraphs a) and b) of the joint Bamako Communique. ?1 120 
This reference to article 4 of the Bamako agreement and 
the stipulation that the Commission can establish its own 
rules of procedure and working methods in accordance with 
the principles of the OAU Charter and the Rules of Procedure 
of the Council of Ministers are the only guidelines given to 
the Commission by the Council. They did not make' the task 
of this Commission any easier. 
118. OAU Document, First Extraordinary Session of the 
Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, November 15 -18, 
1963, ECFM, Resolution 1 
119. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.388 
120. OAU Document ECFM, Resolution 1. The following 
countries were members of the Commission; Ivory Coast, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika. 
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Both the Bamako agreement in its paragraph 4 and 
the resolution adopted at the Addis Ababa Council meeting 
contained certain contradictions as fax as the status of 
the Commission was concerned. The Bamako agreement calls 
for an 'arbitration commission'. By definition arbitration 
means that the parties accepting such a commission recognize 
from the start the binding nature on themselves of the 
arbitral sentence. On the other hand, article 4, 
paragraph b talks about admitting recommendations to Algeria 
and Morocco. This leaves the opponents with freedom to 
accept or reject the suggestions or proposals that the 
commission is going to put before them. 
Unfortunately, I do not have access to the verbatim 
record of the Council's meeting. Thus it is difficult to 
find out what it really had in mind when it set up the 
ad hoc Commission. It must be assumed that the ministers 
were aware of the ambiguity of the status of the Commission 
as defined in the two aforementioned documents. Saying 
that the Commission can establish its own rules of procedure 
indicated that the Commission was entitled to use all 
resources i.e. mediation, conciliation and arbitration 
without having the power to enforce any ruling upon the 
opponents. Strauch contends that the discord is due to 
the fact that Algeria was prepared to accept an arbitral 
decision while Morocco would only agree upon mediation and 
conciliation.121 Both Woronoff and Borella believe that 
121. H. Strauch, "L'OUA et les Conflits Frontaliers ", 
op.cit., p.68 
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the Commission was not a body of arbitration.122 Such 
contentions must be looked at from a critical point of 
view. Reviewing the Commission's performance - 
unfortunately, there is very little descriptive material 
available - may provide us with some clues about how the 
Commission members interpreted the legal status of their 
body. The use of the Commission to effect a definite 
settlement of the dispute is also important in view of the 
then projected OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration. If the ad hoc Commission would be able 
to succeed it would have established a valuable precedent, 
"and a device which could possibly cope with the far more 
intractable problem that looms ahead - Somalia's boundaries. "1 
23 
With the help of the cease -fire commission an 
agreement was reached on February 20, 1964 defining the 
demilitarized zone with a consequent withdrawal of forces.124 
The cease -fire commission was not asked to supervise the 
cease -fire and in April 1964 it was dissolved at the 
request of both parties.125 
122. See J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.340. Borella writes that 
the Commission is "á la fois une commission d'enquéte et 
de conciliation mais en aucune maniére une commission 
d'arbitrage." "Le Régionalisme Africain en 1964 ", in: 
Annuaire Francais. de Droit International, vol.X, 1964, 
p.629 
123. West Africa, vol.47, no.2425, 23 November 1963, p.1314 
124. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.108. 
This improvement was possible due to direct talks which 
had taken place at the Arab League meeting in Cairo in 
January 1964 between Ben Bella and King Hassan II. 
Although the Arab League did not become involved as 
mediator, its conference nevertheless provided a meeting 
ground for both antagonists. 
125. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.343 
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On the road to reconciliation a further step was 
taken in April 1964 when prisoners were exchanged. This 
was followed in May by the exchange of ambassadors and an 
agreement between both governments to resume direct 
bargaining on various technical matters and projects of 
co- operation. "Such a course, if successful, could have 
circumvented the territorial dispute and rendered at least 
the economic causes of the dispute no longer relevant."r126 
A year later the two Heads of State met again. This 
encounter did not bring about substantial decisions but 
nevertheless resulted in further détente between the two 
countries. After the overthrow of Ben Bella, the Boumedienne 
regime took a less conciliatory outlook. In May 1966 the 
conflict flared up again. Morocco accused Algeria of 
violating the cease -fire agreement.127 She asked the old 
mediators, Keita and Haile Selassie, to intervene. "Whether 
thanks to the mediators' effort or to direct talks between 
the two parties the tension soon subsided."128 
But the problem of border delimitations remained. 
Boumedienne left no doubt that he was a hard -liner on this 
question insisting that Algeria's frontiers were not 
negotiable. His country was not prepared to cede any part 
of its territory and was ready to defend its boundaries with 
Soviet arms if necessary.129 The question of whether or 
126. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., 
p.109 
127. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.343 
128. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.110 
129. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.344 
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not the unresolved border problem would lead to other 
outbreaks of armed conflict depended very much on the general 
climate of relations existing between the two governments 
as well as on the determination to refrain from interfering 
with each other's domestic affairs. Furthermore, a new 
crisis could stem from interference of the big powers. 
While the cease -fire committee was successful in 
fulfilling its assignment the same cannot be said of the 
ad hoc Commission which was charged with the much more 
complicated task of finding a final legal settlement of 
the border problem. In other words, was the Commission a 
complete failure? The Commission, from its first meeting 
on December 2 -5, 1963 at Abidjan, held almost a dozen more 
meetings in the following years.130 At a meeting in 
Bamako on December 24 -26, 1963 the Commission received 
documents from both sides in which they argued their cases. 
But according to Touval a discussion on these papers had 
to be postponed because of difficulties with the translations 
of the documents.131 It must be assumed that what the 
Commission tried to do in all the meetings which were to 
follow was to find a compromise formula able to reconcile 
the claims of both sides. Anyway, during the first 
session in Abidjan the members only got as far as adopting 
rules of procedures. During the second regular meeting of 
the Council of Ministers on February 22 -29, 1964 the ad hoc 
130. P.B. Wild, op.cit., pp.32 -33 
131. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders", op.cit., p.109 
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Commission reported on its work. They could not claim to 
have brought a final settlement any nearer. In view of 
the fact that the cease -fire committee had been successful 
just a week before, the Council recommended the establishment 
of direct contacts between the ad hoc Commission and the 
cease -fire committee. However, this recommendation soon 
became obsolete, because the cease -fire committee ceased 
to exist in April 1964. 
After further meetings the third Council of Ministers 
in Cairo in July 1964 expected a proposal of a draft 
settlement by the ad hoc Commission. "But difficulties 
apparently developed, and the Council resolved again to 
take note of the commission's report and to request it to 
continue its work until the complete fulfilment of its 
mandate. "132 At the fourth session of the Council the 
picture was exactly the same. No headway had been made 
towards any settlement; however, a steady improvement of 
relations between the two parties could be observed. At 
the time of increased tension in May 1966 - bringing a 
certain setback for reconciliation - Morocco asked for an 
urgent re- sitting of the Commission. However, by the time 
the Commission was convened in July the crisis had been 
overcome already without the help of the Commission. The 
deadlock which the ad hoc Commission could not break led to 
renewed procedural discussion concerning the Commission's 
original terms of reference. It was the old question of 
whether the Commission had a mandate for arbitration or 
132. Ibid., p.109 
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whether it was meant to be simply a mediation and 
conciliation body. The outcome of the debate was the 
decision that it needed a new mandate from the Council 
if it were to act as an arbitration body.133 
As at previous meetings of the Council its seventh 
ordinary session in November 1966 saw another submission 
of a report of the ad hoc Commission which was subsequently 
asked to continue until its task would be completed.134 
"Each time the commission met or appeared before the 
Council it reconfirmed the goodwill of the contending 
parties and was re- endowed with their confidence. The 
very process of seeking a solution was praised as a victory 
for African unity. " 135 
At the summit meeting at Kinshasa in September 1967 
the Algerian- Moroccan conflict was not even discussed. In 
1968 at the OAU Assembly in Algiers, Hassan II and Boumedienne 
agreed not to let their border problem become an item on 
the conference's agenda. The envisaged meetings of the 
Commission due to take place in January and July 1967 were 
never convened.136 The activities of the Commission 
petered out, although it was never officially dissolved. 
Morocco and Algeria signed a "Treaty of Solidarity, Good 
Neighbourliness and Co- operation" in January 1969 agreeing 
to negotiate in future all mutual problems on a bilateral 
133. Ibid., p.110 
134. B. Boutros-Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.55 
135. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.342 
136. B. Boutros-Ghali, L'OUA, op.cit., p.55 
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basis. This was interpreted as a renunciation of the 
good offices of the OAU ad hoc Commission although no 
direct reference to the frontier dispute was made in the 
treaty.137 But knowing the failure of the Commission to 
sort out the problems, it seems unlikely that anybody had 
an interest to keep it alive. Also, in the meantime the 
OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
had been constituted. So if the two sides wanted to use 
the OAU, this could be the body to deal with the questions. 
In a meeting of the two Heads of State in Tlemcen 
in May 1970 they agreed to set up a joint commission to 
demarcate the boundary in the disputed region from Figuig 
to Tindouf. It was expected that the border line would 
follow the de facto boundary inherited from French rule. 
As a result the iron ore deposits in Gara- Djebilit would 
remain in Algerian hands. However, an Algerian- Moroccan 
agency was to be set up to study the joint exploitation of 
these resources.138 
Assessment of the OAU Intervention 
An assessment of the role of the OAU in this conflict 
is not easy, partly because more detailed material would 
be necessary in order to prove who was finally responsible 
for the ease of tension - the OAU with its Council and 
ad hoc Commission, the mediation of individual African 
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the Algerian- Moroccan dispute a "feather in the cap of the 
new Organization" ?139 Seen against the background of the 
institutional framework of the Charter and the complexity 
of the border dispute, I would not hesitate to give some 
credit to the OAU. However, Wallerstein's view that the 
dispute "resulted in a great victory for the OAU ", seeing 
it as a "remarkable achievement" that the conflict could be 
contained within the frame of the OAU seems exaggerated to 
m140 e. Nevertheless, it is true that the mere existence 
of the OAU made an African tackling of the problem possible. 
Africa was confronted with a twofold task. In the 
first place, after the outbreak of fighting, the urgent 
problem was to bring the 'hot' crisis to a quick end. In 
this respect tangible results were achieved relatively 
quickly at Bamako through the efforts of two individual 
African leaders and the cease -fire commission. In order 
to bring in the OAU, several obstacles had to be overcome. 
One delaying fact was that the OAU had just recently been 
founded and its elaborate machinery was not yet ready to 
operate. Secondly, to convoke an extraordinary session 
of the OAU Council of Ministers required the consent of 
two- thirds of the member states. Such a procedure takes 
time. Fifteen days passed between the calling for such a 
meeting and the convening. Furthermore, the OAU member 
countries seemed to have been reluctant to agree to such a 
meeting as long as only one of the disputants requested it. 
139. S. Chime, op.cit., p.70 
140. I. Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity, 
op.cit., p.73 
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The subsequent treatment of the Algerian- Moroccan 
dispute by the OAU seemed to have been a logical 
consequence considering the circumstances of this 
particular case. Any assessment must keep all these 
factors in mind. Although the OAU failed to act 
immediately, it nevertheless endorsed the achievements 
made in Bamako by adopting the Bamako agreement as the 
basis for its own discussions of the dispute at the Council 
meeting. The OAU thus brought the pressure of the African 
organization to bear upon the dispute.141 It must be 
recalled that it was only after this meeting that the 
cease -fire commission was able to work out an agreement on 
a demilitarized zone acceptable to both sides. Thus the 
'hot' crisis was tackled by forces outside the OAU 
machinery albeit with the endorsement of this body. This 
is why I am inclined to give some credit to the OAU which, 
under the aforementioned shortcomings and without having 
recourse to a precedent on which to base its procedure, 
did as much as seemed to be possible and feasible. 
The second half of the problem was to help find a 
long -term settlement of the dispute which would solve the 
territorial question once and for all in a legally binding 
agreement or treaty. This is where the ad hoc Commission 
comes in. Its lack of success might be attributed to the 
complexity of this particular territorial dispute142 as 
141. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.36 
142. To name but one problem, it would have been difficult 
to apply the principles of state succession to a case 
where delimited borders never existed. 
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well as to the reluctance of the OAU "to associate itself 
with any findings or recommendations concerning the 
substance of the issue which might arouse the resentment 
of either party ."143 Such a Commission was obviously not 
regarded to be the best means of solving the problem of 
legal settlement of territorial disputes. The course of 
events showed the preference of the opposing sides to reach 
a long -term agreement through direct bilateral discussions. 
According to Wild, this first conflict the OAU was 
confronted with raises questions about the usefulness of 
such an organ as the then projected Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration.144 On one hand the African 
states seemed to be reluctant to use the procedure of 
arbitration. On the other hand mediation and conciliation 
practice might be used in bilateral negotiations with 
individual African politicians acting as go- betweens and 
mediators with the consent of the OAU rather than using 
the officially provided organs of the OAU established for 
mediation purposes. Ad hoc procedures seemed to have a 
greater appeal to African leaders than the sluggish 
machinery of their international organization. 
However, at this point of the discussion it would 
be premature to draw definite conclusions about the pattern 
of peace -making and dispute settlement processes in Africa 
143. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.127. 
The Commission did not put any blame on either country 
for the outbreak of hostilities nor did it make proposals 
for a specific border line. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.342 
144. P.B. Wild, op.cit., p.34 
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and the utilization of the OAU and its bodies in such 
undertakings. What can be safely contended is that 
"the mere existence of the OAU and the 
disappearance of the 1958 -1963 alliance 
system meant that, whenever grave crises 
erupted, as with the Algero- Moroccan war, 
it was fax simpler to contrive a mechanism 
with which to press the contending factions 
to settle their differences peacefully than 
it otherwise would have been. " 145 
Nevertheless this statement has to be qualified. In 
each problem which will arise the international connotations 
of the crisis more than any other single factor determine 
the OAU's chances of success no matter how small, or failure 
right from the beginning. 
That the African politicians were able to deal with 
the Algerian- Moroccan dispute within the confines of Africa 
was not primarily due to the OAU's relative prestige and 
authority but largely to the fact that big power interference 
and thus UN involvement was kept at a very low key. The 
two superpowers remained aloof. The decisions to keep the 
cold war issues out of this conflict were made in Moscow 
and Washington. Africa and the OAU gained from this 
insulation of the dispute but they would have been unable 
to effect it against the will of the big powers. 
145. W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority... ", op.cit., p.31 
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MAP OF THE HORN OF AFRICA 







-r FR EN C H *,;,;::: 
. ...., ,-. 1 
.4.: Sot --- e. 
F.: 
,....1 / , ...- .-,ko. bb a r",-"-.1K- CS' s. 
..-G.'uCaVaefuT 
7',..- 
I ill { , fi-ko.lhodo , 1 e4;1,2-icrikisda."0"F" 0 
Cr) 
Addis !kb ob c ax4x1/ .44"44T4-17)'' : NC'Eljr<10 11 
r 11 0 Ì te:7:-..'T-7-:'%,,k1S-6 
.,\..'(1: 
4.'.. 
.. : ' 
- 
- 








4j\1 1 - -- 1 
9 ., / 4(.1 r. 1------ -/-\\ - q. q*:- 4.7-7=------ \ s.e. ..P' :-.4.. k.t.i 4: 
.4.%7S ..z, 
- 
V 12! 0 
N 7 
,Z-----------5-------------- --.i1 n (..1 i o n--------- 
SAO D 
A.., 
04,..........,,. .... ' r .. .. ..-,? .... ,,. 1 
i i °O.\ 
Z. 71_,.., .... ...,.. 
E ...: 
f.....-.- ;....:-...;:";.:,-'11-4- _.._ _ 
,`, .....v -.... .......-.. Z...-t':, 
LVic!Gr ,..11,,, "..., 
-------::-Q?-7.:3 *0 
C3-:\;--k,:i'r 






C e o n---------- 
' 
4 -MC371;CSO_ 
v." %-ass IfItti-POTiOr 01 bOtiftdOritS 
taat 11 adminiitrciiva 
cb;i3t -.0 by Brih::N 
Aj.nirislcctiOr:950 /pr,: chi limit of tecritoil 
inhcbi!ed by Som; 
Hocid end Re:ervtd Arco. 
returnetd o Etotsa.1955 
Forr,er 






4) The Ethiopia - Somalia - Kenya Territorial Dispute 
The key problem of the territorial disputes which 
erupted between the Somali Republic146 and Ethiopia and 
Kenya is the quest of the Somali people to extend the 
boundaries of their state in order to encompass the whole 
Somali nation i.e. the fulfilment of the dream of a 
'Greater Somalia'.147 They claim the Ogaden area in 
Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. 
Two -thirds of the Somali live in the Somali Republic 
while the remainder are divided between Ethiopia, Kenya 
and French Somaliland. For the Somalis unity is a 
question of national self- determination, a principle 
which the two other countries involved in the dispute 
cannot concede. 
It is useful in order to understand the problems 
involved to know some of the contentions which underlie 
the claims and counterclaims. Some of the conflict 
potential was inherited from the colonial times when the 
territorial make -up with all its repercussions was decided 
upon. Other clues to the perception of what the conflict 
is all about are found in the different interpretations 
given to the concept of self -determination by the Somalis, 
Kenyans and Ethiopians. 
146. Throughout this chapter I will use the name "Somalia" 
as a synonym for "Somali Republic ". Referring to the 
pre- independence period I will use the terms British 
or Italian Somaliland. 
147. This quest is stipulated in the national constitution 
of the Somali Republic in article 6,4. See R.Z. Kapil, 
op.cit., p.668 
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Claims and Counterclaims 
As indicated above the Somalis base their claim 
for a "Greater Somalia" on the principle of self - 
determination. It is a question of ethnic nationalism. 
In discussing Somali nationhood one encounters the old 
basic difficulties regarding the criteria of 'nation' to 
be applied. Before the territory in the Horn of Africa 
inhabited by Somali tribes was divided among Britain, 
France, Italy and Ethiopia in the nineteenth century the 
Somalis were not organized in a single autonomous political 
unit but were instead split into a number of larger often 
hostile clans. Even today the process of integration of 
the lineage groups of the Somali tribes into a nation in 
the Western sense has not yet been accomplished. Nevertheless, 
it can be contended in Touval's view that "the Somalis are 
a rare case of a homogeneous ethnic group, inhabiting a 
large territory, and united by culture, religion and 
tradition. Their sense of unity was not effaced even by 
the divisive impact of alien rule. "148 Such an impact 
might even have helped to strengthen the sense of unity. 
The imperial partition did bring about the gradual development 
of political nationalism which saw the establishment of a 
nation state as its ultimate goal. As the people in the 
partitioned area were all Somalis - apart from the 
ethnically related Danakil in French Somaliland - the 
Somalis did not have to invoke the concept of 'we are all 
Africans' as a cohesive force. "To assert their rights 
148. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, Cambridge, Mass., 
1963, p.29 
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to independence the Somali therefore had no need to claim 
any other common feature than that of being Somali."149 
In fact Somalis had objections to being regarded as 
Africans, a term which to them implied subject Negroid 
people. However, during the course of recent years an 
increase of Africa's political status occurred, as a 
result of which they became more inclined to see themselves 
as Africans.150 
The Somalis are in their great majority a nomadic 
people who only accept the limits of their pastures as 
their border.151 A 'natural' border for them would be 
one that goes to the furthest limits of the grazing land, 
so that nation and territory would coincide. These for 
the Somali nationalists would be boundaries in accordance 
with the principle of self -determination and thereby 
bringing to an end a situation on which the former Somali 
Prime Minister, Abdi Rashid Shermarke commented: "Our 
misfortune is that our neighbouring countries, with whom, 
we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, 
are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somalí 
kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by 
indiscriminate boundary 'arrangements' . ,' 152 
The Somalis contend that they can apply the 
principle of self- determination to their case because they 
149. I.M. Lewis, "Pan- Africanism and Pan- Somalism ", in: 
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.I, no.2, 
June 1963, p.148 
150. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.25 
151. John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, London, 1964, p.7 
152. Ibid., p.8 
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have no doubt about how to define the 'self'. The gain 
of territory inhabited by Somalis adjacent to the Somali 
Republic's territory would incorporate areas into the 
country whose tribal make -up could not upset the tribal 
balance inside the state. The identity among Somalis has 
always been an ethnic rather than a racial one. The 
political leaders of the Somali people claimed it a 
victory for their cause towards Pan -Somalism when in July 
1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were merged 
to become independent. As they see it this step was made 
possible by application of the principle of self- determination.153 
While this first victory for the 'Greater Somalia' concept 
encouraged the Somalis to continue their efforts to bring 
further territory into the union, Ethiopia and Kenya had 
to fear that these attempts would threaten their 
countries' integrity. Both countries would never give in 
to any loss of territory, therefore they refuse to contemplate 
any change. 
Kenya left nobody in doubt about her position. In 
a Memorandum submitted to the Addis Ababa Conference in 
May 1963 strong words were expressed. 
"If anyone wishes to exercise his right of 
self -determination let him exercise this 
right by moving out of the country if 
necessary but not seek to balkanize Africa 
any further under the guise of a so- called 
self -determination. The principle of 
self -determination has relevance only where 
Foreign Domination is the issue. It has 
no relevance where the issue is territorial 
153. See I.M. Lewis, "Pan- Africanism and Pan- Somalism ", 
op.cit., p.151 
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disintegration by dissident citizens. We 
in Kenya shall not give up one inch of our 
country to the Somali tribalists, and that 
is final. "154 
Kenya regards her Somali minority group as one of her many 
tribal groups who are all Kenya Africans. She rejects 
any idea of creating new African nations on the basis of 
tribal or religious identities.155 
Ethiopia argues very much along the saine lines, 
being herself "an essentially arbitrary artificial 
creation, a patch work of different tribes and ethnic 
groups, possessing little overall cohesion and national 
patriotism. "156 To give in to any demands by the Somali 
Republic to cede the Ogaden would involve a loss of one - 
fifth of her territory as well as a challenge upon the 
political stability of this multi -ethnic country.157 
The threat of disintegration looms large in a country whose 
dominant Amharic minority group failed to assimilate the 
other minorities. The fact that these groups live along 
the border with Kenya, the Sudan and the Somali Republic 
to whose peoples they are related aggravates the problem. 
To grant the right of self -determination could quite 
154. Reprinted in C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African 
Diplomacy: II, op.cit., p.39 
155. Ibid., p.37 
156. I.M. Lewis, "Nationalism and Particularism in Somalia ", 
in: P.H. Gulliver: Tradition and Transition in East 
Africa, London, 1969, p.340 
157. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.132. There 




easily lead to secessionist movements. Although the case 
of the Somalis in Ethiopia is a special one because there 
is no other group with the same degree of national 
cohesion, any form of complaisance in the Somali case 
could be taken as an incentive by the other groups to 
intensify their claims. 
The Ethiopians have always replied to claims for 
a 'Greater Somalia' by calling on the Somalis to join 
Ethiopia and thus gain unity. This is a reflection of 
Ethiopia's own nationalistic aspiration.158 This 
attitude is based on Ethiopian tradition that those areas 
which are now the Somali Republic were part of the 
Ethiopian Empire at one time in history.159 In the early 
Middle Ages, Ethiopia did indeed exercise an overlordship 
over much of the Horn area, but her control was not 
unbroken. It seems that the Somali Government does not 
deny this but argues that such a claim is based on 
"medieval rights ".160 This opinion is shared by 
Margery Perham who maintains that there is little basis 
to the Ethiopian claim to Somalia "which threw off at 
least five centuries ago such overlordship as Ethiopia 
exercised over part of it."161 
158. Ibid., p.141 
159. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "Background to the Ethio- Somalian 
Boundary Dispute ", in: Journal of Modern African Studies, 
vol.2, no.2, July 1964, p.194 
160. Ibid., p.194 
161. J. Drysdale, op.cit., p.66 
-199- 
Boundary Treaties 
Solutions to the territorial disputes in the Horn of 
Africa are not only difficult to find because of controversial 
interpretations of the principle of self -determination and 
its application but likewise because of the colonial legacy 
which left this area with boundaries whose validity and 
interpretation is contested. When the European powers 
arrived in the Horn in the later part of the nineteenth 
century the boundaries there were in a condition of flux 
with Ethiopia being the only existing state.162 The 
territorial dispute between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic 
has its origin in various treaties concluded between the 
European powers and Ethiopia. While Somalia today regards 
her entire border with Ethiopia as invalid, Ethiopia admits 
that only her border with former Italian Somaliland is open 
to settlement.163 At the time when Britain established her 
Protectorate she left the border with Ethiopia undefined. 
The first attempts to delimit the boundary were guided by 
rivalries between the European powers. The British dealt 
first with the Italians in order to divide their spheres of 
influence. 
After the Italian defeat by the Ethiopians at Adowa 
when it became apparent 
claim of a protectorate 
this country directly. 
Emperor Menelik II and a 
that Ethiopia did not accept Italy's 
over Ethiopia, Britain approached 
After negotiations between the 
British delegation an agreement was 
reached in 1897; in a compromise deal Britain abandoned her 
162. M.W. Mariam, op.cit., p.196 
163. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.97 
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claim over parts of the Haud. Lewis points out one 
interesting fact concerning this treaty. It was worded 
in such a way as "to stipulate that while Ethiopia recognized 
British sovereignty within the new frontiers of the 
Protectorate, Britain did not reciprocally recognize 
Ethiopian sovereignty over the land and people who had been 
abandoned."164 Although Britain had relinquished the 
Western Haud, Ethiopia's claim over this area rested on a 
dubious basis right from the beginning. In any case, for 
the Somalis this treaty was a betrayal because Britain had 
pledged herself in Anglo- Somali treaties of 1884 -1886 in 
order to protect the Somali clans' 'independence' in this 
region. Britain was aware that the new border line cut 
across the Somali grazing lands. An annex to the 1897 
treaty provided that the tribes "occupying either side of 
the line have the right to use the grazing grounds on the 
other side . " 165 In an exchange of notes following the 
1897 agreement the boundary was delimited.166 
The frictions between Britain and Ethiopia over 
border issues never ceased to trouble their relations. 
In a new agreement signed in 1954 both countries reaffirmed 
the stipulations of the 1897 treaty. As a result the 
Ethiopian sovereignty over the Haud remained on a 
164. I.M. Lewis, "Pan- Africanism and Pan- Somalism ", op.cit., 
13.152, footnote 
165. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.156 
166. The demarcation was only carried out between 1932 -34. 
Ibid., p.157 
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questionable basis. The Haud was returned to Ethiopia in 
February 1955. Thus in this area which had been placed 
under British administration during the Second World War 
Ethiopia's sovereignty was re- established.167 After 
British Somaliland reached independence her government 
declared that it recognized neither the 1897 nor the 1954 
treaties, regarding both as violations of the 1884 -86 
Anglo- Somali treaties.168 The Ethiopian Government for 
its part announced that it viewed the grazing rights as 
"automatically invalid" but not the treaties of 1897 and 
1954.169 
This leaves us with the key problem of assessing 
the validity of both contentions. On human and economic 
grounds Somalia's claims seem justified. The country was 
deprived of a territory which was of great importance as 
grazing land for her nomadic people, but Ethiopia claimed 
the territory for similar reasons. The legal problems 
involved are difficult to sort out. On one hand there is 
167. Ibid., p.158. 
168. J. Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, oo .cit., pp.75 -76. 
See also J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.348. Britain regarded 
the 1897 treaty as binding by virtue of its superior 
status in international law as compared with the 1884- 
86 agreements. This is D.J. Latham Brown's inter- 
pretation. 
169. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., p.11l. Britain shares Ethiopia's 
view. See M.W. Mariam, op.cit., p.211. A statement 
by the British Prime Minister laid down that .... "the 
provisions of the 1897 Anglo- Ethiopian Treaty should, 
in our view, be regarded as remaining in force between 
Ethiopia and the successor state. On the other hand, 
article III of the 1965 Agreement, which comprises most 
of what was additional to the 1897 treaty, would, in our 
opinion, lapse." Quoted in A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., 
p.111. 
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Cukwurah's argument which is in line with our general 
remarks on the problem of state succession. 
"Experience has shown that international 
boundaries sometimes disrupt traditional 
rights, such as the right of pasturage, 
unless provision is made for their 
continuance. It is, therefore, submitted 
that Somaliland succeeded to the treaty 
boundaries, independent of the fate of the 
other provisions in the agreement. "170 
On the other hand Drysdale hinges his criticism of the 
British attitude towards the 1897 Treaty on one 'disquieting 
feature'. Britain did not recognize Ethiopia's sovereignty 
in the Haud area in this treaty. It is therefore 
questionable whether the Haud region had been Ethiopian 
territory in international law since the Treaty of 1897.171 
A shortcoming of the 1954 agreement was the fact that the 
citizenship of the nomadic Somalis in the Haud region 
remained unclarified. Were they citizens of Ethiopia or 
of the Protectorate? If they had fallen under the 
authority of the British, it imposed on the Ethiopian 
Government "the tacit recognition to the fact that the 
territory was occupied, albeit temporarily, by non - 
Ethiopian subjects. "172 This situation provided Somalia 
with one of the strong levers for her demand. Drysdale 
has clearly pointed out a number of facts which support 
the Somalian demands . 17 3 
170. A.O. Cukwurah, op.cit., pp.111 -112 
171. J. Drysdale, op.cit., p.77 
172. Ibid., p.80 
173. As far as the practical question of succession to pre - 
independence border treaties goes, the OAU in its 1964 
Resolution Concerning Boundaries made no unequivocal 
stipulations. 
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If it comes to the border between Ethiopia and the 
former Italian Somaliland, later the trust territory of 
Somalia, the overriding factor is that the boundary has no 
legal basis and was still undefined when the trust territory 
became independent in 1960.174 This situation is the 
outcome of a long and complicated legal history of which I 
will only give a few details. When Major Nerazzini was 
engaged in peacetalks with the Ethiopian Emperor Menlik II 
after Italy's defeat at Adowa an agreement was reached in 
1897 on a provisional boundary.175 The border was traced 
on two maps which were subsequently lost and no -one can 
recall the exact nature of the agreement as far as the 
delimitation line is concerned.176 A convention drawn 
in 1908 is the only existing document. But its 
interpretation was soon open to disagreement and 
consequently the border was never demarcated.177 Between 
1935 and 1948 when the Ogaden was administratively merged 
with Italian Somaliland the vexing boundary question was 
temporarily forgotten only to emerge afresh as a smouldering 
problem when Italian Somaliland became a UN trust territory 
in 1950. Until 1957 Italy and Ethiopia tried in vain to 
reach an agreement in direct negotiations. When the UN 
recommended arbitration, the arbitration tribunal under 
174. J. Drysdale, op.cit., p.88 
175. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.160 
176. M.W. Mariam, op.cit., p.200. Nerazzini's own records 
are full of contradictions. 
177. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.161. In the 
1908 convention reference was made to the 1897 agreement 
of which no authentic record was available. 
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Trygve Lie tried to find a compromise. But the two 
countries were unable to agree and negotiations reached 
deadlock once again.178 When Italian Somaliland became 
independent the only border line that existed was the 
"provisional administrative line ". This was established 
by the British authorities in consultation with the Italian 
and Ethiopian governments at the time of the transfer of 
Somalia to Italian trust administration in 1950.179 
Somali nationalism is also a challenge to the 
territorial integrity of Kenya. The border dispute which 
clouds the relationship between the Somali Republic and 
Kenya is of long standing. An outbreak of hostilities, 
however, had been avoided as long as the conflict had been 
contained by colonial administration of Kenya.180 Somalia 
claims that the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya 
should become part of her territory, a demand which Kenya 
rejects without reservations. The area under dispute 
makes up one -fifth of Kenya's territory. It is a semi - 
desert plateau providing rough living conditions for her 
less than a 100.000 nomadic inhabitants - almost all 
Somalis.181 
178. J. Drysdale, op.cit., pp.92 -93 
179. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.160 
180. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p.113 
181. A.A. Castagno, "The Somali -Kenyan 
Implications for the Future ", in: 
African Studies, vol.2, no.2, July 
McEwen gives a much higher figure 
living in the NFD. He also talks 
Kenya's total area as claimed by S 
A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p.113 and p. 
Controversy: 
Journal of Modern 
1964, p.165. 
of 240.000 Somalis 




It was in 1909 that the gradual expansion which 
brought the Somali nomads westwards into Kenyan territory 
was accomplished. They consolidated their position in 
the NFD thereafter. 182 As early as 1891 a line separating 
what were then the British and Italian territories in East 
Africa was defined for the first time running along the 
Juba river northwards.183 An effective British administration, 
however, only came into being in Jubaland many years after 
the Anglo- Italian Agreement of 1891.184 In an Anglo- 
Italian treaty signed in 1924 Jubaland was transferred to 
Italian Somaliland, in conformity with the 1915 Treaty of 
London, as a sort of reward for Italy's participation in 
the First World War.185 Kenya today claims that the 
British Government was morally wrong to have ceded Jubaland. 
The exact description of the new boundary between British 
Kenya and Italian Somaliland revealed that not the entire 
Jubaland was given to Italy. All the land west of the 
meridian of 41° east longitude was made part of the NFD. 
Given that the new line was an artificial division between 
Somali kinsmen, Britain and Italy provided in an additional 
agreement that the Somalis from the Italian side of the 
division line were allowed to cross into British 
administered territory. The demarcation of the line was 
182. A.A. Castagno, op.cit., 
move into an unoccupied 
the local inhabitants. 
183. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p 
184. Ibid., p.116 
185. Ibid., pp.117 -118 
p.167. The Somalis did not 
area but rather forced back 
.115 
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concluded in an agreement between the British and Italian 
Government in 1927. But problems of demarcation arose in 
the coming years and only in 1933 the legal status of 
Kenya's new Eastern border was at last settled by international 
agreement.186 
When Italian and British Somaliland were merged to 
become independent as the Somali Republic, Somalis on both 
sides of the Kenyan-Somalian border cherished hopes for 
unification of the NFD with the Republic. Britain did not 
commit herself to such a solution but declared that she 
would do nothing against the will of the Governments and 
peoples concerned.187 
At the Kenya Constitutional Conference in London in 
1962 the issue of secession was an item on the agenda. As 
might have been anticipated the attitudes of the delegation 
representing the NFD and the delegates from KANU and KADU 
clashed. A commission was appointed to report on public 
opinion in the NFD. This fact finding commission came to 
the conclusion that the great majority in the District 
supported the idea of secession. However, the wishes of 
the majority were ignored. All the British Government 
was prepared to grant was a wide measure of autonomy for the 
Somalis in one of the regions of independent Kenya.188 The 
new regional arrangements in Kenya's Independence Constitution 
186. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., pp.121 -122 
187. See Statement by Prime Minister Macmillan. Ibid., 
p.125 
188. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism, op.cit., p.153 
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of December, 1963 provided for a new territorial structure. 
The old NFD ceased to be a single entity. Part of it 
became the North Eastern Region and parts were incorporated 
in the Eastern Region and Coast Region.189 Somalia never 
accepted these solutions and claims the whole of the former 
NFD.190 
This summary of developments regarding the frontier 
problems between the Somali Republic and her two neighbours, 
Ethiopia and Kenya, suggests that any attempt to reach 
long -term solutions is confronted with a great deal of 
difficulties. However, it would be wrong to assume that 
a solution depends "solely on the validity and interpretation 
of boundary agreements. "191 If both sides are willing to 
reach agreement these problems can be overcome. But in 
cases of strife the invocation of old treaties and the 
dispute over it can be used to prevent any settlement or 
agreement. 
Attempts at Mediation by the OAU and Third Parties 
Right from the beginning of Somalia's independence 
her relations with her neighbours became strained. Border 
incidents occurred a number of times since 1960. So- called 
189. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p.126 
190. In March 1963 Somalia broke diplomatic relations with 
Britain. In a note the Somali Government blamed 
Britain for the situation which had arisen in the Horn: 
"... The instability of the Horn of Africa is the 
creation of the British Government which will be held 
responsible for any consequencies that may follow." 
Reprinted in C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African 
Diplomacy: II, op.cit., p.28 
191. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p.113 
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"shiftas ", small groups of Somalis who mingled with the 
nomadic herdsmen, carried out attacks on the Ethiopian 
authorities in the Ogaden area. Ethiopia retaliated 
these attacks. From October 1963 onwards the raids 
increased steadily in intensity. The deterioration of 
relations was accompanied by a propaganda war carried out 
on the radio and in the press.192 In the summer of 1963 
these incidents flared up in Kenya as well where life was 
disrupted in the NFD. 
The climax of escalation was reached on February 7, 
1964 when fighting between the Ethiopian and Somali regular 
armies broke out. Both sides blamed each other for the 
outbreak of open hostilities but they were also anxious to 
stop the fighting.193 As both protagonists had obviously 
not been able to solve the problems in bilateral negotiations, 
the question - similar to the Algerian- Moroccan dispute - 
arose of finding a suitable mediator. In this case as in 
the preceding border dispute the preferable choice of 
mediators was somehow predictable. Both countries were 
fully aware of the status quo attitude on border issues 
shared by the overwhelming majority of African states. 
Ethiopia's preferences were based on similar grounds as 
those of Algeria while Somalia approached the problem with 
the arguments which are familiar to us since the discussion 
of the Moroccan attitude. 
192. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.349 -350 
193. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.111 
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On February 8, 1964, in accordance with article KII 
of the OAU Charter, Haile Selassie requested an extraordinagy 
meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers to consider the 
dispute. He also addressed messages to all African Heads 
of State.194 It is not surprising that Somalia preferred 
the UN as a mediator. Consequently, her government 
launched a request for a UN Security Council meeting on 
February 10, 1964. The previous day, however, U Thant 
had sent messages both to the Emperor and the Somali Prime 
Minister in which he called for a peaceful settlement of 
the dispute and made reference to the OAU as the appropriate 
forum. His attitude concurred with the opinion of the 
majority in the UN, notably of the African Members.195 
The Horn of Africa had not remained untouched by the cold 
war with Ethiopia and Kenya receiving military aid from the 
West while Somalia obtained help from the other side. Only 
days after the fighting started there were appeals from 
East and West to stop the war. But they did not want to 
intervene in a fruitless war through which they would only 
make enemies in Africa. The great powers were urging 
restraint on the belligerents. They were anxious to 
avoid an open entanglement. However, had the matter been 
brought before the UN, the big powers could not have stayed 
194. The following information is taken from Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, vol.XIV, 1963 -1964, p.20176 
195. See S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., 
p.112; also "Les Relations entre l'OUA et l'ODU", 
op.cit., p.52. Somalia based her request on the 
complaint that her borders had been violated rather 
than on the wider issue of self- determination. See 
M. Manigat, op.cit., p.390 
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aloof, and the danger of internationalizing what was 
basically a regional conflict would have been unavoidable. 
196 
On February 11, when the reluctance of the UN to 
deal with the dispute must have been known at Mogadishu, the 
Somali Government called for the inclusion of the dispute 
in the agenda of the Council of Ministers meeting due to 
open in Dar -es- Salaam the next day.197 Although Somalia 
seemed to have consented to OAU mediation she did not 
entirely give up her idea of UN intervention in the crisis. 
On February 12, the Somali Government asked U Thant to send 
a commission of independent observers to determine the 
responsibility for the fighting and to supervise the 
cease-fire. 
Kenya's request that her dispute with Somalia should 
also be considered was accepted by the ministers albeit 
reluctantly.198 When the debate opened at the Council 
both sides accused each other of invasion and armed 
aggression. It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the 
speeches delivered by the representatives of Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Somalia's Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Issa, dealt 
in great length with the outbreak of the hostilities, 
196. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.459 -460 
197. Such an extraordinary meeting had already been 
scheduled to convene in Dar -es- Salaam on February 12, 
1964 to consider the army mutinies in Tanzania. 
198. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.112. 
Some delegates wanted the discussion of this dispute to 
be postponed until the ordinary meeting due to be held 
in Lagos two weeks later, because they did not have time 
to get instructions from their governments concerning 
the attitudes towards this item. 
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accusing Ethiopia of aggression. The wider issue of 
territorial claims is only touched in one sentence: "The 
solution to this problem will not be found by resorting to 
false charges against the Somali Republic - but by the 
Ethiopian Government facing squarely the realities of the 
situation and allowing the people to exercise their 
inalienable right to self- determination... "199 What the 
Somali Government expected the Conference to do was to 
adopt a resolution for an immediate cease -fire and to 
appoint observers to supervise the truce and a demilitarized 
zone. What it wanted to avoid was a full discussion of 
the conflict by the Council. Somalia was apprehensive of 
the prevailing status quo attitude in the OAU with respect 
to territorial claims which was detrimental to her interests. 
By the same token she hoped that the Council would limit 
its discussion to the problem of military disengagement. 
Although Somalia had to secure "international recognition 
that the Somali- inhabited areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, over 
which these two states claimed exclusive sovereignty, were 
actually disputed territories ",200 she was aware that she 
could more easily get it by involvement of the UN and not 
the OAU. 
Ethiopia and Kenya, fully aware that they could 
count on Africa's aversion to redraw the inherited boundaries, 
199. OAU Mimeographed Texts, February 1964, reprinted in 
C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: II, 
op.cit., p.56 
200. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.113 
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indicated in their respective statements that they wanted 
to discuss the problem in the widest possible context 
considering the roots of the claims and counterclaims. 
Ethiopia's Foreign Minister therefore openly asked the 
Council "to pave the way for a permanent settlement of 
this issue."201 Kenya made the same request and proposed 
that the African states should sign a charter "that we 
shall all desist from making further territorial claims on 
each other and shall seek to reach mutual agreement."202 
A committee of twelve was set up to draft a resolution 
concerning the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. 
Ghana's proposal that this committee should also discuss 
the Somalia -Kenya dispute was rejected because of Somalia's 
objection. She regarded both disputes as separate items.203 
The first resolution adopted on February 14, 1964 by 
the Council was on the Somalia- Ethiopia conflict. It 
emphasized explicitly "that the Unity of Africa requires the 
solution to all disputes between member states be sought 
first within the OAU . +204 It then called for a cease -fire, 
a cessation of hostile propaganda and urged the two 
governments to enter into negotiations. Another interesting 
201. OAU Mimeographed Texts, February 1964, reprinted in: 
C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: II, 
op.cit., p.53 
202. Ibid., p.59. It will be recalled that this was done 
the summit meeting in Cairo in July, 1964. 
203. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., 
pp.113 -114 
204. The text of the two resolutions is reprinted in 
C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: II, 
op.cit., pp.60 -61 
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inclusion in the text was the call "upon all African states 
with diplomatic or consular missions in Ethiopia and 
Somalia to do their best to assist in the implementation of 
the cease -fire." This seems to indicate that the ministers 
had doubts about the capacities of the OAU to do this job. 
In any case, they probably felt that it would be worthwhile 
if individual diplomats could assist the OAU. It is 
plausible that they were encouraged in this opinion by the 
successful job some mediators had performed in the Algerian- 
Moroccan dispute and discouraged by the difficulties of the 
ad hoc Commission. In the resolution the ministers pledged 
themselves to take up the dispute in their ordinary meeting 
which was scheduled for February 24, in Lagos. The way in 
which the Council dealt with this crisis seems to be also 
a reflection of the OAU's poor resources. The task of an 
effective supervisory machine would have been fax too 
difficult in terms of size and cost considering the length 
of the border.205 After the adoption of the resolution 
Somalia informed the Security Council that she would not 
pursue her complaints in this body as long as the OAU was 
engaged in trying to find a solution. The principle of 
'Africa first' was triumphant.206 
The resolution on the Kenya- Somalia dispute on the 
other hand contained no invitation to the African politicians 
and diplomats to offer their good offices. It rather asked 
the protagonists to solve the problem in bilateral discussions.207 
205. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.351 
206. West Africa, vol.48, no.2438, 22 February 1964, p.199 
207. B. Boutros- Ghali. L'OUA, op.cit., pp.56 -57 
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Why were African politicians and diplomats invited to act 
in the Somalia- Ethiopia crisis but not in the Somalia -Kenya 
dispute? The answer might be that in the first case the 
task was to bring to an end a 'hot' crisis i.e. to reach a 
short -term cease -fire agreement rather than a long -term 
settlement which tackled the roots of the problem. Such 
an assignment is not beyond the capabilities of mediators. 
Experience with the Algerian-Moroccan dispute proved that 
mediation by African politicians outside the OAU can be 
quite successful in bringing armed conflicts to a halt. 
However, evidence shows that it is easier to reach a 
cease -fire agreement at the conference table through 
negotiation and mediation than to implement such an 
agreement on the spot. On the other hand diplomatic 
involvement in the dispute have confronted 
the mediators with the immensely more complicated problem 
of finding a long -term solution to the territorial question. 
Unless the protagonists give clear evidence that they are 
interested to debate and negotiate in order to find a 
solution to their territorial conflict, there was no point 
in starting a process of mediation. 
As fax as the armed conflict was concerned a 
temporary cease -fire agreement between Ethiopia and the 
Somali Republic was reached not through the OAU but through 
the instrumentality of the Sudanese President Abboud, 
unfortunately breaking down a few hours after it came into 
force. Subsequently President Osman of Somalia asked for 
a Peace- keeping force along the frontiers.2O8 
208. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.351. In the weeks between the 
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When the Foreign Ministers and their representatives 
met in Lagos they were confronted with the fact that the 
OAU or any other mediator failed to impose an effective 
truce.209 Somalia renewed her demands for a demilitarized 
zone and a supervisory force. She found support from 
Nkrumah who was hoping thus to promote his own idea for an 
African military force, 210 as well as from the Congo- 
Brazzaville, Libya, Nigeria and Tunisia. To Ethiopia 
both seemed unnecessary if Somalia would once and for all 
renounce her territorial claims. In the exchange between 
Kenya and Somalia the delegate of the former country invoked 
the inapplicability of the principle of self- determination 
in the case of independent states, an argumentation to which 
she adhered ever since the Addis Ababa Conference in 1963. 
After reviewing the situation in committees the 
Council came out with resolutions much along the lines of 
their previous meeting in Dar -es- Salaam, whose resolutions 
they confirmed. The Council congratulated Somalia and 
Ethiopia for having ordered a cease -fire - which they did 
not observe. One interesting inclusion in the resolution 
was the appeal to the protagonists to "direct negotiations 
two Council meetings attempts of mediation had also 
been made by Nkrumah and Nyerere. See West Africa, 
vol.48, no.2438, February 22, 1964, p.199 
209. In this description of the Lagos meeting I follow 
closely Touval's account which is based on the 
unpublished record of the session. 
210. Discussion about this plan have cropped up in OAU 
meetings ever since. The latest conference in Rabat 
in June 1972 dealt with this plan. But agreement on 
this question is still nowhere in sight. See The Times, 
June 20, 1972, p.15 
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with due respect to paragraph 3 of article III of the 
Charter "211 respect for the territorial integrity - a 
reference not contained in the Dar -es- Salaam Resolution. 
The Resolution on the Kenya- Somali Dispute being 
likewise a repetition of Dar -es- Salaam also made reference 
to article III,3 of the Charter. That this paragraph was 
included must have been very much to the liking of Ethiopia 
and Kenya. It showed implicitly that the majority in the 
Council shared their attitude. It was recorded that 
Somalia's reaction was one of great disappointment.212 
The inclusion of article III,3 in the resolutions indicates 
that the sympathy had shifted towards Ethiopia. I do not 
know what was going on "backstage" to influence this 
attitude against Somalia. Probably, there was no shifting 
at all. That the Lagos resolution did explicitly invoke 
article III,3 while the Dar -es- Salaam one did not is perhaps 
simply due to the fact that at Dar -es- Salaam the ministers 
were pre- occupied with the urgent task of a peaceful 
settlement of the 'hot' crisis. The background in Lagos 
was that some achievement in this respect could be reported 
and thus the ministers were concerned with a long -term 
solution of the dispute. They had to confirm the basic 
principle by which negotiations for long -term territorial 
settlements in Africa should be guided. 
211. OAU Mimeographed Texts, in: C. Hoskyns, Case Studies, 
in: African Diplomacy: II, op.cit., p.62 
212. See West Africa, vol.48, no.2440, March 7, 1964, 
p.254 
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Comparing the OAU's dealing with this conflict to 
the manner in which it tried to solve the Algerian- Moroccan 
dispute, one point comes to mind immediately, The OAU did 
not set up another ad hoc Commission. The ministers' 
decision could not have been influenced by the performance 
of the ad hoc Commission which tried to mediate between 
Algeria and Morocco. It was still too early to reveal its 
relative incapability. What the decision does seem to 
indicate is that there was not a fixed pattern of procedure 
according to which inter -African territorial disputes were 
to be handled. 
The call for bilateral negotiations made by the 
Council was taken up by Ethiopia and the Somali Republic 
whose Foreign Ministers met in Khartoum on March 24, 1964 
with the Sudanese Government as mediator. It must be 
viewed as a big accomplishment of inter -African diplomacy 
that thanks to the efforts of the Sudanese not only a 
breakdown was avoided but also after only six days of 
meetings an agreement could be concluded.213 The Joint 
Communique published in Khartoum on March 30, 1964 showed 
that the agreement was reached in compliance with the OAU's 
request on the maintenance of the cease -fire, the creation 
of a demilitarized zone along the bounder, the establishment 
of a joint commission to supervise the withdrawal of troops 
and the curtailment of hostile propaganda.214 Both sides 
213. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.116. 
She gives the credit for the success to the Sudanese 
Foreign Minister. Strauch on the other hand attributes 
the outcome to Abboud's mediation efforts. H. Strauch, 
"L'OUA et les Conflits Frontaliers ", op.cit., p.68 
214. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.115 
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pledged themselves to resume negotiations in pursuance 
of paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted in Lagos before 
the next Assembly, in other words to find a final solution 
to the dispute.215 
Developments after 1964 
The Khartoum agreement did not bring raids and 
clashes to a complete halt. Relatively serious clashes 
happened in March 1965. Somalia asked the OAU Secretary - 
General to send a OAU commission to investigate the situation, 
but the OAU did not take up this matter. A few days later, 
however, the Ethiopian and Somali Governments agreed to 
re- activate the joint commission to help implement the 
Khartoum agreement.216 
Incursions and clashes never stopped completely. 
The question was kept on the agenda of many OAU meetings 
and was discussed between the parties without substantive 
results. The other countries in the region were aware of 
the threat to peace in Africa resulting from the tension 
between the Somali Republic and her neighbours. Their 
leaders had a vested interest in helping any attempts to 
reach agreement. The events proved that it was their good 
offices rather than the interference of the OAU which eased 
tensions.217 
As far as the relations between Kenya and Somalia 
215. C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: II, 
op.cit., p.66 
216. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., p.117 
217. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.356 
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are concerned a further step forward was taken in Arusha 
in December 1965. A meeting between Presidents Kenyatta 
and Osman was arranged by President Nyerere. Although the 
mood of the Conference was reported to be good, nothing 
substantial was achieved. Both sides stubbornly stuck 
to their well -known positions.218 A considerable improvement 
of relations emerged, however, after another meeting between 
the two countries' representatives had taken place in Arusha 
in October 1967 under the chairmanship of President Kaunda.2 9 
The meeting had been arranged at the previous 4th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 
Kinshasa. Once more the OAU seemed to have functioned as 
a forum for contacts between African politicians. The 
Kenyan and Somali representatives agreed to maintain peace 
and security on both sides of the border, refrain from 
hostile propaganda, to re -open diplomatic relations, and to 
appoint a Working Committee consisting of representatives 
from Somalia, Kenya and Zambia to examine ways and means 
of bringing out a satisfactory solution to major and minor 
differences between Kenya and the Somali Republic.220 Ever 
since Arusha 1967 both sides showed their inclination to 
end the dispute. "At present, however, the root problem 
218. C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: II, 
op.cit., pp.73 -74. 
219. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p.128. Nyerere and Obote were 
present as observers. 
220. Arusha Memorandum, Mimeographed Text, reprinted in: 
C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy; II, 
op.cit., pp82 -83. 
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remains unsolved and it is not yet clear what steps can 
or will be taken to reconcile the opposing views of ethnic 
self -determination and territorial integrity."221) 
Rosberg hails the success as "a skilful act of international 
African diplomacy and bargaining among leaders of both 
nations ".222 
As far as the negotiations between Somalia and her 
neighbours are concerned Woronoff believes that they became 
easier after a change in government in the Somali Republic. 
Mohammed Ibrahim Egal succeeded Abdi Rashid Shermarke as 
Prime Minister who in his turn replaced Aden Abdullah Osman 
as President. Egal "was not intimately connected with the 
claims and aggressive policy of the earlier governments ".223 
He was believed to be a very strong Pan- Africanist.224 Egal 
could not renounce any claims based on the principle of 
reunification of all the territories inhabited by Somalis. 
"We do not wish to annex the territory of 
any st é whatever, nor to expand into 
such territory. We do intend to champion 
the cause of Somali territories under 
foreign domination, in order that they 
obtain independent status through the 
process of self -determination." 225 
The new Prime Minister, however, did believe that the goal 
of Somali reunification was not to be realized immediately 
and should not be tackled by means of military operations 
221. A.C. McEwen, op.cit., p.128. 
222. Carl G. Rosberg, "National Identity in African States ", 
in: The African Review, vol.I, No.1, March 1971, p.92. 
223. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.356. 
224. C. Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy: II, 
op.cit., p.85. 
-221- 
but rather in pacific negotiations.226 
The fact is that relations between Somalia and 
Ethiopia improved considerably after a conference was held 
between the Emperor and the new Somali Prime Minister in 
Addis Ababa in September 1967. They reached agreement to 
eliminate all sources of tension. A joint military 
commission was to be set up which would study all complaints. 
Furthermore, in quarterly meetings of administrative author- 
ities, efforts should be made to pave the way for increased 
co- operation along the frontier.227 This policy of 
reconciliation was continued by the military regime of 
General Ziab Ziad Barre who ousted the Egal Government in a 
coup d'etat in October 1969.228 
Assessment of the OAU's Role in the Dispute 
An assessment of the OAU's role in the disputes in the 
Horn of Africa must be made against the background of 
internal and international political developments in this 
area. In both conflicts what had been achieved was an 
improvement in interstate relations, but by no means did the 
roots of the disputes disappear. It seems unlikely that 
they will disappear as long as the Somalis remain nomads with 
stronger ties between blood brothers than towards allegiance 
to the states in which they have their grazing grounds. 
The Somali government can ill- afford to ignore these feelings 
even if its primary concern were good neighbourly relations 
225. Reprinted ibid., p.85. 
226. Georges R. Malecot, "La Politique Etrangére de l'Éthio- 
pie", in: Revue Francaise d'Etudes Politiques Africaines, 
no.79, July 1972, p.49. 
227. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.357. 
228. G.R. Malecot, op.cit., p.50. 
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with Ethiopia and Kenya. 
On the other hand it is inconceivable that either 
Ethiopia or Kenya should be prepared to cede parts of their 
territories. Their answer to the Somali problem is to 
fully integrate their respective Somali minority groups into 
their multi - tribal societies in the process of nation - 
building and creation of national identity. If the Somalis 
become Kenyans or Ethiopians their claims of secession will 
be obsolete. 
At the root of the Somali dispute thus lies a clash 
of two concepts of nation -building. On one side there is 
the demand to translate "Somali ethnic nationalism into 
statehood"229 i.e. to incorporate all Somali people into one 
nation -state. On the other side there is the desire to 
form a nation not on the premise of ethnic identity but 
through a process of "containing and accommodating tribal 
and ethnic particularism ".230 Kenya and Ethiopia are 
engaged in the second type of nation -building, an assignment 
which they share with the overwhelming majority of African 
states, while Somalia is a unique example of the first 
concept. "The basic sociological considerations are far 
more important in understanding the nature of the Somali 
dispute, and its wider ramifications in the policies of the 
countries, than the political hue of their leaders or 
regimes, however these be labelled."231 Unless one or both 
229. I.M. Lewis, "Recent Developments in the Somali Dispute ", 
in; African Affairs, vol.66, no.263, April 1967, p.104. 
230. Ibid., p.106. 
231. Ibid., p.106. 
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sides to the dispute reverse their concept of nationhood 
and territorial sovereignty, the problem cannot be solved. 
The only alternative would be the battlefield. 
However, any realistically minded Somali politician must 
know that at least for the time being any military efforts 
to solve the dispute impose a heavy burden upon his poor 
country without being a real threat to her much stronger 
neighbours. Without the backing of the Arab countries 
and the East, Somalia's harassments are of little consequence. 
After the Arab- Israeli War in 1967 "much of this support 
evaporated or was proven unreliable ".232 Any open partisan- 
ship on behalf of the Somali would drive the other countries 
in the dispute even more into the arms of the Western 
powers and the Israelis who already play a significant role 
in Ethiopia. Owing to heavy military aid from the 
Americans this country is already in a very strong position. 
Somalia's main arms supplier is the Soviet Union who is 
trying to prevent an increase in Chinese influence.233 
The arms race which is taking place in the Horn is not 
primarily caused by the territorial conflict which opposes 
the Somali Republic and her neighbours but by the geo- 
strategic and political importance of the area in connection 
with the Middle East problem. This factor makes the big 
powers interested in this area. Their main concern seems to 
be to consolidate their strong holds in this region in order 
232. J. Woronoff, op.cit. 
233. Ibid., p.458. 
p.357. 
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not to unbalance the positions of power in the Middle East 
crisis. In this connection they have nothing to gain from 
a change of the prevailing territorial status quo of the 
Horn. And their behaviour during the 'hot' crisis between 
Somalia and Ethiopia gives evidence that they used their 
influence to urge both sides to refrain from escalating the 
conflict. They had no interest "in the victory of either 
side and neither wished to upset the balance in the region 
irremediably or unleash a wave of territorial claims they 
would be called upon to support or combat".234 This self - 
imposed restraint of the big powers gave the OAU the chance 
to come in as a peacemaker. The international scene did not 
seem to have been in the way of a successful accomplishment 
of the OAU's task. The OAU rather failed to bring about a 
long -term agreement because it was unable to reconcile the 
two abovementioned concepts of nationhood which lie at the 
root of the problem. 
Thus in dealing with the Somali dispute its part was 
very modest, even more modest than in the Algerian- Moroccan 
conflict. It was able to create an atmosphere of brotherhood 
and make the politicians involved directly aware of their 
responsibility to keep the peace in Africa. It provided a 
forum where problems could be discussed. But as the two 
case studies reveal, the OAU cannot claim primacy as peace- 
maker in these disputes.235 Concrete results were achieved 
by individual statesmen and not by the OAU machinery. 
However, it can play a useful role in setting out and 
expressing the consensus that exist among African states 
234. Ibid., p.459. 
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with respect to certain issues such as the status quo 
attitude towards inherited boundaries. Thus any individual 
mediator can operate from a position of increased strength 
knowing that he is backed by the great majority of African 
states, whose leaders share the same opinion on territorial 
questions. 
"Perhaps the most significant achievement of the year 
for the OAU was the positive part played by African states- 
men in resolving the explosive border fighting between 
Morocco and Algeria and between Somalia and Ethiopia. The 
significance of this event lies in the fact that in the 
absence of the OAU, these incidents would surely have been 
referred to the UN Security Council. In that event they 
would have ceased to be African problems. They would even 
have ceased to be simple border disputes. They would have 
become world problems and that immediately draws in the 
cold war. "236 By and large Mboya's assessment is in 
keeping with my own judgement of the OAU's role in the border 
conflicts. He naturally emphasizes the hope which Africa 
pins on the OAU. Any objective critique must bring into 
question such an optimistic viewpoint. 
235. S. Touval, "The OAU and African Borders ", op.cit., 
p.126 
236. Tom Mboya, "African Unity and the OAU ", in: East Africa 
Journal, vol.I, no.10, October 1964, p.23 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND 
THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR 
It would certainly be beyond the scope of this 
thesis to begin this chapter with an extensive analysis of 
what went wrong in Nigeria. Only a comprehensive dis- 
cussion of all the historical,1 political, economic and 
social problems with which the independent state of 
Nigeria was confronted in the years between 1960 and 1966 
would disclose the fact that a unified Nigeria never 
existed. In our context it would be helpful to describe 
how the main African and non -African political actors who 
became involved in the solution of the Civil War in one way 
or another perceived and analysed the problems of this 
country. Their perception of the crisis and its background 
must have undoubtedly influenced their policy towards this 
problem. Although I am aware of the validity of such an 
approach I nevertheless believe that this cannot be provided 
for a number of reasons of which the lack of material is the 
most important one. 
The main task of this chapter is to show the degree 
of involvement of the OAU in the Nigerian civil strife and 
the impact this crisis had on the OAU as well as its 
importance for the issue of African Unity. I agree with 
Cervenka that the "two main principles of the OAU Charter 
which were put to a crucial test were those of non -interference 
1. As Jenkins argues "it is largely the genesis of nation 
states that explains their degree or lack of integration" 
R. Jenkins, op.cit., p.49. 
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in the internal affairs of the states and the respect for 
the inalienable right to independence. "2 When it comes to 
the history of the Civil War I am more concerned with the 
ramifications of the conflict in terms of the international 
African state -system than with the internal disorder as 
such. What must be given, however, are accounts of the 
strategic and political situation which prevailed at the 
time of the various OAU meetings and interferences by 
African politicians in the conflict.3 
1) Problems of Nigerian Integration 
It was for the Nigerian leaders to try to close the 
gap between the institutional framework and the socio- 
economic realities which had bedevilled the First Nigerian 
Republic and led to a collapse of the "onetime showpiece 
of decolonizing Africa ".4 My concern in these intro- 
ductory paragraphs will be focused on the question of 
whether or not there was a case for Biafra.5 At the centre 
of the problem lies the question of the applicability of 
the principle of self- determination in the case of Nigeria - 
Biafra. 6 
Surveying some of the literature that has been written 
analysing the factors which hampered the process of 
2. Z. Cervenka, oE.cit., p.192. 
3. Kirk -Greene indicates that "objective research may have 
many years to wait until reason is restored in men's 
mind and the total archives of both sides are freely and 
fairly open to public examination." in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, 
Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria A Documenta Sourcebook 
urnes, on on, o . P 
4. Ibid., p.VII. 
5. see K.W.J. Post, "Is there a Case for Biafra ? ", in: Inter- 
national Affairs, Vol.XLIV, no.1, Jan. 1968. 
6. Tackling this problem I will mainly rely on two articles 
by Post and Panter- Brick. 
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integration and the emergence of 'one Nigeria', authors 
tend to vary as far as emphasizing the main reasons are 
concerned. They nevertheless seem to be in agreement 
that the Nigerian experiment failed because - as Post 
put it - "the 'political frame' left by the British proved 
unable to withstand the centrifugal pressures of the 
'political facts'. "7 In as much as such an approach and 
an analysis along this line will be useful it indicates by 
no means a factor unique to Nigeria. The history of post - 
colonial Africa is a record of failures of the inherited 
political systems to withstand the pressures put upon it 
by the indigenous participants in the power struggle. In 
Nigeria as in the great majority of African states 
O'Connell's contention is borne out: "once independence 
comes the African politicians immediately shift their 
emphasis to the struggle for power, and then encounter the 
distortions that they accepted in order to speed the coming 
of independence. "8 Nigeria equally shared with other 
states the fact that they were unable to yield a "terri- 
torial -wide organization incorporating and containing the 
existing pluralism" in the pre -colonial days.9 In most 
cases the period of anti -colonial struggle for independence 
was too short to construct an integrative force containing 
7. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.29. 
8. James O'Connell, "The Inevitability of Instability ", in: 
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.V, no.2, Sept. 67, 
p.1/32. 
9. Carl J. Rosberg, op.cit., p.82. 
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the important sectors of the country. Many African 
countries made good some of these drawbacks by generating 
a single national leader whose amount of prestige and 
authority made him become "accepted by a majority of key 
groups and factions and recognized as superior to other 
leaders"1O and thus enabled him to play an important part 
in managing the problem of national identity: in Nigeria 
none of the leaders was able to fulfil such a task. 
The country gained independence under a federal 
system combined with a parliamentary system modelled on 
the British example. Given the specific historical and 
ethnic realities of this vast country, a federal system 
based on administrative divisions carried over from the 
colonial period seemed to have been the only solution 
available to guarantee the unity of this heterogeneous 
territory. The Nigerian Constitution was not superimposed 
by the British Government but derived formative influences 
in its framing from the Nigerian political leaders. The 
Nigerian leaders had consciously worked for a federal 
structure.11 
As a unit Nigeria had a comparatively short history. 
It was only in 1914 under the Governor General Lord Lugard 
that Northern and Southern Nigeria came to be known as the 
united Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. In this 
10. I_., p.84. 
11. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.I, p.3; see also 
J. O'Connell, "Political Integration: The Nigerian 
Case ", in: A. Hazlewood, op.cit., p.158 and John P. 
Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 
1966, p.17. 
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territory some 250 languages and dialects are spoken but 
two- thirds of the population speak only three languages 
between them. This is one of the factors which divides 
the three main groups: the Hausa -Fulani in the North, the 
Yoruba in the West and the Ibo in the East. In addition 
to the division along language lines these peoples are 
separated from one another by the "most deep- seated 
beliefs, values and social structures. "12 
During the colonial period each area and each tribal 
group within these areas developed along a different 
path.13 Sub -national identities emerged and were re- 
inforced. Many authors put the blame for such a develop- 
ment squarely upon the British colonialists. As an 
example one might quote Post: 
"Indirect Rule, Lord Lugard's baleful gift 
to Africa, created the Native Authority 
System which envisaged Nigeria developing 
as a hotch -potch of local government 
units of varying sizes: far from creating 
any sense of transcending loyalties, it 
even emphasized differences within ethnic 
groups. Thus much of the 'nationalism' 
which developed took as its focus the ethnic 
group as such, rather than Nigeria as a 
totality." 14 
Although this is correct as an overall assessment 
of the Nigerian colonial history it needs some quali- 
fication. The picture in the late 1940's and the 1950's 
- the formative years for the elaboration of the Nigerian 
12. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.27. As Jenkins points out, it 
is not the heterogeneity of her people as such which 
caused the problems of unity and a threat of secession 
in Nigeria, but the factor that the differences were 
additive and did not criss -cross over one another. see 
R. Jenkins, op.cit., p.51. 
13. J. Woronoff, 2 .cit., pp.395 -396. 
14. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.28; see also Frederick Forsyth, 
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Constitution - showed a North whose "feudal and reaction- 
ary" rulers expressed "rejection of the whole ethos of 
unity ".15 Her masses were not interested in a unified 
Nigeria in which they feared to be dominated by the more 
dynamic peoples of the South.16 The Ibos and their elite 
had emerged as the country's "most modern, progressive, 
nationally- oriented people ".17 They became the advocates 
for pan -Nigerian nationalism and unity.18 The Ibos were 
quick in absorbing Western education which made them ready 
to take jobs in the urban centres in their own area as 
well as in the West and the North. By 1960 the Ibos had 
become "the major source of administrators, managers, 
technicians and civil servants for the country, occupying 
senior positions far out of proportion to their numbers. "19 
While the migrants from the East became assimilated in the 
Western part of the territory, in the North they lived 
segregated from the people in this area.20 Since the 
colonial era the Ibos have been more open to change, more 
mobile, and more nationally oriented as compared to the 
Hausa -Fulani and Yoruba.21 
The Biafra Story, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1969, p.16: 
"In the 60 years from Lugard to Independence the dif- 
ferences in religious, historical and moral attitudes 
and values between the North and the South, and the 
educational and technological gap, became not steadily 
narrower but wider." 
15. A.H.M. Kirk- Greene, op.cit., Vol.I, p.3. 
16. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.396. 
17. Paul Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration: 
Nigeria and the Ibos ", in: Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol.V, No.2, Sept. 1967, p.167. 
18. C.G. Rosberg, op.cit., p.90. 
19. P. Anber, op.cit., p.172. 
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Nigeria became independent as a Federation in 1960. 
The North was not prepared to accept any other constitu- 
tional arrangements but welcomed the federal system 
because the regional set -up guaranteed a built -in majority 
for the North. It was by far the largest region in 
space and population and thus able to outnumber the 
Southerners.22 The future development of Nigeria was 
burdened with an unequal degree of modernisation reached 
by her tribal groups. The Ibos being undoubtedly the most 
advanced group were thus necessarily more prone to 
frustration when their expectations in the system were not 
fulfilled. Their nationalism became more and more Ibo- 
nationalism in the course of the First Republic. 
"Modernity brought the Ibos a self -consciousness and 
distinction as a people that they never had before, 
heightening their tribal loyalties and finally resulting 
in demands for their own state. " 
23 
The tribal diversity and social heterogeneity which 
prevailed in Nigeria did not need to lead inevitably to a 
collapse of the experiment. It was due to the failure of 
the constitutional set -up to minimize the effects of the 
regionally based power structure with its centrifugal forces. 
20. F. Forsyth, op.cit., p.17. 
21. P. Anber, op.cit., p.167. 
22. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.397. When the Northerners 
agreed to join the Federation they intended "not to be 
co -equal partners in the federation but to be dominant 
over them "i.e. the Southerners. see P.C. Lloyd, "The 
Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis ", in S.K. Panter- 
Brick, Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to 
the Civil War, London, 1970, p.9. 
23. P. Anber, op.cit., p.178. 
-233- - 
The constitutional frame was formed without enough 
consideration being given to "how it was likely to work in 
practice and how far the structure would be affected by 
the activities and outlook of the Nigerian parties and 
their leaders ".24 "As in all federations, the practice 
and development of party politics has had an effect on the 
distribution of power arranged by the Constitution. "25 
This is not to say that the constitution with its elaborate 
system of checks and balances as such was bad.26 
Given all the ethnic, social and historical facts, 
the history of the First Republic pointed up the 
incompatibility of Nigerian federalism with the Westminster 
parliamentary model. This is not an intrinsic 
incompatibility, but it was in the case of Nigeria, which 
did not have integrative national parties which are needed 
in a Federal system. Instead, the Nigerian parties 
remained regional parties; according to Mackintosh the 
regional character of the parties even increased during the 
years of Nigeria's independence.27 Their strongholds were 
the regional governments. A system emerged in which not 
only regional politics were monopolized by the tribal units 
but also national politics. "Regional issues were 
repeatedly given precedence over national causes, and the 
24. J.P. Mackintosh, op.cit., p.37. 
25. Ibid., p.63. 
26. F. Forsyth, op.cit., p.23. 
27. J.P. Mackintosh, op.cit., p.65. 
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federal government was left to sort out the differences. "28 
The essence of British parliamentary democracy is 
the interplay of government and opposition. In Nigeria 
this was unable to operate owing to the regional nature 
of the Nigerian party system. This system undermined 
the assumption upon which the Westminster model is based. 
Each party loathed the idea of forming the opposition 
since it meant being cut off from power at the Centre and 
thereby excluded from having a say in the allocation of 
Central resources for the development of their respective 
regions. No wonder that leading politicians both from the 
East and the West like Dr. Okpara and Chief Akintola pressed 
for all -party governments in order to guarantee economic 
development all over the country. These ideas were rejected 
by the North who had a majority in the parliament and 
government anyway and did not fear any exclusion from 
power. 29 
It must be seen as the crucial point of explanation 
for the failure of the Nigerian Federal system that the 
country's split into three, later four, regions with its 
"ambiguous division of powers"3° obstructed overall planned 
economic growth. As far as development capital went 
"there were no fixed guidelines for its distribution between 
regions and the process therefore involved in a kind of 
28. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.398. 
29. J.P. Mackintosh, op.cit., p.40. 
30. Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty ?, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968, p.35. 
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political free -for- a11"31 Each region was competing with 
the others for economic resources and the big problem was 
the co- ordination between the Federal and the regional 
governments. The closer the connections between the 
political leaders in Lagos and a region were, the better 
for the development of this region. The picture that 
emerged in reality showed a Federal Government which was 
the focus of regional rivalries as far as economic 
policies were concerned. "In terms of the economy, each 
region had tended to develop as a separate economic 
entity, with its own series of development plans, and the 
attempt to co- ordinate these after independence met with 
very little success. "32 
The main political entities in the country which 
could have acted as centripetal forces - the political 
parties - were led by a political elite who used party 
politics to foster the interests of the Nigerian 
bourgeoisie.33 The elite in each region tried to secure 
its influence by appealing to ethnic sensibilities. 
"Tribalism has been their most trustworthy weapon against 
change. "34 In order to gain and retain as much influence 
as possible the leaders were not kid- gloved when it came to 
using means in order to make their political ends meet. 
31. K.W.J. Post, o .cit., p.29 "Politically, since the regions 
derived between - 5 per cent of their revenue from 
federal payments their governments employed every possible 
pressure on the federal government to improve their own 
position." 
32. Ib, p.30. 
33. Richard L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Inte- 
gration - A Radical Approach ", Journal of Modern African 
Studies, vol.5, no.1, 1967, p.6. 
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Manipulation of local power as well as of censuses and 
elections helped ruin the political system and undermine 
the confidence of the Nigerian people in the existing 
system. In the end the system collapsed not because of 
the ethnic heterogeneity of the country or the incompat- 
ibility of the federal structure and the Westminster Model, 
but because the political elite did not stick to the rules 
of the game.35 Or, as Lloyd has put it, "The scale of 
ethnic differences does not determine the degree of 
hostility between the groups. The hostility derives.... 
from competition between peoples for wealth and power: "36 
Basil Davidson likewise rejects the concept of "tribalism" 
as "perfectly inadequate" to explain the Nigerian problem. 
For him the crisis was mainly one "of traditional modes of 
political life and attitudes at grips with modern problems 
and demandsi37 
The preceding remarks have only touched upon some 
of the roots of the breakdown of the Federation. They are 
background material for the cause of secession. For 
obvious reasons we cannot provide what Kirk -Greene regards 
34. Ibid., p.6. Sklar proposes "that tribalism should be 
viewed as a dependent variable rather than a primordial 
political force in the new nation ", p.6. 
35. See J.0. Akintunde, "The Demise of Democracy in the 
First Republic of Nigeria: A Causal Analysis ", in: 
ODU, vol.4, no.1', July 1967. He tries to explain the 
Nigerial dilemma in terms of the existing discrepancy 
between the political and economic prerequisites of a 
democratic system in the Western sense in Nigeria, p.6. 
36. P.C. Lloyd, op.cit., p.5. 
37. B. Davidson, op.cit., pp.150 -151. 
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as necessary "in any evaluation of the causes of the 
Nigerian débacle ", namely to trace back "a seemingly 
endless chain of antecedents and reactions to actions ".38 
A mere review of basic dates would not explain much while 
a detailed chronological analysis would be beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
2) The Princi.le of Self- Determination in the Nigerian Case 
What seems to be useful and appropriate at this 
point of the discussion is an examination of the general 
principle of self -determination in the Nigerian context. 
This is a problem Africa's "peace- makers" are confronted 
with whenever they become involved in inter- African 
conflicts. It will be recalled that it was argued in the 
previous chapter - dealing with the principle of self - 
determination as far as border disputes are concerned - 
that the prevailing attitude among Africa's leaders is to 
deny the invocation of the principle after independence has 
been attained. It amounts to the question about "the 
degree of finality with which the right to self- determination 
was exercised at the time of achieving independence from 
colonial rule. "39 
In the case of Biafra there is the problem of timing 
of the secession, and this seems to be a crucial point in 
38. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.I, p.13. The crucial 
time between the first coup in January 1966 and the 
secession of Biafra in May 1967 is dealt with by S.K. 
Panter- Brick. See his article "From Military Coup to 
Civil War, January 1966 to May 1967 ", in: Nigerian 
Politics and Military Rule, op.cit., 1970. 
39. S.K. Panter- Brick, "The Right to Self- Determination: 
Its Application to Nigeria ", in: International Affairs 
vol.XLIV, No.2, April 1968, p.254. 
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answering the aforementioned question. Panter -Brick 
points out that "the act of secession on the part of 
Biafra is a re- assertion of the right to self -determination, 
a right which its inhabitants might be deemed to have 
exercised already, in 1960, at the moment of Nigerian 
independence. "40 Biafra's claim for separate, independent 
existence outside the Federation was only launched six 
years after Nigeria had ceased to be a British colony. 
Prior to secession the East "had tried to make the system 
work - albeit often with impure motives on the part of its 
civilian leaders. "41 It is impossible to deny that the 
Easterners were as firmly - or as little for that matter - 
committed to support the integrity of Nigeria as the 
peoples in the other parts of the country. This picture 
need not be altered even if one agrees with O'Connell that 
the elite in the East lacked this deep commitment after the 
1966 massacres. They pushed for secession because they 
believed that "the East had the human and economic 
resources to become a model state ",42 
In most other African secessionist movements claims 
were voiced right from the beginning of independence. All, 
however, including Biafra, seemed to share the same motive 
for their claims, namely, that a peaceful living together 
40. Ibid., p.256 
41. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.32. 
42. J. O'Connell, "The Scope of the Tragedy ", in: Africa 
Report, Vol.13, No.2, February 1968, p.10. 
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under one government in the inherited framework proved 
impossible. Separation would be the only answer given 
the ethnic heterogeneity of the people. Panter -Brick 
Blokes it clear that the political failure of the Federation 
is not a reason in itself for a sufficient justification 
of Biafra's secession. He comes to this statement on the 
grounds that "it would indeed be a dangerous doctrine if 
it were ever to be accepted that a breakdown of the 
political system ipso facto provided a right to break up 
the state. "43 
Panter -Brick draws attention to yet another problem 
involved in the assertion of self -determination, the 
question of size of the political entity. If the granting 
of self- determination brings about a new unit, the question 
is raised about the viability of the new state. Although 
there can be no general answer to the question of what 
constitutes the minimum size, population and resources which 
are necessary from a practical point of view for an 
independent existence of a state, it is beyond doubt that 
Biafra would be able to survive on its own.44 
When the Easterners decided to go it alone their 
country was better equipped than most of the other 
independent West African countries. The country had a 
population of about 14 million people which made it bigger 
than any other present West African country. Compared with 
many other developing states it had a cadre of well- trained 
43. S.K. Panter- Brick, "The Right to Self- Determination ", 
op.cit., p.257. 
44. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.37. 
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people. And it had oil as one of its major resources.45 
It would be difficult to find arguments which could prove 
that a "balkanization" of Nigeria would have been detri- 
mental to the people in the East as far as their economic 
prospects were concerned. 
But the question of size also has pan -African 
connotations. This is the ideological side of the coin. 
As indicated in previous chapters it has been a tradition 
in the pan- African movement to condemn any form of 
"balkanization" and blame its results on the colonialists 
and neo- colonialists. The attitude adopted amongst the 
OAU members made it clear, however, that they accepted the 
inherited territorial status quo. And while they showed 
their hostility towards further fragmentation, they are at 
least theoretically not opposed to any "amalgamation of 
existing states into larger units." "The right to self - 
determination is something which may legitimately still be 
exercised, but only in a one -way direction: "46 Following 
this line of argumentation Biafra did not stand any chance 
whatsoever to secure the sympathy of the African states. 
This sympathy would be likewise impossible to obtain 
if those who pressed for self -determination could be 
denounced of being 'tribalists'. If the Ibos could have 
been accused of tribalism as their motive for advocating 
45. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.37. 
46. S.K. Panter- Brick, "The Right to Self- Determination ", 
op.cit., p.258. 
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the principle of self -determination, their claims would 
have become completely unacceptable to African political 
leaders who at least at face -value have declared war on 
such out -moded and dangerous attitudes. As Panter -Brick 
points out "many a popular movement in contemporary African 
society has little to do with tribalism in this conservative 
sense "47 i.e. tribalism based on historic divisions little 
permeated by modernizing influences. As contended earlier 
on in this chapter, it was in the course of modernization 
and settling all over Nigeria that the Ibos became fully 
aware of their homogeneity as a group distinct from other 
peoples in that country. When the Ibos, after the events 
in 1966, thought they had lost their dignity and status, 
they claimed self- determination in order to regain it in a 
political entity of their own. 
What has been said so far does not run either unequi- 
vocally for or against the Ibos' right to secession as an 
expression of self -determination. Those who are against 
any change in the territorial make -up of the African 
continent contend that Africa is a powder -keg in the sense 
that any concession made in one country to the principle of 
self- determination will lead to explosions in other parts 
of the continent. This implied that Biafra needed to 
prove that hers was a special case whose circumstances did 
not apply to any other country. Only if other African 
47. Ibid., p.258. 
48. Ibid., pp.262-266. 
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leaders could have drawn the conclusion that the 
situation prevailing in Nigeria is not applicable to their 
own countries was there any chance that they might forget 
their apprehension and come out with statements in favour 
of the Biafran quest. 
Panter -Brick lists some arguments which suggest that 
Biafra cannot establish itself as a special case.48 Fore- 
most, he points out one major ambiguity in the Biafran case. 
While the secessionists placed their demand for independence 
on the grounds of Ibo ill- treatment in the Republic of 
Nigeria, they did not confine their claim for independence 
to the Ibo people. They proclaimed secession for the whole 
area of the Eastern Region. This Region did not only 
consist of eight million Ibos but also included five million 
non -Ibos, who may have feared Ibo domination in an inde- 
pendent Biafra. 
Nevertheless, Biafra's independence was called for 
"not just on behalf of Ibos and those who considered them- 
selves equally affected. Herein lies the ambiguity in the 
Biafran case, an ambiguity which reflects a familiar 
difficulty characteristic of all claims to self- determina- 
tion. It is not possible to assert a claim to self - 
determination without asserting a claim to certain 
territory. "49 By the same token Biafra is - on a smaller 
scale - as much an artificial creation as Nigeria, each 
encompassing a considerable variety of peoples. If the 
breaking away of the Eastern Region means self- determination 
49. Ibid., pp.262-263. 
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for the Ibos it does not have the same significance for 
the minority tribes in this area. "Because Biafra's case 
and Nigeria's case are both of the same order, both may 
be said to face the same problem, that of securing from 
diverse peoples acceptance of a common sovereign central 
authority. "50 For the Biafran leaders to secure this 
acceptance was not only important for the moral justifica- 
tion of their demands but it was also vital for Biafra's 
capacity to survive economically, because the territory 
of the minority groups contains two- thirds of the oil of 
Biafra.51 
Biafra's leaders could at no time claim to have the 
unequivocal support of the minority peoples. Although 
these groups had their grievances about the way the First 
Republic had worked, they did not share the Ibos' 
apprehension because they had not been subject to killings 
and did not feel threatened by the other groups.52 The 
policy of the Biafran leaders to woo the minorities to 
their cause by giving them a fairer share in the admini- 
stration of their communities is not undisputed as far as 
the success of this policy goes. Why should the non -Ibos 
prefer to live in an Ibo- dominated country rather than in 
the bigger Federation? Biafra's ethnic composition could 
50. Ibid., p.263. 
51. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.38. 
52. S.K. Panter- Brick, op.cit., p.264. 
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only disfavour the Ibo claims of self- determination. If 
the Ibo leaders had restricted their demands to the new 
South -Eastern State they would have reduced Biafra to 
"nothing more than an impoverished, landlocked, over- 
populated Ibo province. "53 
When all is said the Biafran question is yet another 
example of the fact that there are no incontestable factors 
on which to ground the right of self -determination for a 
people. The Biafrans could not prove beyond any doubt that 
secession was the only remedy to avoid a repetition of the 
1966 massacres. It is ultimately a political question 
whether or not one believes that the partitioning of 
Nigeria into smaller territorial units would ease the 
political problems in this part of Africa. And it further- 
more was a matter of how the African and non -African leaders 
involved would interpret their interests and the way in 
which they would benefit best from the potential wealth of 
the country. 
3) Mediation Attempts 1967 -1968 
It must have been evident to Africa's leading 
statesmen ever since the continuous crisis which bedevilled 
Nigeria's political life reached its climax in the two coups 
in 1966, that trouble in one of the most important 
countries on the continent must have repercussions not only 
for the internal situation of this state but also for the 
African community of states as a whole. Although the first 
53. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.I, p.97. 
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official consideration of the Nigerian problem by the 
member states of the OAU only came in September 1967 in 
the course of the summit meeting in Kinshasa.54 
Early Peace Initiatives 
African statesmen intervened more or less directly 
in order to help find a peaceful solution before and after 
secession had taken place on March 30, 1967. President 
Tubman of Liberia was reported to have called for the 
assistance of the OAU to help solve the Nigerian crisis 
in September 1966 at a time when the Federation was 
crumbling further each day. This step taken by one of the 
elder statesmen in Africa was then welcomed by Lagos as 
"'a brotherly but premature gesture' in contrast to the 
brusquer treatment meted out to such appeals a year 
later. "55 Tubman must have been aware that such a 
proposal could be interpreted as interference in the 
internal affairs of a country, something the OAU member 
states pledged themselves to abstain from in Article III,2 
of the OAU Charter, but he probably felt that the intricate 
situation would justify mediation from outside, given that 
Nigeria's leaders agreed to such a step. However, nothing 
came of Tubman's initiative. 
The African politician who became directly involved 
before the outbreak of war was Ghana's General Ankrah, who 
showed himself prepared to mediate among Nigeria's opposing 
factions. He invited them to come to Aburi in Ghana for 
talks. Ankrah's invitation removed one obstacle to a 
54. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.195. 
55. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.I, p.59. 
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meeting between Ojukwu and his fellow -members of the 
Supreme Military Council. Ojukwu was not prepared to 
convene somewhere in Nigeria believing that safety for 
himself and his delegation could not be guaranteed.56 
Ankrah, however, did not take part in the discussion 
between Gowon and the four military governors. Whether 
or not an agreement had been reached at Aburi became 
relatively unimportant - according to Kirk- Greene they 
agreed on "back to 14 January "57 - because soon after 
Aburi the results of this meeting "degenerated into an 
additional source of disagreement, for what was actually 
decided at Aburi itself became a matter of some dispute. "58 
Taking this and the disastrous developments that followed 
into account, it was just as well that Ankrah's name was not 
more intimately connected with the results of this meeting. 
It would not have helped to strengthen the cause of those 
who were advocates of African mediation. 
When all attempts to find a compromise between the 
Federal Military Government and Ojukwu failed, he declared 
the Eastern Region an independent state - the Republic 
of Biafra - on May 30, 1967. He declared that the Biafrans 
would be "prepared to enter into such association, treaty 
or alliance with any sovereign state within the former 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms and 
56. Ibid., p.75. 
57. Ibid., p.75. The Final Aburi Communiqué is reprinted 
in: Ibid., pp.313 -314. 
58. S.K. Panter- Brick, "From Military Coup to Civil War ", 
op.cit., p.35. 
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conditions as best to subserve your common good. "59 The 
fighting started over a month later on July 6, 1967, after 
economic and other measures taken by the Federal Government 
to crush the secession failed.60 
After secession and the outbreak of a full -scale war 
rather than a 'police action' against the rebels, the 
question of a solution to Nigeria's crisis reached such 
international proportions that it could no longer be ignored 
by Africa's leaders. Any further move of intervention or a 
deliberate abstention from any attempt to reconciliate was 
undoubtedly influenced by the way the politicians evaluated 
the situation in Nigeria and its repercussions for their own 
countries, the OAU and African unity. 
According to Woronoff, there was a degree of 
uncertainty of how to evaluate it among African politicians.61 
Those who were reluctant to become involved could always fall 
back on the argument that the Nigerian- Biafran war was a 
domestic affair not within the competence of the OAU. Of 
course this is a debatable argument which could not stop 
those who wanted to comment on the situation from doing so. 
The war not only very quickly became an inter -African 
political issue but also grew into a problem of international 
standing with the involvement of the big powers. The 
African leaders could no longer remain aloof. 
59. Quoted from 0jukwu's Declaration of Independence, re- 
printed in A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.I, pp. 
451 -453. 
60. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.404 -405. 
61. Ibid., p.407. 
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For Post there is no doubt that Africa's experience 
of the Katanga secession must have influenced the attitudes 
towards Biafra.62 This seems to be convincing. The 
Katanga secession - occurring immediately after independence 
without the attempt to make the larger unit work - was "an 
obvious manoeuvre by neo- colonial interests ".63 However, 
there are important differences between "Biafra" and "Kat - 
anga ".64 While in the Congo crisis conservative and 
progressive attitudes were easy to discern, in the Nigerian 
case the situation was different. For the African leaders 
it was not a conflict between feudal, reactionary North and 
the more advanced East of Nigeria or between independent 
Nigerian leaders and imperialist stooges, but a tribal 
feud.65 
It will be shown later on in this chapter that those 
African statesmen who came out in favour of the Biafran 
quest belonged to different 'ideological' camps. "Secession, 
more than revolution, frightened the African states. They 
all had their own dangers of tribalism and separatism. And 
they came out unanimously against the threat. This was true 
of both the moderates, traditionally in favour of the status 
91aó, and the radicals. But there were definite nuances. "66 
These 'nuances' were discernible right from the beginning 
of secession. While Egypt and the Sudan sold the Federal 
62. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.32. As Kaye Whiteman puts it: 
"No matter how much evidence can be produced of the 
genuine popular backing for secession in Biafra, Ojukwu 
and his colleagues cannot escape the Tshombe shadow." 
Kaye Whiteman, "The OAU and the Nigerian Issue ", in: 
The World Today, vol.24, no.II, November 1968, p.450. 
63. K.W.J. Post, op.cit., p.37. He says that: "Katanga's 
secession was backed by Union Miniare and the Belgian 
troops; despite some hesitation, the oil companies have 
refused to back Biafra, and Britain supports the regime 
-248A- 
Military Government a number of aircraft - some of them 
piloted by Egyptians67 - other states kept silent or 
contented themselves with statements of support for Gowon 
and his policy. The Emperor Haile Selassie is reported to 
have sent a message to General Gowon pledging that 
Ethiopia would never favour any policy detrimental to 
Nigeria's unity.ó8 However, two days after the fighting 
broke out, the Emperor, together with Presidents Kaunda, 
Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote, appealed to both sides at a 
meeting in Lusaka "to halt the fighting and reopen dis - 
cussions ".69 This joint request was probably inter alia 
initiated by Kaunda's appeal launched on June 24, 1967, 
asking African leaders to help solve the Nigerian crisis.70 
The OAU - created to serve as a peace -maker - 
remained silent although the war escalated quickly and the 
intervention of foreign powers became apparent. All that 
was heard was a statement by the OAU Secretary- General, 
made on the occasion of a courtesy visit to Lagos, 
emphasizing that there was "no single disagreement" on the 
Nigerian crisis among Africa's leaders. They believed it 
to be a domestic problem of Nigeria.71 
of General Gowon." 
op.cit., p.308. 
64. See West Africa, 
Ibid., p.32. See also V.B. Thompson, 
3 June, 1967, p.713. vol.51, no.2609, 
65. K. Whiteman, op.cit., p.449. 
66. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.407. 
67. Ibid., p.407. 
68. West Africa, vol.51, no.2611, 17 June 1967, p.806. 
69. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.407. 
70. West Africa, vol.51, no.2612, 24 June 1967, p.838. 
71. West Africa, vol.51, no.2616, 22 July 1967, p.970. 
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This emphasis on the domestic nature of the problem 
gave the inactive OAU an excuse for not getting involved. 
At this time of the crisis a statement like Diallo Telli's 
must have been to the liking of the Federal leaders who 
were not interested in OAU involvement. Only very shortly 
after the outbreak of the war Radio Nigeria sent out 
warnings to the African states that any support for Biafra 
would be considered as a hostile act by the Nigerians apart 
from being a nail to the coffin of the integrity of other 
African countries.72 Diallo Tellí called for an extra- 
ordinary OAU meeting in order to discuss the Middle East 
and the use of mercenaries without suggesting that the 
Nigerian problem should be on the agenda as well. The OAU 
refused to consider the situation in spite of the months 
of fighting. Since it had been established as a "peace- 
maker" in Africa, its refusal to act put its usefulness 
into discredit.73 
The OAU Assembly in Kinshasa 
What was the situation like in the war- stricken 
country at the time of the scheduled meeting of Heads of 
State and Government on September 10 -14, 1967? Gowon and 
the Federal Government were in a strong position at this 
time. Ojukwu's troops had launched an attack into the 
Mid -West capturing the capital Benin and bringing his forces 
within little more than a hundred miles from Lagos, but when 
72. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.3. 
73. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.408. 
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they hesitated to move on to the Federal capital, they gave 
the Federal troops the chance to counter- attack and regain 
control over the territory in a short time. On September 
2, 1967, when Gowon broadcast to the nation, he was in a 
strong position again. The Federal troops had managed to 
occupy half of the Biafran territory.74 He announced that 
as far as he was concerned the fighting could stop 
immediately and negotiations could start if the Biafrans 
agreed: "a) to remain part of Nigeria and give up secession 
and b) accept the new structure of the Federation based on 
the twelve states, including the South Eastern and Rivers 
states." Gowon refused, however, to accept Ojukwu as 
negotiation partner.75 Summed up in one sentence, the 
Federal Government was in a favourable position. Ojukwu 
had all the odds against him. Nevertheless, he had made it 
clear that the prerequisite of negotiations for Biafra would 
be nothing less than the recognition of her sovereignty.76 
When the conference met there was no way of con- 
cealing the disagreement which prevailed among the African 
states whether or not the OAU should be concerned with the 
civil war in Nigeria.77 Following the letter as well as 
the spirit of the OAU Charter, the prohibition against 
interference in the internal affairs of states barred the OAU 
74. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.12. 
75. See text of Gowon's broadcast, Ibid., pp.166 -168. 
76. Ibid., p.12. Ojukwu released a White Paper on 29 August 
177 in which he defined the areas of future co- operation 
between Biafra and the rest of Nigeria. Reprinted ibid., 
pp.163-165. 
77. See R. Nagel and R. Rathbone, "The OAU at Kinshasa ", in: 
The World Today, vol.23, no.11, Nov. 1967, p.476. 
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from involvement in this intra -state conflict. On the 
other hand critical voices were heard in Africa about the 
OAU's obvious failure to do something to solve the crisis. 
"Anybody who still regards the crisis as an 'internal 
affair' is simply not being sincere. The OAU must do 
something to break this conspiracy of silence. "78 
Meanwhile, Lagos was busily campaigning to keep the 
item off the agenda, arguing that the whole problem was an 
internal Nigerian affair in which they would not consent to 
any interference from outside. This campaign was success- 
ful enough to keep the preceding Council of Ministers 
conference from discussing the matter.79 At that stage no 
African government had yet recognized the secessionist 
regime of Biafra. When the Heads of State and Government 
assembled they must have been aware that nothing less than 
the credibility of their African organization was at stake. 
If they ignored the Nigerian problem they would only 
nourish the criticism voiced about the impotence of the OAU 
in the face of that devastating war. 
It is difficult to assess what made the African 
leaders discuss the Nigerian war in the end 80 Was it the 
awareness that the reputation of their organization would 
suffer or was it the pressure put on the African statesmen 
from sources outside Africa? Kirk -Greene reports that 
78. Onyemaeke Ogum, "Nigeria: Africa's Problem ", in: Legon 
Observer, vol.Il, no.18, 1 -14 September 1967, p.7. 
79. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.408; and R. Nagel and 
R. Rathbone, op.cit., p.481. 
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Lord Brockway - the leader of the Movement for Colonial 
Freedom - had "written to all heads of African States 
urging on them the need for a goodwill mission to be quickly 
sent to Nigeria and Biafra. "81 How much was their decision 
influenced by Biafra's constant pressure for an 'inter - 
nationalisation' of the conflict, making it become a crisis 
that concerns the whole community of African states and not 
only Nigeria? If the leaders did not deal with it, they 
opened the gates wide for non -African intervention. As 
the examples of the border conflicts in the previous chapter 
have shown, this is a threat which Africa is afraid of and 
tries to prevent. 
Biafra did everything to lobby during the meeting. 
Her representatives tried "to acquaint the African Heads 
of State with the Biafran point of view ".82 The former 
Eastern Region's Premier, Dr. Okpara, equipped with much 
literature, sustaining the Biafran Government's point of 
view of the crisis, was seeking every opportunity to speak 
with Africa's leaders outside the conference hall.83 In a 
comment in West Africa it is suggested that the Nigerian 
question "was very much subject for the corridors and not 
the general debate ".84 According to Kirk -Greene, the 
Biafrans managed to secure some success among anglophone 
East and Central African leaders who were in sympathy with 
a move towards mediation.85 
80. This act, by the way, provides one of the few examples 
in the short history of the OAU in which the Assembly 
preoccupied itself with a conflict not previously dis- 
cussed at the Council meeting. See M. Manigat, op.cit., p. 
393. 
81. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.13. 
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It seems likely that a combination of all these 
factors and others eventually made the conference talk 
about the Nigerian problem. There was surely also the 
humanitarian aspect which made the leaders act, although it 
would be getting the priorities wrong to state - as 
Cervenka does - "that the reasons for the Assembly's 
decision to adopt a resolution on Nigeria were humanitarian 
rather than political ".86 The carefully worded resolution 
which was adopted on September 14, 1967, was undoubtedly a 
political statement. In their resolution87 the African 
politicians adhered to the principles of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and 
condemnation of secession. They emphasized that they 
regarded the crisis as an internal Nigerian affair. More- 
over, they reposed their confidence in the Federal Govern- 
ment, but they also showed their readiness to place the 
services of the OAU at the disposal of the Federal Govern- 
ment. In order to put this promise into practice they set 
82. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., pp.195 -196. 
83. The Biafran Memorandum circulated to Heads of States at 
the OAU meeting in Kinshasa is reprinted in A.H.M. Kirk - 
Greene, op.cit., vol.II, pp.168 -171. Apart from giving 
the Biafran historical interpretation of the events 
which led to the war, it tries hard to emphasize the 
uniqueness of the Biafran case. 
84. West Africa, vol.51, no.2624, 16 September 1967, p.1218. 
85. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., Vol.II, p.13. This atti- 
tude is also reflected in the East African press at that 
time. 
86. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.196. 
87. Reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk- Greene, op.cit., vol.II, 
PP.172 -173. 
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up a consultative mission of six Heads of State represent- 
ing Liberia, Cameroun, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Ghana 
and Niger. The role of this mission was to go "to the 
Head of the Federal Government of Nigeria to assure him of 
the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity 
and peace of Nigeria. "88 
At first sight, it seems that the Federal Govern- 
ment had scored an unequivocal victory. The resolution 
did endorse the Federal point of view that the crisis was an 
internal matter. In fact, it could not have been worded 
more prudently in order to avoid any suspicion of intruding 
in the domestic affairs of a member country. There was no 
question of direct mediation. The Organization would have 
been incapable of imposing such a measure on a member 
government. Mediation would have been difficult anyway 
because the deliberations of the Assembly showed a 
definite anti- Biafran bias. In spite of the feeling pre- 
vailing among the states that the conflict in Nigeria was 
contagious, no efforts were made to reach a quick settlement 
through the mediation of the OAU. 
If it is true, as West Africa reported, that the 
Nigerian delegation was directly involved in the wording of 
the final resolution and that telephone contact was made 
with General Gowon to seek his consent, the one -sidedness 
of the text comes as no surprise.89 Following the spirit 
as well as the letter of the OAU Charter, the member states 
of this Organization had no option but to come forward with 
88. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.173. 
89. West Africa, vol.51, no.2625, 23 September 1967, p.1223. 
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the sort of statement which was passed unanimously. But, 
if the Federal Government was delighted with the text, the 
fact that the Assembly concerned itself with the war ran 
against Lagos' wishes. She had previously objected to any 
kind of outside interference into a problem which she 
regarded as entirely domestic.90 On the other hand it was 
no small fish to secure, as she did, the unequivocal con- 
demnation of Biafra's secession from the community of 
African states. This could indeed strengthen the inter- 
national position of the Federal Government, as non -African 
states would perhaps be more reluctant to openly back 
Biafra, a move which could be interpreted by Africa's 
leaders as detrimental to their interests. Lagos surely 
hoped for international isolation of the rebel regime. 
The resolution itself contained nothing to 
encourage the Biafrans. The principle of self- determination 
was not mentioned.91 But the Biafrans did not leave 
Kinshasa completely empty- handed. Even if the African odds 
were heavily loaded against Biafra, the fact that the 
Nigerian problem was discussed on an international African 
level was what the Biafrans had been pressing for. Ojukwu 
indicated his satisfaction about the outcome of the 
Kinshasa summit in a broadcast on September 29, 1967: 
"The world still understands our case. Our 
sister African countries know as well. That 
is why, despite the efforts of Gowon and his 
90. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.13. 
91. We know from earlier discussion that Africa only 
agreed to apply this towards colonial territories. 
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aides, to exclude the discussions or 
even the mention of our war with Nigeria 
during the last meeting of the OAU, 
members of that organization felt obliged 
to discuss the matter and appoint a 
committee to look into it." 92 
Furthermore, at least at this particular moment in the 
development of the war, if the OAU mission was to achieve 
anything it could not be done with complete disregard of 
the Biafran side. That in its turn would involve some 
form of recognition of the de facto existence of a govern- 
ment in control of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria. 
In any case the Biafrans were keen to get OAU intervention 
and they interpreted the task of the mission to be one of 
mediation.93 The terms of reference of the resolution do 
not give the slightest support for such an interpretation. 
It is striking that Enugu was pressing so much for mediation 
when the Biafran leaders knew that the majority of the OAU 
members were biased against them. But they felt that 
once an 'internationalization' of the conflict was achieved, 
they would stand a chance to convince African governments 
of the validity of their cause. As Woronoff points out, 
the question of timing the first meeting of the commission 
could be a very important factor in increasing the mission's 
effectiveness and role beyond what had been anticipated at 
the Kinshasa meeting.94 As long as there was no victory 
in sight for either party there was a greater chance for a 
92. Reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, 
PP174 -175. 
93. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.409. 
94. Ibid., p.410. 
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compromise settlement. Had they met immediately after 
Kinshasa, a cease -fire agreement might have been possible. 
One might evaluate the Kinshasa meeting as a 
disappointment because of the bias shown by the African 
states which could only harden Biafra's obsessive 
determination. But as Nagel and Rathbone see it: "The 
fact that the Assembly got the Federal Government to grant 
even the possibility of such an official involvement from 
outside was to the OAU's credit. "95 It remains to be seen 
whether anything positive was to emerge out of the mission's 
activities, and how other African attempts outside the OAU 
as well as outside Africa compare with the mission's efforts. 
The First Meeting of the OAU Consultative Mission 
in Lagos 
Although everybody was aware that time was pressing, 
with heavy casualties increasing the death toll every day, 
it took the OAU Consultative Mission a considerable time to 
convene the first meeting. The fact that the mission, 
including some of the most eminent African politicians, was 
the most prestigious committee ever to act on behalf of the 
interests of the African community gave it great prominence.96 
The continual postponement of the meeting - originally 
scheduled to take place shortly after Kinshasa - was partly 
due to Lagos and partly due to the committee's members. The 
engagements of the leaders seemed to ensure that it would be 
extremely difficult to find a date which would suit them all. 
95. R. Nagel and R. Rathbone, op.cit., p.481. 
96. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.409. 
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Presidents Tubman and Mobutu, both pleading urgent internal 
duties, were not present97 when the mission finally met in 
Lagos on November 22, 1967. 
At that stage, as at any other during the war, a success- 
ful outcome of the mission's task to help end the war depended 
"ultimately upon the Federal Government's assessment of its 
chances of military victory,". 98 That in its turn hinged upon 
the kind of world support Nigeria would get as well as on 
Biafra's ability to get help from wherever it could. 
It is fruitless to speculate what might have happened if 
the mission had been able to come to Lagos as early as September 
21, 1967, as was the intention of the mission's leader, Haile 
Selassie.99 
"At that juncture, with the war raging near -by and 
no victory in sight for either side, the six Heads 
of State could hardly have limited themselves in 
their restrictive and almost degrading functions. 
A compromise settlement might have seemed 
particularly reasonable... In fact, this would have 
been the best time to impose a cease -fire or seek a 
peaceful settlement if any were to be found. "100 
It is true that neither side was in sight of military 
victory at this stage. But the fact remains that Gowon was in 
a stronger position having occupied half of the Biafran 
territory. I tend to be less optimistic about the changes for 
a cease -fire than Woronoff is. But whatever the outcome of an 
earlier meeting of the commission might have been, the fact 
remains that the frequent postponements of a meeting did not 
help to increase the prestige of this OAU- sponsored body. 
From the end of September 1967 onwards, with more military 
equipment coming to the Federal side, the Biafrans were driven 
97. S. Chime, op.cit., p.75. 
98. R. Nagel and R. Rathbone, op.cit., p.481. 
99. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.'', p.14. 
100. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.410. 
101. Ibid., p.410. 
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back into the old Eastern Region. Biafra was attacked at 
all frontiers and her capital Enugu fell on October 4, 
1967.101 Calabar, the important port city, was captured 
a fortnight later. The impact on the Biafrans, however, 
was not strong enough to lead to a surrender, and the 
Federal troops did not succeed in taking Onitsha, Biafra's 
major commercial and industrial centre.102 The war dragged 
on, but no further spectacular military victories for the 
Federal troops were at hand at the time the OAU mission came 
to Lagos. The fighting lulled, but both sides had been 
successful in soliciting foreign aid. The Federal Govern- 
ment acquired full Russian support while Biafra achieved 
"growing involvement of Portugal ", a country which proved 
"highly effective in organizing a dangerous milk -run of 
arms supplies ".103 The military situation had not eased 
the task of the African Heads of State, nor had the fact 
that the value of the mission was now debased in the eyes of 
the Biafran and Nigerian information media, owing to the long 
postponement. 
In his welcoming speech to the members of the mission, 
Gowon made it clear that he was not prepared to allow the 
committee much leeway. He reaffirmed that he believed that 
the African states could be helpful in supporting Nigeria's 
fight to regain her integrity. "Our true friends are those 
who publicly and genuinely condemn the attempted secession 
by a few who have imposed their will on the former Eastern 
102. Africa Report, Vol.13, no.1, January 1968, "News in 
Brief ", p.45. 
103. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.17. 
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Region of Nigeria." He also emphasized again the 
domestic character of the problem from which he concluded 
that "your mission is not here to mediate ".104 Add to this 
that Gowon likewise stated that "the most valuable contri- 
bution the mission can make in the present circumstances 
is to call on the rebel leaders to abandon secession ",105 
and it becomes clear that the African leaders were left 
with no alternative to what they could do. This imposed 
narrow margin in which the members of the mission were to 
operate was apparent in Haile Selassie's reply to Gowon. 
He pointed out that the mission's chief objective was to 
find ways and means of preserving Nigerian territorial 
integrity. As Woronoff points out, this does not 
necessarily mean the mission had to follow the Federal 
Government's view of solving the crisis. However, it 
nevertheless committed the mission to the same ultimate 
goal as Gowon and his government, i.e. the return to 
Nigeria's national unity. Biafra on the other hand was 
neither prepared to surrender militarily nor was she willing 
to negotiate about her sovereignty. 
The mission left Lagos the next day after nine hours 
of discussions with the Gowon Government.106 The fact that 
it left it to the Federal Government to issue a communiqué 
indicated that complete agreement must have been reached 
104. Ibid., p.14. 
105. Quoted from "Report on the OAU Consultative Mission to 
Nigeria ", Nigerian National Press, 1968, in: J. Woronoff 
op.cit., p.411. 
106. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.411. 
-261- 
between the mission members and Gowon. Indeed the 
document revealed that Lagos had it all her way: "The 
mission reaffirmed the decision of the OAU summit embodied 
in its resolution condemning all secessionist attempts in 
Africa" and it also said "that any solution of the Nigerian 
crisis must be in the context of preserving the unity and 
territorial integrity of Nigeria ". The mission agreed 
"that as a basis for a return to peace and normal 
conditions in Nigeria the secessionists should renounce 
secession and accept the present administrative structure 
of the Federation of Nigeria... "107 
General Ankrah was mandated by the mission to convey 
the Kinshasa resolution and the mission's conclusions to 
the secessionists, and to report back any reactions from 
Biafra. On the basis of such a report the mission would 
decide on its further steps. OAU Secretary -General Diallo 
Telli, who was also present in Lagos, endorsed the result 
of the meeting. He was pleased that full agreement between 
the mission and the Federal Government had been achieved on 
the goal of safeguarding Nigeria's territorial unity.l08 
The reaction from Biafra was hostile. The Biafrans, 
who once pinned their hopes upon African intervention, could 
no longer look towards the OAU as a mediator because it was 
all too evident that the organized institution of Pan- 
Africanism wholeheartedly endorsed the enemy's point of 
107. The Communiqué-is reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk- Greene, 
op.cit., vol.Il, pp.173 -174. 
108. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.198. 
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view.1O9 Once the Biafrans had understood that they did 
not stand a chance of help from a body whose politics of 
intervention was based on principles not acceptable to 
Biafra, they tried to solicit the mediation of countries 
which they considered to be more sympathetic to their aims. 
They justified their withdrawal from Africa by arguing 
"le conflit n'est pas un problke africaine aux yeux du 
Biafra et l'OUA ne peut le resoudre."11O 
Non -African Peace Offensives 
Peace offensives were also made by other influential 
people. Most prominent among those who tried to work 
toward a negotiated settlement was the Commonwealth 
Secretary -General in London. There had been attempts to 
mediate between the two sides in the conflict throughout the 
year 1967. Kirk -Greene reports that in October and 
November of that year the Commonwealth Secretariat had tried 
to arrange for "representatives of the two sides to 'co- 
incide' in London." But it seems that the representatives 
of the Federal Government waited in vain to meet their 
colleagues from the other side.111 Nothing came of it. 
Even before these fruitless attempts the Commonwealth 
Secretary -General, Mr. Arnold Smith, was reported to have 
109. In a broadcast on November 24, 1967, Radio Enugu 
condemned the mission which had demonstrated its lack 
of objectivity and doomed itself to failure right from 
the start. See: Africa Report, vol.13, no.1, January 
1968, "News in Brief ", p.46. 
110. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.391. 
111. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, pp.23 -24. 
-263- 
flown to Lagos in July 1967 at an invitation by Gowon.112 
But at that stage of the conflict nobody believed that 
Nigeria was in for a protracted and bloody civil war. 
In 1967 some other attempts to initiate peace talks 
came from the Vatican. There were several calls by the 
Pope imploring both sides to seek a peaceful settlement. 
On October 10, 1967, L'Osservatore Romano published the 
text of peace appeals by Pope Paul VI to Gowon and Ojukwu.113 
On December 22, 1967, the Pope sent two envoys to Lagos. 
Monsignors Conway and Rochau came to Nigeria to try to 
arrange a truce as a follow -up to the Pope's cease -fire 
appeal to the Nigerian leaders.114 Woronoff considers this 
step by the Vatican as the "first real initiative for peace.'115 
Anyway, neither the Commonwealth Secretariat's nor the 
Vatican's peace initiatives in 1967 had any concrete results. 
Both only became active again in February 1968. 
In the meantime, both sides had come up with 
important statements concerning their conditions for nego- 
tiations. In his Christmas broadcast to the nation on 
December 24, 1967, Gowon reiterated his conditions for a 
negotiated settlement. 
112. Reported in: The Financial Times, 7 July, 1967. 
113. The appeals were made in July 1967, see Africa Report 
vol.13, no.1, January 1968, "News in Brief ", p.46. 
114. Africa Report, vol.13, no.2, February 1968, "News in 
Brief ", p.40. 
115. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.490. Kirk- Greene refers to the 
papal Christmas message to Gowon as "something more 
positive than papal good wishes." Kirk -Greene, op.cit., 
vol.II, p.24. 
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"First, the rebels must renounce 
secession; second, the rebel regime 
should accept the present admini- 
strative structure of a federal union 
of Nigeria comprising twelve states; 
third, a body of men should come for- 
ward from the East -Central state, 
willing to work for national conciliation, 
peace and reconstruction." 116 
It is remarkable that the third condition does not 
bear any reference to Ojukwu. Previously Gowon had 
refused to accept Ojukwu as negotiation partner. Gowon's 
new position seemed to indicate that Ojukwu need not be 
the major stumbling- block. 
In his turn, Ojukwu called in his Christmas message 
on those who started the war to take the initiative in 
order to bring it to an end.117 He repeated this condition 
in his address to the Consultative Assembly of Biafra on 
January 27, 1968, in which he talked about the 'genocidal' 
character of the war. He put heavy blame on Britain and 
the Soviet Union because of their involvement on the 
Federal side. Nigeria was accused of blackmailing African 
states by contending that if Nigeria disintegrated other 
African countries may follow suit. Ojukwu also rejected 
the idea that the obligation of the OAU Charter to respect 
the territorial integrity of a member state can be applied 
to a situation of disintegration from within. The assess- 
ment of the situation which came through in his speech was 
116. Reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, 
p.22. 
117. Africa Retort, vol.13, no.2, February 1968, "News in 
Brief ", p.39. See also J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.412. 
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that although Biafra was facing a great challenge, she was 
far from collapsing.118 
The next day, however, in a press conference Ojukwu 
indirectly revealed that Biafra's position must have been 
quite desperate. He called for a cease -fire and "uncon- 
ditional negotiations" which implied that he was playing 
down Biafra's demands for sovereignty as a sine gua non for 
negotiations. He also welcomed outside mediation "by any 
impartial body"; oddly enough, he included among the 
"impartial bodies" the OAU, the Commonwealth and Britain.119 
Ojukwu could not possibly have believed in the impartiality 
of the OAU, but at the beginning of 1968 the military odds 
were against Biafra winning the war on the battlefield. 
Thus Ojukwu had to look for a negotiated settlement. He 
probably hoped that he could influence the OAU in his 
favour once it would accept him as a negotiation partner. 
In any case, Ojukwu's attitude towards the OAU was never 
consistent throughout the years of the war. 
An analysis of how the two leaders saw the situation 
in the early part of 1968 reveals that any peace -maker would 
face a difficult task. Nigeria, believing herself to be in 
an advantageous position, would be reluctant to accept 
outside interference unless she could have it all her way. 
Biafra being in a much more serious military dilemma was 
118. The speech is reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., 
vol.Il, pp.192 -199. 
119. Africa Report, vol.13, no.3, March 1968, "News in 
Brief ", p.35. 
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pinning her hopes on gaining more and more African and 
world -wide sympathy while the fighting and killing continued, 
especially if she could convince the world of the 
'genocidal' character of the war. As will be seen, both 
sides grossly underestimated each other's ability and 
determination.120 The Biafran forces were able to launch 
successful counterattacks and prevent the Federal troops 
from advancing smoothly, at times when the final collapse 
of Biafra seemed to be inevitable. 
Both the Commonwealth and the Vatican resumed their 
efforts of peace -making in February 1968. The Pope sent 
his two envoys, Monsignors Conway and Rochau to Biafra. 
They appealed to Ojukwu to enter open peace negotiations with 
the Federal Government. However, they denied that they 
had come as mediators.121 Woronoff states that as a 
result of this papal move Ojukwu expressed his readiness to 
accept a cease -fire and to start peace negotiations.122 
Gowon's answer to Pope Paul's diplomatic approach was a 
statement at a press conference held in Lagos on January 5, 
1968, in which he stressed again his willingness "to work 
with all Ibo leaders ready to work for reconciliation, unity 
and national development ".123 It will be recalled that 
this is only a repetition of a statement made in his Christ- 
mas broadcast, but this time he explicitly named those Ibo 
120. Although it would be interesting to look deeper into 
the question of international and external factors which 
helped to prolong the war, I will limit my discussion to 
some factors which might have been the reasons for the 
failure of any peace -maker, especially the OAU at any 
given time. 
121. see West Africa, vol.52, No.2646, 17 February 1968, p.205. 
According to Africa Report they brought a papal donation 
of X/20,000 to Biafra's Emergency Aid Fund. see vol.13, 
no.4, April 1968, p.35. This move was not really suited 
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leaders, with Dr. Azikiwe on top of the list, whom the 
Federal Government would accept as negotiators. Although 
the papal initiative may not have remained without impact 
upon both sides as Woronoff and Kirk -Greene contend, it is 
difficult to assess whether the influence of the Vatican was 
the decisive factor for the apparent willingness of both 
opponents to show signs of compromise.124 It will be seen 
that the Pope repeated his attempts to help find a peace 
agreement throughout the duration of the war. 
We have to give greater attention to the activities 
of the Commonwealth Secretariat because it was through its 
Secretary -General that attempts were made to bring the 
opponents to the conference table in the absence of new OAU 
initiatives. The Commonwealth could claim a special 
interest in the Nigerian crisis since it concerned one of its 
member states. It was its Secretary -General who was eager 
to serve as a go- between for the two opponents. In February 
1968 he visited Lagos twice. After his first visit the 
British press was full of intensive speculations about his 
role as potential mediator. Patrick Keatley in The 
Guardian wrote: "After six weeks of secret negotiations in 
London, the stage is set for a boldly ambitious plan to 
bring about a ceasefire in the Nigerian civil war by sending 
a Commonwealth force to occupy and police the battle zone."125 
to convince Lagos of the Vatican's impartiality. 
122. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.490. 
123. See excerpts of Gowon's statement, reprinted in: 
A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.24. 
124. Biafra had recently suffered a considerable economic 
blow when the Federal Government withdrew the banknotes 
currently in circulation. It left the Biafrans with 
virtually no access to foreign exchange. See West Africa 
vol.52, no.2640, 6 January 1968, p.25. 
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The premature publicity given to these secret talks led the 
Commonwealth Secretary to announce that his talks with 
Gowon took place at his own initiative and should not be 
given more attention than it deserved. Anyway, both sides 
in the war came out with strong statements of their 
respective positions.126 The New Nigerian denounced the 
proposal as a "neocolonialist sublety, that can only serve 
the rebels and their backers ".127 And Gowon said in a 
broadcast on 31 March 1968 "I wish to state quite firmly 
that at no time did Mr. Arnold Smith discuss with me the 
possibility of using a Commonwealth Peace Force to separate 
the so- called combatants. That would be untenable in a 
situation in which we, as a sovereign country, are committed 
to putting down an internal rebellion." However, he did 
not exclude the possibility of involving the Secretary - 
General in further peace talks saying: "When the rebels 
show genuine interest in peace by giving up secession, the 
OAU Peace Mission and the Commonwealth Secretary- General 
may have a role to play. ,"128 
On the Biafran side Ojukwu, who earlier on spoke 
about Biafra's readiness to contemplate 'unconditional 
negotiations', formulated his position in much more rigid 
terms: "The challenge to those working on a peace plan is 
125. Reprinted in: Africa Report, vol.13, No.4, April 1968, 
"News in Brief ", p.35. 
126. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., Vol.II, p.27. 
127. Africa Report, vol.13, no.4, April 1968, "News in Brief" 
P.35. 
128. His broadcast is reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, 
op.cit., vol.Il, pp.202 -204. The quotations are from 
p.203. 
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to find a formula which will enable Biafra to live peace- 
fully, not in Nigeria, but with Nigeria. "129 Although 
Biafra was still anxious to get negotiations under way, she 
managed to gain support from influential groups in Britain 
and the United States which was a boost to her morale. 
When Arnold Smith returned to Lagos to attend the Common- 
wealth Education Conference, he again had talks with Gowon. 
Nothing seems to have come of it. "Arnold Smith's cool 
rejection by Lagos was sufficient to prick the ballooning 
bubble of peace hopes for the time being. "130 The Common- 
wealth Secretary only comes into the picture again in 
early May 1968 when 'talks about talks' began in London. 
Biafra's Recognition 
In the meantime some important events took place and 
Africa's interest in the war emerged anew. The "conspiracy 
of silence" on the part of the African governments was 
finally broken in April 1968. Some African leaders began 
to have 'second thoughts' about the crisis as the bloodshed 
continued. They might have started to feel that the Biafran 
fighting could be seen as a "genuine effort for self- determin- 
ation, and not a Katanga -like plot to make off with the oil 
revenue of Nigeria. "131 So far Africa had presented itself 
as a united front adhering to a policy of non -recognition 
of Biafra, but finally Tanzania became the first country to 
break from this. On April 13, 1968, it was announced that 
129. Broadcast over Biafran Radio, 
Reprinted in: Ibid., p.29. 
130. Kirk -Greene's conclusion, see 
131. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.413. 
15 February 1968. 
Ibid., p.29. 
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Tanzania recognized Biafra as "an independent sovereign 
entity ". This step was partly seen as a pay -off of the 
persistent lobbying done by highly esteemed Biafran envoys, 
notably Dr. Azikiwe, who visited Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Senegal and the Ivory Coast.132 It is understandable that 
Biafra hailed Nyerere's step as a major diplomatic victory 
for the Biafran cause. Lagos' reaction on the other hand 
was one of outright condemnation of Nyerere. Knowing 
that in the course of events only three other African 
countries followed the Tanzanian example, the fears that 
the recognition by Tanzania might have started "a Biafran 
band -wagon on which many nations - African, Asian and 
European - may jump" seems unjustified in retrospect.133 
At that time one could not blame the Federal Government for 
taking the threat seriously and being grateful for signs of 
support. And, indeed, they came from countries like Niger, 
Upper Volta and Chad who fully endorsed the stand of the 
Government in Lagos. President Senghor, deploring the 
conflict and urging for a rapid conclusion, emphasized that 
Senegal did not contemplate the recognition of Biafra. 
Despite its own claims for self -determination, even the 
Somalis came out in support for the Federal Government.134 
To make an assessment of Tanzania's move possible, 
it is necessary to look at some of the motives of the 
132. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.34. 
133. see Editorial in: The Legon Observer, vol.III, no.9, 
26 April -9 May 1966, p.l. 
134. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.414. 
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Tanzanian Government. For the first time in the history 
of the OAU did a country "deviate from the orthodox OAU 
stand ",135 a stand which condemned secession. The other 
accusation that Nyerere's step was a clear infringement on 
the OAU's avowed political principle of non -interference in 
the internal affairs of its member states seems to forget 
that the OAU itself was guilty of contravening this 
principle. After all, the OAU had clearly interfered into 
the internal policy of Nigeria by endorsing the Federal 
Government's stand. However, Nyerere needed strong 
arguments to justify his move in the eyes of Africa's 
Pan -Africanists. Tanzania felt that the development in 
Nigeria -Biafra was a set -back to African unity, but one 
that had to be faced with realism. It would be against the 
clearly expressed will of the Biafran people to deny them 
the right of self- determination. If unity could not be 
maintained on the basis of overall consent of the people, 
it should not be imposed by force.136 A strong motive for 
Tanzania as well as for the three other countries which 
recognized Biafra diplomatically - Gabon on May 8, 1968, the 
Ivory Coast on May 14, 1968, and Zambia on May 20, 1968 - 
was the humanitarian aspect.137 
It is tempting to look for ulterior motives which 
135. S. Chime, op.cit., p.76. 
136. The text of the statement by the Tanzanian Government 
issued on April 13, 1968, is reprinted in A.H.M. Kirk - 
Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, pp.206 -211. Also Nyerere's 
statement "Why we recognized Biafra ", in: The Observer 
28 April 1968. 
137. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.415. 
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might have been behind the move. However, unless a careful 
study of the internal and external political situation of 
each of the four countries is given, all analyses must 
remain provisional. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the 
Chinese encouraged Nyerere's policy because they wanted to 
embarrass the Russians who were siding with the Federal 
Government. The French who were keen to supply arms to 
Biafra must have encouraged Houphougt- Boigny. After all, 
Houphougt recognized Biafra shortly after his visit to Paris. 
There was probably some desire on the part of the French to 
undermine the British position by encouraging recognition 
of Biafra. On the other hand a full understanding of the 
reasons of the four leaders would also require an examination 
of the history of attitudes towards federation in these 
countries and in Africa as a whole. 
One cannot deny that the fact that some African states 
did recognize Biafra and the speculations about their 
respective motives had repercussions for the OAU's attempts 
to deal with the crisis. Africa no longer spoke with one 
voice. Some countries no longer wanted to play by the rules 
of the African game. At any OAU meeting in the near future 
the question of recognition was bound to break into the open 
because four states had deviated from the official OAU point 
of view as endorsed in the Kinshasa resolution. On the 
other hand the new diplomatic situation in which Biafra found 
herself by the end of May 1968 could not decisively alter the 
course of events. As much as Biafra welcomed the step it 
brought her no material help and this was what she needed 
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desperately. Nor did the policy of the four recognizing 
states trigger off the avalanche of recognition as feared by 
Lagos. The OAU, represented through the Consultative Tiission 
of the six Heads of State, could carry on along the same line 
at least until the next Assembly. The cooperation in this 
body was not hampered because none of the recognizing states 
was among the members of the mission. Anyway, this body only 
became active again in July when the impact of recognition had 
waned. 
4) Peace Talks 
Although recognition and moral support was not capable 
of changing the situation on the battlefield, its effects can 
be traced in the statements concerned with the terms under 
which both sides were prepared to enter peace talks. An 
important step forward towards peace negotiations was made by 
the Federal Government when Nigeria's Permanent Secretary for 
External Affairs admitted at a press conference in London 
early in I4'arch, 1968 that his government was prepared to drop 
the third of the original conditions. If the rebels would 
accept the first two essential conditions for peace negotia- 
tions, 'Yr.' Ojukwu could be acceptable as a negotiator.138 
Parch also saw a joint call for an immediate cessation 
of the fighting by the Roman Catholic Church and the World 
Council of Churches. "We appeal in particular to the African 
Chiefs of state to offer the contribution of their counsel, 
their suggestions and, should the case arise, their mediation, 
138. West Africa, vol, 52, No. 2649, 9 March 1968, 
p.298. 
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with a view to the resolution of this sad conflict ..." 139 
It is difficult to assess whether the Churches could bring 
immediate pressure to bear upon both antagonists. The Churches 
did become involved in the war. The operations they set up 
in order to relieve the starvation and suffering of the civil- 
ian population in Biafra had an effect on Biafra's ability to 
continue the fighting. Therefore, it could hardly be expected 
that the Federal Government would look upon Church attempts 
to promote peace negotiations as actions coming from a neutral 
body. However, it is conceivable that the Churches' efforts 
had at least some moral impact upon the Heads of State who had 
remained silent for far too long a period. 
On April 22 Ojukwu's voice was heard again. His morale 
had been boosted by Tanzania's previous recognition of Biafra. 
At his press conference Ojukwu accused the British Government 
of interfering in the conflict on the Federal side. His 
strong words left no doubt that any mediator who, in Ojukwu's 
eyes, was somehow connected with London, would be resented by 
the Biafran side. He then named five terms as the basis for 
any peace negotiations: 
1) that talks commence without further ado within forty -eight 
hours; 
2) that talks should be either at ministerial or official 
level; 
3) that talks should be at a venue mutually agreed in Africa; 
4) that the talks should have joint chairmanship with each of 
139. Excerpts of this call are reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk - 
Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.201. 
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the opposing camps nominating and seeking the good offices 
of one of the respected Heads of African states; 
5) that the first item on the agenda of such a meeting should 
be an immediate cease- fire.140 
In addition to Ojukwu's sign of apparent readiness to 
get on with talks as soon as possible, the fact that Dr. 
Arikpo had stated in Lagos on April 18 that peace talks could 
be held "at any time and at any venue acceptable to both 
sides "141 suggests that for the first time since the outbreak 
of hostilities there was some hope that a mediator might bring 
the two sides to the conference table. Dr. Arikpo, who 
arrived in London for talks with the Commonwealth Secretary 
and the British Government on April 25, went even further. 
He declared "that the Federal Military Government are prepared 
to embark on talks without preconditions under the auspices 
of the Commonwealth Secretary -General. "142 $e also stated 
that although his government considered London to be an 
appropriate meeting place, Lagos would also accept an African 
state as venue.143 
Lagos' sudden interest in peace talks was attributed 
to the fear of further international recognition for Biafra.144 
According to Akpan, Ojukwu judged his country's position 
differently during these preconference and conference weeks 
of April and May 1968. He saw the moves of Mr. Arnold Smith 
140. Ibid., p.36 
141. Ibid., p.37 
142. Ibid., pp.215 -217 
143. Africa Report, vol.13, no.6, June 1968, "News in Brief ", 
p.38 
144. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.37. 
as 
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"nothing but a clever manoeuvre by 
Britain and the Federal Government 
to stop further recognition ... 
As long as the impression was given 
that talks were going on, no country 
would take action for fear of being 
accused of trying to undermine the 
success of the peace talks. Equally, 
once they knew that negotiation for 
talks were in progress or even pos- 
sible, no action would be taken. 
Our strategy, then, was to do more 
to obtain additional diplomatic 
recognition than for successful 
peace negotiations." 145 
It is quite conceivable that Ojukwu reasoned along such lines. 
On the other hand, he must have known that playing for time 
would not help his military position unless he was hoping for 
a miracle. 
On April 24 Arnold Smith informed the Biafran Govern- 
ment that Lagos was ready for talks without pre- conditions and 
agreed to send a team of representatives to London for this 
purpose. Smith likewise proposed that the delegations of 
both sides should convene in the Commonwealth Secretariat's 
headquarters on May 1 or earlier. Biafra informed Mr. Smith 
that it accepted the terms under which the meeting should take 
place but asked for Dakar as venue because of objections 
against London on the grounds of "Britain's non -neutral stance 
as a supplier of arms to Nigeria. "146 Addis Ababa as possible 
145. Akpan was Chief Secretary to the Military Government of 
Biafra, Head of the Civil Service, and Member and Secretary 
to the Cabinet of Biafra, and therefore very close to the 
centre of decision -making in Biafra. Ntieyong U. Akpan 
The Struggle for Secession, 1966 -1970, A Personal Account 
of the Nigerian Civil War, London, 1971, p.137. 
146. Africa Report, vol.13, no.6, June 1968 "News in Brief ", 
p.38. 
147. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.39. 
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venue was rejected too. The Biafran Commissioner for 
Information Dr. Eke explained the reason in a radio statement: 
"Since the OAU is not acceptable, other reputable African 
international organizations like the OCAM and the East African 
Common Service Organization, would be quite acceptable to 
Biafra." He named Dakar and Arusha as the most suitable 
places for the proposed meeting.147 But Biafra finally 
agreed that preliminary talks could begin in London on May 6. 
The 'talks about talks' which only became an 'across - 
the -table confrontation' of both delegates after two days of 
unilateral meetings with Mr. Smith, dealt with two main items: 
the place of venue for the official negotiations and the 
possible agenda.148 Although there is no detailed informa- 
tion about how the discussions were conducted the slowness 
which any headway made indicates negotia- 
tions must have been very tough. In view of the major mili- 
tary breakthrough which the Federal side made only a few days 
after the end of the London talks, it is conceivable that 
Lagos' negotiation tactics were to delay agreement. They 
thus hoped that the military success would have an immediate 
impact on Biafra's willingness to give in to the Federal 
Government's proposals. Agreement about Kampala as venue 
was reached after only two days but it took the delegations 
another week to come up with an agreement on the agenda and 
the date. 
The Communiqué issued by the Commonwealth Secretariat 
on May 15 informed the public that peace talks could begin on 
May 23, 1968 and that "the following agenda will be the frame- 
148. Woronoff, op.cit., p.417 
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work for the talks: 1) the question of chairmanship, 
2) the question of observers (foreign), 3) conditions for 
ending the hostilities, 4) arrangements for a permanent 
settlement ". The Commonwealth Secretary -General was made 
responsible for servicing the peace talks.149 
The Kampala Talks 
By the time the Kampala talks were due to begin Biafra 
had suffered considerable military set -backs. Port Harcourt 
was captured by the Federal army on May 19, robbing Biafra of 
her last major airport and control of the oil fields.150 
This loss could not be made up for by the recognition of 
three more states which Biafra had gained at that time. In 
Kirk -Greene's assessment the fall of Port Harcourt must be 
seen as "a turning point in the rebels' resistance ". Ojukwu 
declared that the conflict "cannot be settled by victories 
won in the battlefield ".151 Operating now from a very weak 
military and economic position indeed, he instructed his re- 
presentatives in Kampala "to insist on the cessation of 
hostilities before any discussions about the future relation- 
ship with the Federal side were pursued ".152 Gowon on the 
other hand was determined to carry on with the military opera- 
tions until the rebels surrendered. These were the circum- 
stances in which the Kampala talks began; that they began as 
149. Communiqué is reprinted in A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit. 
vol.II, p.220 
150. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.417 
151. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.42 
152. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.200 
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scheduled came as a surprise to many observers.153 
In his opening speech the host, President Obote, left 
no doubt about the urgency of bringing an end to the fighting. 
It can be assumed that he voiced what everyone in Africa and 
elsewhere felt: "Whether the war is just or unjust is no 
longer the question. The price of failure will be too much 
for you, the people you represent and all of Africa."154 
After Obote's speech both delegation leaders gave lengthy 
accounts of the history of the crisis and what they hoped to 
achieve in these peace talks.155 Both addresses repeated the 
well -known arguments and laid bare the basic differences. 
Surprisingly, agreement on procedural matters was reached 
quickly. Mr. Arnold Smith was selected as go- between and 
Uganda's Foreign Secretary, Sam Odaka, was to act as 'foreign 
observer'.156 
Optimism after this encouraging start did not prevail 
very long. Before they got to discuss item three, the con- 
ference was threatened with breakdown after a secretary to the 
Federal delegation disappeared. The Federal delegation 
accused the Biafrans of abduction, an accusation which the 
Biafrans countered by contending that it was all a Federal 
plot. The atmosphere was poisoned. According to Kirk - 
Greene it was only owing to the relentless efforts of Arnold 
153. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.43 
154. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.417 -418 
155. See reprinted excerpts of both speeches in A.H.M. Kirk - 
Greene, op.cit., vol.II, pp.221 -232 
156. Africa Report, vol.13, no.7, October 1968, "News in 
Brief ", p.52 
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Smith and President Obote that the talks could be resumed.157 
Unfortunately the more serious hurdle, item three, caused the 
final break -up in complete deadlock. 
The conditions for peace were beyond conciliation. 
Sir Louis Mbanefo, the Biafran representative, called for an 
immediate cessation of hostilities, a removal of the blockade 
and a withdrawal of troops to the pre -war boundaries.158 An 
international force was to supervise these agreements. Biafra 
would then be prepared to talk about conditions for economic 
cooperation with Nigeria and about "plebiscites in the areas 
inhabited by minority tribes ".159 On the Nigerian side Chief 
Enahoro left no doubt in his counter- proposals that as a sine 
qua non of any further discussion Biafra must renounce seces- 
sion. Until this was done the fighting would go on. 
Both proposals were influenced impact of the 
military situation. The successes of the Federal army 
"precluded (Lagos) from giving up its military advantage by 
halting the offensive unless its targets - enforcement of the 
renunciation of secession by Biafra - could be reached by 
other means ..." 
160 Only some considerable pressure brought 
to bear upon either side could have led to a positive result. 
157. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.200. According to Kirk -Greene 
the body of the Secretary was discovered three weeks 
later and murder was established. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, 
op.cit., vol.Il, p.43 
158. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.201 
159. Africa Report, vol.13, no.7, October 1968, "News in 
Brief ", p.52 
160. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.202 
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All Mr. Smith and Mr. Odaka could do was to offer their good 
office and that, unfortunately, was not enough. The blame 
for the breakdown of talks has to be put on the Biafran side. 
It is true that neither side was prepared to move an inch from 
their position in order to reach a compromise. Lagos could 
not compromise on the essential point of rejection of seces- 
sion. If this target could not be reached at the conference 
table, she was poised and confident enough to eventually have 
it her way on the battlefield. Biafra's obstinacy on the 
other hand was difficult to explain, given her precarious 
military situation and her comparatively hopeless diplomatic 
isolation. But a look at Ojukwu's address to the Nation on 
the eve of the first anniversary of Biafra's independence 
reveals that Biafra was unyielding in her hopes for continued 
sovereign existence.161 
After Kampala everything was back to square one as far 
as peace negotiations were concerned. After the collapse of 
these talks fighting increased. The human sufferings inflicted 
on the civil population in Biafra caught the attention of the 
world. Although the humanitarian problems came to the fore 
especially outside Africa, efforts made to gain a political 
solution of the war never ceased. However, the OAU only came 
into the picture again in July 1968, although according to 
Diallo Telli Africa had been active behind the scene in the 
meantime. He reassured the public of Africa's continued 
awareness of the serious problem and mentioned "that although 
before and after Kampala there had been multiple contacts 
161. Compare with A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.45 
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within the OAU these could not be made public ".162 
Developments after Kampala 
The scene of activities shifted again to London. Both 
sides knew that vital decisions for the outcome of the struggle 
could be taken in the British capital and it was important to 
be on the spot in order to influence them. Lagos was worried 
about the possible effects on British policy of the increasing 
public pressure upon the British government to end its 
partiality and recognize Biafra as well as to stop arms supply 
which was seen to help the Nigerian troops in their 'geno- 
cidal' attempts. As far as this accusation of genocide was 
concerned, Biafra's relentless publicity seemed to have paid 
off. A team of international military observers went to 
Nigeria to investigate the situation. After inspecting the 
combat they came to the conclusion that there was "no 
evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the 
Ibo people or their property ".163 The findings of the obser- 
vers were subsequently criticised and they were accused of not 
looking closely enough. In any case, the question was not so 
much whether Lagos "intended" genocide as a matter of policy 
but of what appeared to be happening in reality. It was a 
question of control over the Federal troops in the field. 
Lagos did not manage to convince the international public that 
there was no indiscriminate bombing of Biafran civilians. 
Biafra naturally took advantage of the international 
indignation and tried to present her problem as a human one. 
162. See interview published in: West Africa, vol.52, no.2663, 
15 June 1968, p.685 
163, See A.H.T. Kirk- Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, pp.48 -49 for 
more details. 
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This was understandable since militarily and even politically 
the odds were against her. There can be no doubt that 
'Biafra' had become a major human tragedy; her people were 
really suffering. Most governments inside and outside the 
black continent preferred a return to the status quo ante.164 
In any case, Lagos was aware that it had to be careful not to 
lose at the propaganda front what it had gained in the battle- 
field. 
Whether or not it was owing to Chief Enahoro's activi- 
ties in London, Mr. Wilson's government continued to believe 
"that it could best retain some influence over Lagos through 
keeping in rather than breaking with the Federal Government ".165 
Biafra's efforts were not rewarded. Sir Louis Mbanefo had 
a fruitless meeting with Lord Shepherd, Minister at the Com- 
monwealth Office. That full agreement between Lagos and 
London prevailed was furthermore underlined after Lord Shep- 
herd's visit to Lagos on June 20 -24, 1968. He reaffirmed 
British support but mentioned that London was anxious to see 
the achievement of a negotiated settlement. Gowon stressed 
his readiness to resume such talks.166 
Propaganda was not only important as far as relations 
with the British government went, but it also had repercussions 
for the world's image of the Nigerian civil war. If inter- 
national public opinion came to a one -sided assessment of the 
crisis and put the blame for the human suffering squarely on 
164. See Biafra -Newsletter, vol.2, no.2, 28 June 1968, for a 
Biafran assessment of the London and Kampala talks. 
165. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.50 
166. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., pp.204 -205 
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the Federal Government, such a portrayal of the situation 
could not be without consequences in Africa. Firstly, 
Africa's leaders could not afford to remain untouched by 
humanitarian arguments if they did not want to lose internat- 
ional esteem. Secondly, if public pressure forced non -African 
governments to become more overtly engaged in the Nigerian 
civil war, Africa would need to take action again to avoid 
being by- passed. It would not only need to come to grips 
with the Nigerian war as an inter -African conflict, but as an 
international one, with increased great power competition. 
This is not to say that the situation had changed that 
dramatically when the Consultative Mission of the OAU met in 
Niamey on July 15, 1968. However, an escalation along these 
lines could no longer be excluded. 
The Second Meeting of the OAU Consultative Mission in 
Niamey 
When the members of the mission started their discus- 
sions in Niamey they seemed to be determined to get preliminary 
talks under way. They wanted to make "a joint and urgent 
effort to find a satisfactory African solution to the grave 
Nigerian crisis ".167 This would take them far beyond their 
original terms of reference.168 It would not be enough merely 
to place the services of the OAU at the disposal of the Federal 
Government. The first task of the mission was to hear General 
Gowon who had suddenly flown to Niamey.169 His personal 
appearance indicated the importance he attached to the mission's 
efforts. He gave a summary of developments in Nigeria and 
167. Quoted from Africa Research Bulletin in: A.H.M. Kirk - 
Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.60 
168. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.206 
169. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.60 
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was anxious to stress that he considered the OAU a very help- 
ful body in any attempts to start negotiations. He reaffirm- 
ed that he was not prepared to compromise on the two essential 
conditions, but he indicated the readiness of the Federal 
Government to accept an international observer force in order 
to allay the Ibos' fears of retaliation. The mission should 
try - with the help of the four recognizing countries - to get 
Ojukwu to the conference table. He rejected "a unilateral 
cease -fire on humanitarian grounds ".170 
The talks with Gowon took place in closed session; 
therefore it is difficult to speculate what the discussions 
were all about. The members might have been disappointed 
about Gowon's rejection of a truce. In Cervenka's opinion 
"he felt it would be extremely difficult 
to renew the hostilities once they had 
been stopped; to do so would undoubted- 
ly cause an outcry in Africa and the 
outside world, and his own commanders 
in the field had given him repeated 
assurances after the fall of Port Har- 
court that a military victory was 
within reach. A halt to their offen- 
sive now would therefore be fatal to 
the attainment of their objectives ". 171 
According to Kirk -Greene the members of the mission were deep- 
ly impressed by Gowon's sincerity.172 
After they had listened to Gowon they decided to invite 
Ojukwu and give him a chance to discuss his point of view. 
He had previously indicated his willingness to come to Niamey 
if asked. Before he arrived in Niamey, the Committee turned 
to discussions on two points: relief supplies and the problem 
of a permanent settlement of the crisis. Again, I have no 
170. Ibid., vol.Il, pp.238 -242 
171. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.207 
172. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.60 
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written records about the meeting. Woronoff contends that 
in a first draft version of a resolution they provided a very 
detailed plan for channelling relief supplies. It included 
suggestions for a limited truce and a demilitarized zone which 
was to be determined in agreement with both opponents and 
supervised by an international force. The adopted version 
of the resolution - published after discussions with the 
Nigerian Government - was, however, less specific.173 It 
asked both sides to agree to the establishment of 'mercy' 
corridors to facilitate the transportation of urgent supplies. 
Yet, it failed to determine the demilitarized zone and there 
were no provisions made for supervision and inspection. The 
mission -members then repeated their call to both parties to 
"resume peace talks as soon as possible in order to achieve a 
final solution..., with the object of preserving Nigeria's 
territorial integrity and guarantee the security of all its 
inhabitants ".174 If it is true that the main preoccupation 
of the mission was to discuss the problem of relief arrangements, 
the resolution is disappointing. It contained no concrete 
proposals as far as actions were concerned let alone any plans 
for a long -term settlement. 
By the time Ojukwu arrived in Niamey on 19 July, Gowon 
had left the capital of Niger; the possibility of a meeting 
of the two opponents was thus avoided. Although Ojukwu's 
173. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.419 -420 
174. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, pp.244 -245. In 
West Africa it is indicated that Ojukwu seemed to have, 
been persuaded after his arrival to accept a communique 
which records the need to maintain Nigerian territorial 
integrity. See West Africa, vol.52, no.2669, 27 July 
1968, p.85. No further evidence for this contention was 
found in the literature used to compile this chapter. 
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speech to the Heads of State was not made public, it is 
likely that he expressed views similar to those given to the 
press prior to his departure from Biafra. At this press 
conference he accused the big powers and the OAU of a one - 
sided approach to the problems involved. But since the OAU 
mission had indicated its willingness to listen to both sides, 
Ojukwu felt confident to go to Niamey despite his criticism. 
During the press conference he also repeated his well -known 
conditions of an immediate cease -fire, a removal of the 
economic blockade and the withdrawal of troops behind the pre- 
war boundaries. He was then prepared to talk amongst other 
things about "maximum economic co- operation and common services 
with Nigeria ".175 However, in his statement he left no doubt 
that he was ready for negotiations. 
This point was taken up by the Committee which announced 
in a communiqué that both sides had agreed to meet under the 
chairmanship of President Diori to begin preliminary talks 
which were to be followed by renewed peace negotiations under 
the OAU Consultative Committee in Addis Ababa.176 This was 
the first tangible result of the Niamey discussions. To choose 
one African leader as a chairman reveals the trend in African 
diplomacy to rely on the skills of an important statesman 
rather than on the OAU as a body to cope with difficult peace- 
making problems. It will be recalled that the same tendency 
was evident in the way the discussed border conflicts have 
175. See excerpts of this press conference, reprinted in: 
A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.243 
176. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.208 
-288- 
been handled. The Committee also seemed to have achieved an 
improvement in the political climate prevailing between Ojukwu 
on one hand and the OAU on the other. This enhanced the OAU's 
chances as a peace- maker. Before Niamey Ojukwu had nothing 
but words of abuse for the OAU. After he had met the Committee 
he praised the spirit of sincerity and honesty which was evi- 
dent in Niamey. "Provided Africa is left on its own to 
grapple with the problems posed by our difficulties, I think 
there would be permanent peace or at least temporary peace. "177 
Ojukwu's sudden change in attitude towards the OAU can probably 
be explained by the fact that the Committee showed apparent 
skills in handling the talks. The body was thus able to gain 
Ojukwu's confidence who perhaps hoped to see some substantive 
gains forthcoming. 
talks between the representatives of both sides were 
indeed off to a promising start. After four days of dis- 
cussion, some agreement was reached on a relief corridor running 
ninety miles from Enugu to Ogoja. Then two obstacles emerged. 
Biafra's proposal to demilitarize Enugu airport, thereby 
making possible a direct air lift from Abidjan or Libreville, 
was unacceptable to Nigeria. Lagos feared that a direct air 
lift could be abused by flying military equipment to Biafra. 
The Federal Government insisted on having control over the 
goods which were sent to Biafra in order to make sure that the 
supplies only served humanitarian purposes. No agreement 
could be reached about the composition of the international 
177. Quotedfrom his speech at a press conference given in 
Abidjan on July 21, 1968. See Ibid., p.208 
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observer force for the 'mercy' corridor either. Biafra's 
demands to include observers representing the four countries 
which had recognized its sovereign existence was rejected by 
Lagos on the grounds that this could only amount to being 
interpreted as an indirect move towards recognizing Biafra.178 
As so often happened before, negotiations broke down. The 
final communiqué revealed only a very limited result. How- 
ever, there had been agreement that talks should be resumed 
in Addis Ababa on 5 August 1968.179 
An assessment of the achievements of the OAU Committee 
depends very much upon what one could realistically expect it 
to do. The OAU had no answer to the intricate problem which 
lay at the roots of the Nigerian crisis. Even if they had 
had one, they could not have imposed it. If one hoped that 
Niamey could have brought an end to the fighting, the results 
must have been disappointing. But it has to be taken into 
account that the OAU did not charge the Committee with a 
mediation task. At the most it thus could provide a forum 
for discussion and act as a go- between, and in this role the 
Committee was modestly successful. It brought the two sides 
back to the conference table. By helping to reach agreement 
on Addis Ababa as the next venue, they also kept up hopes that 
a solution might be found in an African context, under the 
auspices of the OAU. After Niamey little doubt could be left 
that the OAU was the most appropriate political body to work 
in the direction of a peace settlement. To call it the most 
178. Ibid., p.209 and Africa Report, vol.13, no.7, October 
1968, "News in Brief ", p.53 
179. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.245 
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appropriate body does not necessarily imply that it could 
accomplish this task successfully. 
Negotiations in Addis Ababa 
Although only ten days lay between the end of the 
Niamey talks and the beginning of the Addis Ababa negotiations, 
an event took place in the meantime which "was to queer the 
pitch for the heralded Addis Ababa talks ".180 I am referring 
to the statement made by the French Government on 31 July 
1968 calling for a solution to the conflict on grounds of the 
right of self -determination. It was the first time during 
the war that a non -African government had openly expressed 
its support for Biafra.181 The French move gave Biafra 
considerable moral encouragement although the French Govern- 
ment never formally recognized Biafra. More valuable than 
any moral was of the flow of supplies 
which reached Biafra from France via Abidjan and Libreville. 
182 
France, however, officially denied allegations of supplying 
military equipment to the Biafrans.183 
I am not concerned here with the motives which had 
driven de Gaulle to act as he did. It was suggested that 
there were "a variety of political and economic factors behind 
180. Ibid., p.64 
181. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.486. The statement said: 
"Faithful to its principles the French Government ... 
considers that the present conflict should be solved on 
the basis of the right of peoples to self -determination 
and should include the setting in motion of appropriate 
international procedures." Reprinted in A.H.M. Kirk - 
Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, pp.245 -246 
182. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.489 
183. Compare with statement made by the French Embassy in Lagos 
issued on November 10, 1968. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.223 
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the French stand ".184 Whatever the potential gains for 
France, no immediate gains were to be had.185 It is conceiv- 
able that France was interested in making inroads into former- 
ly British parts of West Africa for economic reasons. As 
Kirk -Greene points out, the timing of the French decision 
could not have been more unfortunate. "It was enough to 
encourage an immediate and probably prejudiced hardening of 
the pre -Addis Ababa attitudes now adopted by the two protago- 
nists in public statements."186 
At a Press meeting in London Biafra's Commissioner for 
Home Affairs, Mr. Mojekwu, insisted on the three well known 
conditions for talks. Biafra wanted to discuss with Nigeria 
the terms rather than the conditions for a cease -fire. 
Chief Enahoro on the other hand made it clear that Gowon had 
no intention of meeting Ojukwu at Addis Ababa. In any case, 
Lagos did not pin much hope on this conference.187 The pros- 
pects were gloomy not least because of the preclusion of a 
meeting between the two men who alone could bring about a final 
settlement. According to Akpan, Ojukwu had confided in his 
advisers that he was prepared to make concessions in personal 
discussions with Gowon in Addis.188 If this was really 
Ojukwu's intention, it seems to indicate that the French move, 
encouraging though it must have been for the Biafrans, could 
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generally prevailing assessment of the importance of the 
Addis Ababa talks was that one believed it to be the last 
chance for an agreed settlement to the Nigerian conflict.189 
The talks started under the chairmanship of the Emperor 
representing the OAU and its Commission. He emphasized in 
his opening address - as Obote had done in Kampala some months 
ago - that the parties could not afford to fail because there 
was no other alternative left. Woronoff saw one serious 
impediment in the fact that the discussions were not held in 
camera right from the beginning, thus permitting complete 
frankness. "Instead, the initial statements were made in 
public where a play could be made for world opinion and any 
demands or conditions would be hard to retract. "19° Chief 
Enahoro, who headed the Nigerian delegation, made a brief 
statement which focussed on Nigeria's determination 
to reintegrate 'Biafra' into Nigeria. He stressed that the 
OAU had endorsed this aim of his government and therefore com- 
plete harmony prevailed between Nigeria's policies and the 
OAU resolutions.191 His speech indicated that there was 
really no room for compromise. By reminding the OAU that it 
had endorsed the Federal point of view, Chief Enahoro did not 
permit this body to play a neutral role. His hard line cast 
a shadow over the talks from the start. 
Then came Ojukwu with a speech lasting over two hours 
covering the well -known ground on the roots of the problem. 
189. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.210 and A.H. M. Kirk -Greene, 
op.cit., vol.II, p.66 
190. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.421 
191. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.66 
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He too tried to woo the OAU and mentioned Biafra's pan -African 
attitude. He had always asked for African intervention. He 
believed that Niamey had proved that Africa had accepted the 
fact that there are two sides to the dispute.1g2 He stressed 
his people's "awareness of the need for the whole of Africa to 
unite. Nevertheless," he continued, "we have learnt by bitter 
experience that unity must come in stages through cooperation 
and mutual understanding. This was the purpose for which the 
OAU was established. In fulfilment of that purpose we offer 
to discuss with Nigeria the closest form of association which 
does not detract from our right to ensure our security at home 
and abroad ".193 
Enahoro accused Ojukwu of having started-a war of words 
and a propaganda manoeuvre without embodying in his speech any 
hint Biafra's What seemed to 
have forgotten was that he had taken an equally uncompromising 
line first. Nevertheless, the Nigerian delegation was outraged; 
Ojukwu had gone as far as calling Gowon 'the Hitler of Africa'. 
The conference was off to a very bad start. In contrast to 
Niamey, polemic overshadowed the talks from the very beginning. 
After the first day the conference was already in danger of 
breaking up. Under these circumstances the Emperor was con- 
fronted with a very difficult task. Haile Selassie, if he 
wanted to get negotiations under way at all, needed to act as 
a mediator even though this meant going beyond the mandate 
given to the OAU Consultative Committee.194 
192. Ibid., pp.247 -272 
193. Ibid., p.271 
194, West Africa, vol.52, no.2672, 17 August 1968, p.939 
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The conference continued with both sides putting for- 
ward detailed proposals for discussions and with both parties 
again stipulating maximal conditions. The renunciation of 
secession on one hand was rejected as tantamount to uncondit- 
ional surrender and countered with the well -known demand for 
sovereign existence. Beside these stumbling- blocks, it 
mattered little that Lagos made some small concessions.195 
Following the proposals, the Emperor tried in separate talks 
with the two delegations to find some basis of agreement, 
especially urging the Biafran side to make some concessions 
on the issue of secession. But both sides were intransigent. 
The hopes that the talks could lead to a final settle- 
ment had vanished after the first conference week. Gowon 
never came to Addis, Ojukwu left after a couple of days and 
Chief Enahoro went back to Lagos on August 12, 1968. Before 
his departure he had suggested that since it was impossible to 
find a political settlement, the conference might try to make 
some progress in the question of relief supplies.196 The 
Emperor took up this point and attempted in numerous meetings 
with both sides to attain agreement on the urgent matter of 
relief operations. Although he made compromise proposals,197 
all reports that an agreement on relief corridors had been 
reached turned out to be premature. As previously in Niamey, 
the Federal government rejected the idea of an air lift while 
the Biafran party turned down all plans of a land corridor. 
195. For further details see A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., 
vol.II, p.68 and Africa Report, vol.13, no.7, October 1968 
p.53 
196. Z. Cervenka, op.cit., p.214' 
197. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.423 
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On September 9 the conference was adjourned indefinitely. 
That the conference had lasted as long as that was due 
to the reluctance of both parties to be blamed for the break- 
p. 
198 
"If Kampala, Niamey and Addis Ababa 
have shown anything; it is that 
merely moving the talks from one 
capital to another solves nothing 
unless there are private negotia- 
tions providing at least a glimmer 
of compromise, in the interval. "199 
According to Kirk- Greene mediatory steps behind the scenes 
were taken in addition to the public peace talks,200 but they 
did not "provide a glimmer of compromise ". Maybe the problem 
was not the lack of negotiation, but the lack of success in 
them. 
5) Mediation Efforts - 1968 -1969 
While nothing was achieved at the conference table, the 
'final offensive' had started. Aba, one of the few towns 
left in Biafran hands, fell on September 4th. Gowon, more 
than ever before was determined to have recourse to a military 
solution. Attacks were launched on all fronts. Biafra was 
reduced to a fifth of her original territory, but still had to 
cope with six million people. Everybody looked at the problem 
now as one of a major human tragedy. Yet both sides were 
unable to compromise in order to cut down the sufferings of 
the civilian population. "The whole world saw how the 'peace 
talks' of Addis Ababa, loudly heralded by the OAU, had been 
futile." 201 
198. N.U. Akpan, op.cit., pp.139 -140 
199. West Africa, vol.52, no.2672, 17 August 1968, p.942 
200. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.73 
201. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.425 
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The OAU Assembly in Algiers 
This was the background to the OAU annual summit con- 
ference due to start in Algiers on September 13, 1968. It 
was likely that the Nigerian problem would be a major issue 
on the agenda. Since the last meeting in Kinshasa, events 
had taken a dramatic turn. The OAU was more compelled than 
ever before not to ignore the prevailing crisis. Its image 
suffered as long as it failed to do something to find a solu- 
tion. That was more difficult than a year before not only 
because of increasing international connotations of the con- 
flict but also because in the meantime four African countries 
had recognized Biafra, making it much more unlikely that Africa 
could speak with one voice as far as this conflict went. This 
political act was also an infringement of the principle of non- 
interference as endorsed in the OAU Charter.202 It seemed 
therefore "that, inspite of the valiant efforts of the Emperor 
in trying to bring the two sides together at Addis Ababa, an 
'OAU solution' to the crisis is not possible ".203 
Because it was decided by an Assembly resolution that 
the proceedings should be kept secret with only very little 
information to be given to the press,204 a detailed analysis 
is difficult to make. At the precesding Council of Ministers' 
meeting, the civil war was not even on the agenda, despite 
Tunisia's proposed resolution on Biafra.205 On the other hand 
202. West Africa, vol.52, no.2673, 24 August 1968, p.969 
203, West Africa, vol.52, no.2675, 7 September 1968, p.1034 
204. See Africa Report, vol.13, no.8, November 1968, p.21 
205. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.75 
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it was reported that OAU Secretary -General Diallo Telli "called 
for a redefinition of the idea of non -interference in internal 
affairs of member -states. He also declared that ways must be 
found to prevent members from avoiding important issues ".206 
It was also made known that the Nigerian Government op- 
posed a discussion of her problem at the OAU meeting seeing it 
as an internal affair.207 Kirk -Greene, on the other hand, 
states that Nigeria was no longer reluctant nor afraid to discuss 
the question at the conference.208 Whatever the truth may have 
been, both attitudes can be explained. If Nigeria opposed 
discussion it was because she overestimated the amount of support 
Biafra might be able to secure in the Assembly. It is even 
more conceivable that the Federal Government whose desire was 
for military victory was not keen to be restrained in her efforts 
to pursue this goal by resolutions committing her to find a 
negotiated settlement. 
If Lagos agreed to a discussion she might have done so 
because she was certain that the pro- Federal point of view 
would be endorsed by the majority of African leaders. Indeed, 
the procedures at the meeting confirmed that this was the case. 
Opening the summit, President Boumedienne came out with a 
very strong pro- Federal statement. For him the Nigerian crisis 
was just another imperialist action. He attacked the "machina- 
tions directed at Nigeria aiming to disintegrate that great 
African state, the unity and cohesion of which we are all so 
proud ".209 He was sustaining the Lagos point of view and did 
not even admit any Biafran delegation regardless of whether the 
206. West Africa, vol.52, no.2676, 14 September 1968, p.1063 
207. West Africa, vol.52, no.2676, 14 September 1968, p.1063 
208. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.75 
209. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.425 
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Nigerians or the conference as a whole were prepared to concede 
the possibility.210 Even if the leaders did not agree with 
Boumediennets radical language, in principal the majority en- 
dorsed his view of the situation. His speech led to a clash 
with President Kaunda, who was the only Head of State of the 
recognizing countries to be personally present in Algiers. He 
objected to being "lumped with imperialists" on the Nigeria - 
Biafra issue.211 
Although reference was made to the war in several speeches 
the summit only dealt with the issue in greater length on Sep- 
tember 15, after the Emperor had given an account of the work 
done by the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria. What fol- 
lowed then was a three hour debate on the problem in which the 
four recognizing countries explained the reasons for their 
policy. Knowing they were a minority, they disappointed Biafra 
by only coming out half -heartedly on her side. Their spokesmen 
stressed that they were not hostile to Nigeria as such, and 
although they were not in favour of secession in Africa, they 
nevertheless believed that unity could not be enforced against 
the will of the people concerned. "But none of them pressed 
the matter and a breach was carefully avoided."212 
On the other hand Nigeria found some enthusiastic sup- 
porters. Generally speaking, however, there was hesitation to 
become involved more closely at a stage when the war seemed to 
be in its final stage with complete defeat for Biafra. Chief 
Awolowo spoke on behalf of the Lagos government, describing the 
motives of the rebels as tribalism and emphasizing the well - 
known condition of renouncing secession first. The Biafran 
210. West Africa, vol.52, no.2677, 21 September 1968, p.1089 
211. Ibid., p.1091 
212. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.425 
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delegation in its turn was never given a chance to address 
the Assembly.213 
Another impetus for action came from U Thant who asked 
the African leaders to persist in their efforts to find a solu- 
tion because he believed "that the OAU should be the most appro- 
priate instrument for the promotion of peace in Nigeria ".214 
But the conference did not act according to these appeals. 
"There was no serious thought of ending the hostilities, bring- 
ing together the leaders on both sides and holding negotiations 
under stricter OAU control. There was no discussion of how 
to lessen the suffering by opening relief corridors. "215 
At the end of the discussions a broadly pro- Federal 
Government resolution was adopted by a vote of 33 to 4 with 
Botswana and Rwanda abstaining.216 It included appeals 1) to 
the secessionist leaders to cooperate with the Federal authori- 
ties in order to restore peace and unity in Nigeria, and 2) to 
end hostilities. It asked the Federal Military Government to 
"declare a general amnesty to cooperate with the OAU in ensur- 
ing the physical security of all people of Nigeria ...". 
Furthermore, all concerned should continue to "cooperate in 
speedy delivery of kr-manitarian relief supplies .." The Consul- 
tative Committee should continue with its efforts, while all 
members of the UN and the OAU should refrain "from any action 
detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of 
Nigeria ".217 
The resolution was devoid of any concrete plans of how 
213. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.75 
214. Excerpts of U Thant's address are reprinted in: Ibid., 
pp.327 -328 
215. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.426 
216, Africa Report, vol.13, no.8, November 1968, p.21 
217. The resolution is reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, 
op.cit., vol.II, pp.328 -329 
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to implement any measures taken in order to end the war. 
Rashidi Kawawa, Vice -President of Tanzania, commented on the 
result of the Algiers meeting saying that it was "one clear 
example in history where eminent leaders decided to evade the 
real issue by playing the ostrich game ".218 In comparison 
with the resolution adopted in Kinshasa the 1968 resolution, 
although amounting to a complete endorsement of the Lagos 
standpoint, nevertheless no longer pretended that there was only 
one party to be considered. This time the secessionists were 
mentioned. This was probably due to the fact that four 
countries had recognized Biafra. 
As far as the war in Nigeria went, the Algiers confer- 
ence made no progress towards any solution and its effect on 
it was negligible. As an act of policy- making in the context 
of African unity, it was relevant and revealing. The pre- 
vailing feeling was that difficulties in the relations between 
African states provoked by the Nigerian problem should not be 
allowed to jeopardize the quest for unity let alone lead to a 
break -up of its institutional framework, i.e. the OAU. Africa 
regards secession as one o4 the major threats to her new 
states. Whether or not this is indeed the case is not import- 
ant as long as it influences political decisions in this 
continent. 
"It is because African states are only 
too well aware of their own predicaments 
that they have been inhibited from ex- 
pressing fully their deep concern over 
the Nigerian war, and have finally 
218. Quoted in: West Africa, vol.52, no.2677, 21 September 
1968, p.1089 
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crystallized their opinions into a 
stance of support for Nigeria, as 
being the least undesirable course 
of action." 
The role the African countries could play in the conflict 
after Algiers was "to exercise what influence they can on 
Nigeria while supporting the general thesis of unity and ter- 
ritorial integrity ".219 
Developments after Algiers 
In a statement issued on October 1, 1968, the Federal 
Government made it clear "that it would consider no peace 
talks outside the umbrella of the OAU ".220 The Consultative 
Committee was only convened again in April 1969. In the 
meantime, efforts to reach negotiated settlement never ceased. 
Nobody could just sit back inactively and wait for a military 
solution. 
In mid- October 1968 the war had reached a kind of 
stalemate, although Biafra with only about a tenth of her 
former territory left and the great problem of coping with 
starvation was actually in a much weaker position. However, 
the influx of ammunition helped Ojukwu's army somehow to match 
Nigeria's fire power. The protraction of the war led to some 
unrest in Nigeria; people did not always accept the sacrifices 
the war demanded.221 
Ojukwu never ceased to call for a cease -fire, but he 
refused to listen to those of his advisers who urged him to 
219. Quotations from: West Africa, no.2677, 21 September, 
1968, p.1089 
220. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.77 
221. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.427 -428 
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capitulate. The most eminent 'civilian dove' was Dr. Azi- 
kiwe. 
222 
According to some reports, Lord Shepherd went to 
Lagos on September 25 on behalf of some Biafran representatives 
to try to pave the way for a new peace approach. But Lagos 
did not accept any outside intermediary apart from the OAU.223 
Gowon followed a hard line. He blamed the protraction of the 
war on "certain foreign governments, missionary zealots and 
misguided humanitarian organizations." 224 He also renewed 
his determination to crush the rebellion and reunite the 
country. At the end of 1968 it was quite obvious that no 
matter how much non -African pressure would be put on the 
Federal Government to stop the fighting and end the sufferings 
of the civilian population, Gowon was not prepared to do so. 
"For a Federal withdrawal now would be a surrender not to 
Biafra but to Biafra's foreign friends. "225 
Although the uncompromising stance of both combatants 
was known, December 1968 saw more attempts to get a cease -fire 
under way. Lord Shepherd went to Lagos for his third visit. 
Nothing came of it. He met with a cool reception and was 
reminded that Gowon regarded the OAU as the only acceptable 
peace -maker. The issue had to be settled as an African pro- 
blem in an African way. Lord Shepherd's futile mission 
probably stopped Prime Minister Wilson from going to Lagos 
222. See his unpublished letter, excerpts of which are reprin- 
ted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, pp.330 -331 
223. For some more details see ibid., p.77 
224. See excerpts of a speech made on 30 November 1968, 
reprinted in: ibid., pp.338 -340 
225. Comment in West Africa, vo1.52, no.2688, 7 December 
1968, p.1429 
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himself as a kind of 'super- mediator', as originally planned. 
Instead a British envoy was sent to Addis Ababa to find out 
whether or not the Emperor could step in again in order to 
bring the two sides back to the conference table.226 When 
Christmas 1968 approached, there were renewed calls for a truce 
from various statesmen. In the end Gowon agreed to a forty - 
eight hours truce, but in fact the fighting only stopped for 
twelve hours.227 
The year 1969 began with new hopes that a way to peace 
negotiations could be found as a result of forthcoming inter- 
national conferences like that of the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers. Unfortunately, such hopes turned out to be over- 
optimistic. By mid -January the war had'reverted to its most 
unyielding and despairing level ".228 
At the Commonwealth Conference Chief Awolowo rejected 
on behalf of the Federal Military Government any idea of dis- 
cussion of his country's problems. On the other hand, Tanzania 
and Zambia, the two Commonwealth countries who had recognized 
Biafra, wanted the crisis to be put on the agenda. The 
Nigerians had it their way. 'Nigeria' was only briefly 
mentioned in Mr. Wilson's speech and in Mr. Smith's report, 
but no discussion took place. It was, however, announced that 
Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda met representatives of the 
Nigerian delegation, but without any tangible results. Whether 
or not there were private talks between the Nigerian delegation 
226. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vo1.II, pp.90 -91 
227, J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.428 
228. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.II, p.95 
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and Biafran envoys - Chief Awolowo denied that there were any - 
nothing was achieved in London.229 Nigeria was poised for 
the final push on the battlefield and negotiations could only 
be resumed if Biafra accepted the principle of 'one Nigeria'. 
After a meeting of OCAM, there was also some specula- 
tion about this body's intention to initiate further peace 
talks. The Nigerian crisis was discussed among the Franco- 
phone leaders. But whether Tombalbaye's statement that Diori 
and Mobutu had been entrusted to meet both sides was simply 
meant to be an encouragement for the work of the existing OAU 
mission of which both Presidents were members, or an indication 
of a separate peace mission, was never made clear.230 It 
would have undoubtedly come as a surprise if they agreed on a 
common OCAM policy with regard to the Nigerian conflict. 
After all, OCAM had two recognizing countries among its 
members.231 
The list of possible mediators was thinning. Ojukwu 
repeated in February 1969 that he was opposed to any "British 
sponsored offensive ". In this respect he endorsed Nigeria's 
well -known attitude, albeit with differing reasons. 
From mid -February 1969 onwards strenuous efforts were 
made to resume the work of the OAU Consultative Committee 
229. Ibid., pp.95 -96. Sierra Leone's Prime Minister called 
on the conference to mandate the Emperor and President 
Tubman to form a new committee to work for a cease -fire. 
He must have been frustrated by the inactivity of the 
existing OAU Committee. Awolowo rejected any duplica- 
tion of the work of the existing committee. See Africa 
Report, vol.14, no.3 and 4, March -April 1969, pp.47 -0 
230. West Africa, vol.53 no.2697, 8 February 1969, p.165 
231. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.429 
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adjourned since Addis Ababa. President Tubman contacted the 
Emperor suggesting that the Committee should reactivate con- 
tacts with both sides.232 Speculations that the Committee 
would soon meet in Monrovia took another two months to mater- 
ialize. In the meantime, on the political level Ojukwu had 
revealed that he believed the Emperor to be the best person 
to bring about an end to the war. This "seemed to carry him 
one more important step nearer the Federal Government's con- 
tinuing faith in the efficacy of the OAU and an exclusively 
African ambiance ".233 But it is one thing to pin the hope 
on an OAU- sponsored solution and quite another to face the 
realities of this organization's ability to fulfill these 
expectations. The Council of Ministers' meeting in Addis 
Ababa in late February 1969 did nothing to strengthen these 
hopes. An appeal to implement an immediate cease -fire and 
then negotiate was all that was heard from Addis Ababa.234 
Another political move was made by Harold Wilson who 
came to Lagos on 26 March 1969. Knowing that both sides - 
although for different motives - rejected British mediation, 
any positive result to emerge from this visit would have come 
as a surprise. Gowon left no doubt in his welcoming address 
that he expected "no dramatic peace initiative on your (Wil- 
son's) part ... and that you are not coming to Nigeria to 
mediate in the civil war ".235 After long discussions with 
232. West Africa, vol.53, no.2698, 15 February 1969, p.197 
233. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, p.102 
234. West Africa, vol.53, no.2700, 1 March 1969, p.257 
235. Speech reprinted in: A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, 
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Gowon, Wilson, in agreement with his Nigerian counterpart, 
offered to meet Ojukwu "somewhere in Africa ". Ojukwu turned 
down the invitation unless Wilson was prepared to come to 
Biafra as an act of recognition of the sovereign existence of 
his country. Wilson travelled to London via Addis Ababa 
where he conferred with the Emperor. The British Prime 
Minister took the opportunity to emphasize that the "task of 
mediation in the conflict was one of the OAU ".236 
In my view those who stressed the role of the OAU as 
the only possible and acceptable mediator only disguised that 
they counted on a military victory for the Federal Government. 
Unless they were prepared to stop supplying Lagos with arms 
in order to weaken her position, how could they expect that 
the comparatively weak OAU could enforce a peaceful settlement? 
This is exactly how Nyerere seemed to have assessed the sit- 
uation. He said in an interview that he believed the OAU 
Committee could only be successful with the support of Britain 
and the Soviet Union. If these two decided on a military 
solution, "there is nothing Africa can do about it ".237 In 
any case, the advocates of an OAU solution preferred a return 
to the status quo ante to any other solution. 
The Third Meeting of the OAU Consultative Mission in 
Monrovia 
Biafra was weakening. Her defences were shrinking 
with the Federal troops closing the ring around Umuahia. 
Evacuation of the town started on April 12, 1969. The Federal 
236. Ibid., p.109 
237. West Africa, vol.53, no.2712, 24 May 1969, p.601 
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Government once again seemed assured of final victory. This 
impressive military success for the Federal troops was part 
of the background to the OAU Consultative Committee meeting 
in Monrovia which started on April 17. Again, the military 
situation more than anything else dictated the outcome of the 
meeting. In the first place neither Gowon nor Ojukwu were 
able to attend the conference. Lagos' representative indica- 
ted that their conditions were the same as those submitted in 
Niamey. The Biafran delegation announced that Ojukwu no 
longer insisted on a cease -fire as a prerequisite for further 
negotiations. Then, Presidents Tubman and Diori had long 
discussions with the Biafran delegation while the Emperor and 
President Mobutu talked to the other side.238 
All sessions were held in camera. The final communiqué 
released on April 20, 1969 revealed that no conclusions had 
been reached. The Committee appealed to both parties to 
accept "in the supreme interest of Africa a united Nigeria 
which ensures all forms of security and guarantee of equality 
of rights and privileges to all its citizens ".239 Within the 
context of such an agreement the fighting could cease and 
negotiations could begin. The communiqué-stated that the 
Federal Government had agreed to act according to these pro- 
posals and the secessionists were implored to do the same. 
238. West Africa, vol.53, no.2708. 26 April 1969, p.485 
239. The Communiqué-is reprinted in A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, 
op.cit., vol.II, pp.375 -376. The failure of the 
Monrovia talks were squarely put on Biafra's door. In 
Diallo Telli's words: "For the first time we made it a 
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As could be expected, Biafra was appalled by the out- 
come of the Monrovia meeting while Lagos warmly welcomed its 
results. Gowon needed to score some political points because 
militarily things were not going smoothly for the Federal side. 
Although its troops managed to capture Umuahia, the Biafrans 
could claim successes too. They retook Owerri; it seemed 
likely that they would be able to continue their resistance 
as long as supplies could be flown into Uli airstrip. The 
Biafrans had the advantage of short lines of communications 
while the Federal army had to cope with the problems caused 
by extended lines.240 Unfortunately for all those who suf- 
fered, the fall of Umuahia was not the final mortal blow. 
Those who were concerned with bringing the war to an 
end as quickly as possible could not just sit back and hope 
that all would soon be solved on the battlefield. The public 
was informed that the members of the OAU committee were in 
constant contact with each other as well as with the two pro- 
tagonists, ready to convene again whenever the slightest 
chance for success emerged.241 In May, President Senghor 
came up with a peace plan which was immediately rejected by 
both sides. He suggested that Biafra should give up the 
secession while Lagos should rescind its twelve -state constitu- 
tion. He emphasized that negotiations should preserve "the 
integrity rather than the unity of Nigeria 
".242 Was this 
more than just playing with words? 
240. West Africa, vol.53, no.2709, 3 May 1969, p.513 
241. See report in: West Africa, vol.53, no.2712, 24 May 1969, 
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In June rumours crept up about private talks being 
conducted somewhere in Europe between the two sides. Both 
sides denied such allegations. It was also reported again 
that Zambia had become active, with President Kaunda on a tour 
through West Africa talking about the Nigerian crisis. He 
apparently advocated an African meeting outside the OAU Con- 
sultative Committee.243 However, Kaunda appeared to be wast- 
ing his time, as Lagos had made it known several times that it 
would not take part in negotiations outside the umbrella of 
the OAU. 
When the war entered into its third year, Lagos made a 
move based on her determination to end Biafra's resistance. 
Responsibility for Biafran relief supplies was taken out of 
the I.C.R.C.'s hands and handed over to the Federation's 
National Rehabilitation Committee.244 "Few would wish 
seriously to challenge the premiss that through restraint in 
permitting supplies to be airlifted into enemy territory to a 
degree unparalleled in the history of warfare the Nigerian 
Government had positively helped Biafra to prolong its 
resistance. "245 After 5 June 1969, when an I.C.R.C. airplane 
was shot down, the relief supplies had stopped, causing an 
immediate deterioration of Biafra's food and medical situation. 
In the following months the international discussion was 
centered around the problem of how to open some internationally 
supervised land corridors to make the flow of supplies possible 
243. West Africa, vol.53, no.2717, 28 June 1969, p.732 
244. A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, op.cit., vol.Il, Document on Lagos' 
New policy on Relief Supplies, pp.408 -410 
245. Ibid., p.121 
-310- 
once again. Unfortunately the two sides could not reach any 
agreement.246 Lagos insisted that all relief supplies should 
be checked in Lagos before being sent on to Biafra, a condi- 
tion which Biafra refused to accept. By the end of July, 
stalemate was reached once again, this time in the relief arena 
as well as in the battlefield. 
August 1969 brought new moves on the political front. 
The visit of the Pope to Uganda was seen as an opportunity to 
resume peace negotiations. Ojukwu proposed a three day truce 
during the Papal visit, a proposal which was rejected by the 
Federal Government.247 However, both sides sent delegations 
to Uganda. They both had talks with Pope Paul, but no direct 
contacts with one another. The Pope tried to work out a 
compromise formula - in accord with their respective legitimate 
and essential claims. Lagos could never accept such a 'biased' 
approach which put the claims of the Federal side on the same 
level with the rebels. The Pope's efforts failed: "Europe, 
represented in the Pope, had no more success in mediation than 
had Africa symbolized in the OAU ".248 
The OAU Assembly in Addis Ababa 
As the Sixth Conference of OAU Heads of State and 
Government in Addis Ababa in early September drew closer, 
political and diplomatic activities in Africa increased. The 
Federal Government became engaged in a diplomatic offensive. 
The Federal position had been considerably strengthened by 
246. See West Africa, vol.53, no.2721, 26 July 1969, p.877 
for more details. 
247. West Africa, vo1.53, no.2722, 2 August 1969, p.909 
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--311 -- 
Dr. Azikiwe's public statement endorsing the Federal cause of 
'one Nigeria'.249 He asked his fellow -Ibos to stop the 
fighting and renounce secession. General Gowon went to Ghana 
and Dahomey and he took Azikiwe to Liberia where the two 
talked with President Tubman. But nothing more than a renew- 
al of determination to work for a peaceful settlement of the 
crisis was heard from Monrovia.250 
In an article in West Africa it was indicated that 
Tubman, thinking little of the OAU's capabilities to handle 
the crisis, suggested the intervention of individual African 
leaders. "Presumably he has in mind the possibility of a 
line of communication from General Gowon through himself to 
President Houphouët- Boigny and from the Ivory Coast leader to 
Colonel Ojukwu. "251 Biafra might have been in favour of such 
an approach; Nigeria rather concentrated her efforts on 
presenting her case at the OAU summit meeting. Although 
Lagos did not fear that the OAU would turn against her, she 
probably had to counterbalance popular pro -Biafran feelings 
which had increased with Biafra' sustained resistance.252 
It was expected that this time the Nigerian problem would 
take up a prominent place on the OAU summit agenda. The Con- 
sultative Committee was sitting at the same time hearing numer- 
ous delegations. While Ojukwu did not come to Addis Ababa, 
249. His statement is reprinted in: Ibid., pp.414 -416 
250. Ibid., p.125. Dr. Arikpo went to Cairo and Chief 
Enahoro was sent to Nairobi and Addis Ababa. See West 
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Gowon for the first time addressed an OAU Assembly, underlin- 
ing the Federal Government's unchanged attitude. 
"Unless the secessionist leadership 
gives the OAU the opportunity to settle 
the Nigerian war by peaceful negotia- 
tions on the basis of the Kinshasa and 
Algiers mandate, the Federal Government 
will have no option but to carry on the 
military operations to their logical 
conclusion, no matter how long." 253 
Biafra could only lobby in the corridors of Africa Hall for 
her demand of immediate talks without preconditions. 
During the conference a Tanzanian booklet on her posi- 
tion with regard to Biafra caused much excitement. Nyerere 
criticized the OAU for not always serving the peoples of 
Africa. "We must not just concern ourselves with our own 
survival as Heads of State; we must even be more concerned 
about peace and justice in Africa than we are about the sanc- 
tity of the boundaries we inherited. "254 The Nigerian dele- 
gation launched a strong protest against the Tanzanian memo- 
randum which was officially withdrawn after talks between 
Gowon and Nyerere.255 
At the end of the five days meeting yet another reso- 
lution on Nigeria was adopted. It appealed 
"to the two parties involved in the 
civil war to agree to preserve ... 
the unity of Nigeria and accept 
immediately the suspension of host- 
ilities and the opening without 
delay of negotiations intended to 
253. Excerpts of Gowon's speech are reprinted in: A.H.M. 
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preserve the unity of Nigeria and 
restore reconciliation and peace.. 
The resolution differed from the Algiers one in the respect 
that this time it did no longer include a specific appeal to 
the secessionists but was addressed to both sides. "The use 
of the flexible word 'intended' is also seen as softening the 
resolution. "257 But in substance the endorsement of the'one 
Nigeria'idea remained. The Assembly failed, as so often 
before, "to back up its appeals with machinery for a cease - 
fire and negotiations ".258 
Last Attempts for a Negotiated Settlement 
Some hopes for negotiations were rekindled when Gowon 
was reported to have said on his return to Lagos that he was 
ready for unconditional talks. Biafra took this up and asked 
Nigeria to name a friendly country, a time and a place for a 
meeting. Dr. Arikpo, however, Quickly denied such allegations 
and reaffirmed that Nigeria was totally committed to the OAU 
resolutions. 259 
Activities behind the scenes continued. Diallo Telli 
met Gowon in late September.260 The OAU Secretary -General 
came to Lagos quite a few times during 1969. He was known 
to be an ardent supporter of the Federal Government's policy 
and his activities did not go uncriticized for having exceeded 
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his strictly administrative duties. In connection with the 
Nigerian crisis President Ahidjo found faults with his behav- 
iour. He accused Telli "d'exprimer des opinions personelles 
au lieu de se borner á rapporter les décisions et débats de 
l'Organisation ",261 
In mid -October reports about efforts for peace talks 
became public again. There was a rumour about Gabonese media- 
tion requested by Ojukwu but rejected by Gowon. Ojukwu 
allegedly sent a message to Lagos offering peace negotiations 
without preconditions through the Emperor.262 November began 
with hopes being stirred up by speculations that Ojukwu was 
prepared to make concessions. "Much was made of the state- 
ment in a talk on the Biafra Radio that there was no "senti- 
mental" attachment to sovereignty... "263 Denials that any 
such concessions on Biafra's independence had been contemplated 
followed quickly. Lagos did not even seriously consider any 
such allegations. "If, as some believed, this was a Biafran 
kite, Lagos had made it plain that it was useless to fly it 
again."264 
The last serious attempt to bring the two sides together 
before the gravely weakened Biafra collapsed was made once 
again by Emperor Haile Selassie. But the question of under 
whose chairmanship the talks would be carried out clouded any 
prospects of success. One cannot help feeling that this 
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impediment was deliberately set up to make any last minute 
compromises fail. Nigeria would only accept a chairman who 
acted under OAU auspices. Ojukwu wanted to reduce the 
influence of this organization which in his view was too 
biased. He contended that "the Emperor was taking a personal 
initiative as an African leader. He is not acting as an 
agent of the OAU ".265 The Ethiopian Government stated cate- 
gorically that the Emperor could not become active outside 
the OAU umbrella. This could only signify that Haile Selassie 
felt bound by the OAU resolutions. 
Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate his dove -like 
attitude, Ojukwu sent a delegation to Addis Ababa where it 
waited in vain for the arrival of its Nigerian counterpart.266 
After three days the Biafran representatives were recalled. 
Ojukwu exploited the Nigerian absence from Addis Ababa as 
"'conclusive evidence' of an unrelenting policy of nothing 
less than a military solution to the conflict ".67 The last 
chance for a negotiated settlement was gone. At that point 
the Nigerian side felt certain of winning on the battlefield 
and was surely no longer interested in talks with Ojukwu whom 
it saw as the major stumbling -block for a solution. The 
new year began with the last offensive launched by the 
Federal troops. On January 10,1970 Owerri fell and the Uli 
airstrip was bombed into rubble. The Biafran side was too 
weak after six months of suspended relief flights to offer any 
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effective resistance. Biafra ceased to exist. Ojukwu 
was no longer backed by the other Biafran leaders. He 
fled the country promising to the Biafran people in a last 
broadcast that he would try to explore with Biafra's friends 
a negotiated peace.268 On January 12, Biafra's Chief of 
Staff, General Effiong, called for peace, which was accepted 
by Gowon. An act of surrender was signed in Lagos on 
January 15, 1970. The Nigerian civil war had come to an 
and on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. 
6) Conclusion 
Looking at the OAU's performance in the Nigerian civil 
war one may contend that it was no more but also no less 
crowned with success than other would -be peace -makers. A 
number of reasons are responsible for the OAU's disappointing 
record. Broadly speaking, the decisive factors are 
internal African as well as external ones. 
To begin with there is nothing in the OAU Charter which 
holds that the Organization should promote national recon- 
ciliation within a member country. However, nobody can 
prevent the OAU members from discussing such problems and 
making them a legitimate concern of their body. It seems 
self- evident, however, that the OAU - weak as it is - cannot 
impose any solution upon the two parties involved in an internal 
struggle. It is useless to start any mediatory action 
without the consent of both parties to a dispute. In the case 
of Nigeria- Biafra as in other comparable situations such 
268. His message is reprinted in: ibid., pp.449 -450. 
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consent is likely to be granted only if both sides were 
convinced that a solution to their problems could not be 
found without external help. Furthermore, what is even 
more essential is the confidence of both antagonists that 
the OAU would play its role as a 'peace -maker' in an 
unbiased manner. It is only when both sides feel that they 
would receive some fair consideration of their claims from 
the Organization and those acting on its behalf that they 
might entrust it with the matter under dispute. 
It was precisely this factor which was missing in the 
Nigerian case right from the beginning. From the very first 
meeting of the OAU which concerned itself with the Nigerian 
issue, the pan- African Organization endorsed the Federal 
stand. This attitude - albeit with some modifications - 
remained unchanged until the very end of the crisis. The 
Consultative Mission was confronted with the impossible and 
unrealistic task of trying to conciliate "les points de vue 
des deux parties alors qu'elle se trouvait liée par le 
principe solennellement réaffirmé de l'intégrité territoriale 
du Nigéria. "269 The condemnation of secession which 
revealed the position of the African leaders was the over- 
riding principle guiding the African assessment of the crisis. 
This very principle was also one of the fundamental axioms 
in inter -African relations codified in the OAU Charter, 
committing the African states to preserve the territorial 
status quo in their continent. Any deviation from this guide- 
line would put the very existence of the OAU in jeopardy. 
Thus Africa's politicians were clearly in a dilemma right 
269. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.397. 
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from the beginning of the Nigerian crisis. 
Although there was some sympathy for the Biafran 
claims in Africa only four countries dared to take action 
of some practical consequence, namely to recognize Biafra 
as an independent entity. However, even these states did 
not seem to be prepared to go as far as risking a split of 
the OAU because of their support for the Biafran cause. 
It will be recalled that their backing of Biafra at the 
important Algiers summit meeting 1968 was only lukewarm. 
To sum up, clinging to the status quo in Africa's 
territorial make -up hampered any serious attempts at 
peace -making. But it guaranteed at least for the time 
being the continued existence of the OAU. Although the 
handling of the Nigerian civil war was not exactly to the 
OAU's credit, it nevertheless came out of the Nigerian crisis 
comparatively unmolested. This was mainly due to the fact 
that the Nigerian problem remained free from undertones 
which would have led to a split among the OAU member states 
along lines of ideological affiliation with either side. 
The situation did not emerge as a fight between an 
ideologically 'right -wing' government in Lagos hoping for 
sympathy from the 'conservative' states opposing a 'left - 
wing' rebel regime in Biafra which might count on the support 
of the 'radical' states. Furthermore, the crisis never 
assumed plain cold war connotations since the Federal Govern- 
ment was backed by ideological opponents among the big powers. 
Before turning to the international aspect of the 
Nigerian crisis and its repercussions on the mediation effort 
of the OAU it might be worthwhile to look briefly at the 
other 'civil war crisis' in which the OAU became involved 
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earlier on in its history, i.e. the second Congo crisis. 
It is not intended, however, to give a comprehensive account 
of the OAU intervention in the Congo problem. One must 
take into account the limitations of a comparative analysis 
of the OAU's treatment of different crises. The OAU's 
performance in each individual case can best be assessed in 
relation to the background of the particular genesis of a 
conflict. However, a comparative study might help elucidate 
a certain category of problems with which the OAU as an 
institution in the realm of international relations in Africa 
is confronted. 
In every attack on the existing status quo of a 
political system from within a member country the OAU has 
to reconsider the premises on which it is based before it 
can make any move to become involved. In this respect the 
Congo crisis and the Nigerian civil war exhibited the same 
problems. Looking at both crises from a purely legalistic 
point of view both were initially domestic disputes. An 
interpretation of the OAU Charter has revealed that the 
African states had based their relations on the regulations 
of traditional international law stipulating explicitly the 
non -interference in the internal affairs of a member state. 
This stipulation if strictly adhered to would be a serious 
impediment to the fulfilment of one of the major tasks which 
the African politicians assigned to the OAU, namely to help 
keep non -African powers from interfering in African affairs. 
Since the great powers would not limit their intervention 
attempts to cases of inter -state conflicts in Africa but would 
likewise fish in the troubled waters of internal conflicts, 
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it would be in the interest of the African states to help 
a member government to solve its domestic quarrels before 
non -African intervention occurred or at least to try and 
stop it at the earliest stage possible. In the eyes of 
those who "propagated revolutionary norms for African 
international relations "270 this was the only meaningful 
way of fighting the most dangerous threat to African 
independence i.e. neo- colonialism. "In other words, 
according to the rhetoric of the radical states, intervention 
designed to deliver a state from the neo- colonial control of 
other states was not illegal."271 Furthermore, helping 
one's African brothers to overcome the internal strife which 
threatens the peaceful development of an African country 
would also be in keeping with pan- African ideals, i.e. with 
a "sentimentalized continental identity ".272 
The second Congo crisis was the first test case for 
the OAU dealing with the problem of foreign intervention in 
the affairs of a member state. The question at stake was 
whether the OAU should uncompromisingly adhere to the letter 
of its Charter and refrain from interfering or whether it 
should - in the overriding interest of Africa - intervene 
in order to promote national reconciliation within a member 
270. Yashpal Tandon, "The Organization of African Unity as an 
Instrument and Forum of Protest, ", in: Robert I. Rotberg 
and Ali A. Mazrui, (ed.), Protest and Power in Black 
Africa, New York, 1970, p.1153. 
271. Ib p.1154. 
272. P. Saenz, op.cit., p.206. 
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country. Throughout the OAU's dealings with the Congo 
issue the Organization witnessed clashes between "radical" 
demands and the compliance with "conservative" legalistic 
principles of legitimacy. 
In September 1964 an extraordinary session of the 
Council of Ministers was held in Addis Ababa to consider the 
Congo problem. The African governments were driven by 
controversial motivations to accept that the OAU should step 
in. They all agreed that it was the OAU's task to try and 
patch up the deteriorating relations which had developed 
between the Congo- Léopoldville and her neighbours, in 
particular Congo- Brazzaville and Burundi, whose governments 
were accused by the Tshombe Government of open material 
intervention on behalf of the "rebels ".273 However, they 
were divided on the question of how to act against the 
entrance of the great powers in the Congo as well as on the 
problem of how to bring about national reconciliation. 
The main bone of contention was the legal status of 
the Tshombe Government on one hand and the "rebels" on the 
other. Although there was widespread antipathy against 
Tshombe, the man who had led the Katanga secession and was 
now using white mercenaries to fight his rebellious African 
compatriots, the majority of African politicians did not 
oppose Tshombe's presence at the Council meeting. Taking 
into account that he was previously excluded from the 1964 
Cairo Summit, his attendance of the Council session "marked 
273. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.366 -367. 
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the first major diplomatic victory for Tshombe in Africa. "274 
It furthermore indicated that the Council members were 
prepared to accept the Central Government as the legal govern- 
ment of the Congo. They avoided openly condemning Tshombe, 
and did not even directly challenge the Central Government's 
right to seek foreign assistance in its internal strife.275 
The "rebels" who received help from a number of African 
countries nevertheless did not manage to "be accorded some 
kind of recognized status ".276 This, however, would have 
been required in order to put intervention on their behalf on 
a legal basis by granting the "rebels" the status of 
belligerents.277 The Nigerian spokesman at the Council 
meeting emphasized this "conservative" stand: "To treat 
with any organization other than the proper government of a 
country is to interfere in the internal affairs of that 
country. .. .We all have our own internal problems and we all 
would not like external interference. "278 
The problem of evaluating the situation in the Congo 
and the role of the OAU becomes evident if one looks at the 
resolution adopted at the end of the Addis Ababa Council and 
the subsequent moves taken by the ad hoc Commission to help 
solve the crisis. An analysis reveals the ambiguity which 
274. I. Wallerstein, Africa The Politics of Unity, op.cit., 
p.87. 
275. Y. Tendon, op.cit., p.1158. 
276. Ibid., p.1174. 
277. Ibid., p.1174. 
278. Reprinted in: Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies in African 
Diplomacy: I, "The Organization of African Unity and the 
Congo Crisis 1964 -65 ", Dar Es Salaam, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, 
1969, p.16. 
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persisted in the OAU's dealings with the Congo and which 
its members were reluctant and unable to resolve. Anyway, 
a clarification of this ambiguity could only have been 
achieved at the cost of a split in the OAU. 
While point 4 of the resolution explicitly "appeals 
to all the political leaders of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo to seek, by all appropriate means, to restore and 
consolidate national reconciliation "279 thus implicitly 
putting the "rebels" on the same level with the Central 
Government, the terms of reference describing the task of the 
ad hoc Commission were much more limited. The Commission 
set up in Addis Ababa, consisting of Cameroun, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, U.A.R. and Upper 
Volta under the chairmanship of Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, was 
asked "to help and encourage the efforts of the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration 
of national reconciliation" and "to seek by all possible 
means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and its neighbours...." 
280 
ara- This p 
graph of the resolution thus did not mention the different 
"factions" fighting in the Congo. The Council did not charge 
its Commission with a task of mediation between the opposing 
groups in the civil- war -stricken country. "Eventually the 
members would have to choose between the letter and the spirit 
of the resolution, between aid to the Congolese regime and 
conciliation of that regime with its enemies. "281 
279. 0AU Document, ECM /Res.5 (III), reprinted in: C. Hoskyns, 
Case Studies in African Diplomacy: I, op.cit., pp.19 -20. 
280. Ibid., p.20. 
281. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.371. 
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The apparent ambiguous attitude prevailing in the 
OAU was not only a result of the splits in this body but 
also a reflection of the fact that the existing divisions 
in the ranks of the Congolese "rebels" led to a decreasing 
impact of these groups on the OAU members. In a comment in 
Courrier Africain it was alleged "that the division in the rebel 
leadership made it difficult to see them as a viable 
alternative. "282 
An analysis of the Commission's attempts to carry 
out its assignment bears out Tandon's contention that the 
Congo problem was "really in a twilight zone" for the OAU: 
"it was neither a formally determined civil war - in which 
both parties enjoyed equal rights - nor a situation in which 
the OAU could accept the full implications of the rights of 
the Congolese government as the executive arm of a sovereign 
state. "283 
Initially the Commission tried, however, to find a 
common ground between all parties inside and outside the 
Congo involved in the conflict. It invited the "rebel" 
leaders to submit their allegations. But Tshombe refused 
to meet the "rebel" spokesmen. The Commission also failed 
to reconcile the Congo Government with its neighbours.284 
The Commission soon realized that any conciliatory 
efforts would be futile as long as the fighting continued. 
However, the only way to bring the hostilities to an end was 
282. Excerpts of the comment reprinted in: C. Hoskyns, Case 
Studies in African Diplomacy: I, op.cit., p.21. President 
Kasavubu had made it clear in a message sent to the Council 
meeting that the Commission should "on no account have 
jurisdiction to help to mediate between the Congolese 
parties" see Keesin 's Conteur or Archives, vol.XIV, 
1963 -64, p.204 . 
283. Y. Tandon, op.cit., p.1176. 
284. J. Woronoff, op.cit., pp.371 -372. 
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to stop outside intervention. "Only then would either of 
the two parties be convinced that victory was impossible 
and that they had to negotiate. "285 But in this respect 
the Commission unfortunately indulged in detrimental 
partiality by which it was not only losing credibility with 
the Tshombe Government but also provoking bitter disputes 
within the Commission itself. Instead of sending dele- 
gations to all states involved in the Congo they only sent a 
mission to the United States.286 This was not only a 
biased approach but also doomed to fail. Unless alternative 
means could be provided to help the Central Government to 
enforce its authority over the whole Congolese territory, 
Tshombe had to rely on the aid from the Americans. Assessing 
this move by the Commission Tandon points out "that a good 
political case, (namely to stop outside intervention) supported 
by a considerable majority of the OAU members, had been 
carried through to a very poor diplomatic payoff ".287 
After the Stanleyville incident the OAU's powerlessness 
to act was exacerbated by a feeling of utter frustration. The 
Commission, i.e. its chairman Kenyatta, had tried to intervene 
in order to secure the release of the hostages and promote a 
settlement between the "rebels" and the United States but it 
dismally failed. "Stanleyville" revealed that Africa was too 
weak to prevent intervention by former colonial powers and 
285. C. Hoskyns, "Pan- Africanism and Integration ", op.cit., 
p.382. 
286. Ibid., p.382. The fact that the mission was not granted 
a meeting with President Johnson but was only received by 
the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was seen by the mission 
"as a serious affront to the OAU ". Y. Tandon, op.cit., 
p.1159 
287. Y. Tandon, op.cit., p.1159. 
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their allies in the affairs of the African continent. 
Although the majority of African states condemned the action 
in an outcry of protest there were some African states 
prepared to justify the Western action. Notably Nigeria 
contended that the intervention was legal since the 
Americans and Belgians were authorized to act by the sovereign 
Central Government. Jaja Wachuku, the Nigerian Foreign 
Minister, used the Security Council to accuse the African 
countries of interfering into the internal affairs of a 
sovereign independent country by supplying arms to the 
"rebels ".288 Clearly, there were African countries who 
valued the adherence to conservative principles of international 
law and relations higher than any kind of "moral indignation ". 
In the case of Nigeria, her government was perhaps prone to 
interpret the Congo situation in terms of her own country's 
problems, e.g. internal confrontation and instability. 
However, such states as Kenya and Ethiopia, generally labelled 
as "moderates ", were amongst the most outspoken critics of 
the Stanleyville action. They "were particularly shocked 
at the American lack of faith in the OAU ".2ß9 That countries 
like Ghana, Guinea, Algeria and the U.A.R. strongly attacked 
the "neo- colonial action" could have come as no surprise 
knowing their leaning towards the cause of the "rebels ". 
The African reaction to "Stanleyville" revealed more 
than anything else the splits in the ranks of the African 
states as far as their attitudes towards the Congo problem 
went. The OAU even failed to be "an effective forum of 
288. Keesin 's Contemporary Archives, vol.XV, 1965 -66, p.20563. 
Sierraeone, Togo and the Malagasy Republic shared 
Nigeria's attitude. 
289. Y. Tendon, op.cit., p.1164. 
290. Ibid., p.1164. 
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protest against external intervention "290 quite apart from 
its inability to act as a peace -maker. Even if all those 
involved in the Congo conflict internally and externally 
would have complied with OAU mediation - a highly improbable 
assumption - it would still be inconceivable that the OAU 
and especially its ad hoc Commission could have overcome 
its inherent shortcomings. The Commission was supposed to 
be a "neutral" body, by containing states who unequivocally 
backed the "rebels" and also some who supported the Central 
Government, it was not looked at as an impartial body by 
either side. Only if African states could have agreed to 
a common approach in dealing with the crisis, at the same 
time strictly refraining from interfering individually, could 
they have hoped to score some success. Since this vital 
prerequisite was missing, neither the OAU's appeals for a 
cease -fire nor its attempts at reconciliation were met with 
success. The final solution to the crisis came with the 
military victory for the Central authorities.291 
In this bleak history of the OAU's Congo experience 
there was, however, one fact which had not only repercussions 
for the situation in the former Belgian colony but which had 
likewise important consequences for the OAU's future as a 
'peace- maker' in inter -African crises. I am referring to 
the attitude assumed by the United Nations. The UN seemed 
to have learned a lesson from its predicament in the first 
Congo crisis. It was more than reluctant to become actively 
involved again. Although the Congo situation was discussed 
291. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.439. 
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in its bodies the request by the African foreign ministers 
to condemn foreign intervention in the Congo resulted only 
in "a muffled echo in the Security Council" which "merely 
deplored the 'recent events' ... and requested all states 
'to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic 
affairs of the Congo ";292 The UN recognized the OAU as 
the appropriate body to deal with the Congo. The Security 
Council resolution emphasized the Council's conviction "that 
the Organization of African Unity should be able to help 
find a peaceful solution to all the problems and disputes 
affecting peace and security in the continent of Africa. "293 
Was there a lesson to be learned for the OAU from its 
experience in the Congo which might help it to deal with 
other comparable conflicts? It is essential to assess 
realistically the most important impe1liments for a successful 
handling of this crisis. The first factor was the inter- 
ference by outside powers right from the very beginning of 
the conflict. And secondly the problems were exacerbated 
because the conflict had an "ideological tinge ". Both 
factors were interrelated and helped to make the issue even 
more complicated. The Congo became a cold war issue. 
Foreign intervention was based on ideological preferences. 
However, the real spur for the big powers was the chance to 
strengthen their footholds in one of the potentially most 
important countries of Black Africa. The OAU had no levers 
to prevent non -African powers from pursuing such a policy. 
Nevertheless the African states could at least have tried to 
292. Ibid., p.474. 
293. Ibid., p.475. 
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counterbalance such a policy, hoping to eliminate some of 
its dangers for the continent by adhering themselves to a 
policy of non -intervention. Unfortunately this was not 
done. On the contrary Africa became heavily involved on 
both sides. "Since Africa in general was also polarized, 
some states backing the 'legitimate' government and some 
the 'nationalists', it was in no position to give a lesson 
to outside powers or discourage their interference."294 
As long as there are basic ideological questions involved 
in a conflict and as long as some of the basic premisses 
which are meant to guide inter -African relations are bones 
of contention, the chances for successful peace -making will 
be almost non -existent. Consensus has to be found as to 
how to approach and assess any given strife. Without such 
a consensus the best thing the OAU can hope for is to get 
away with a policy of inactivity; the worst thing will be 
a return to partial groupings and the demise of the universal 
African organization. The consensus is essential and the 
main prerequisite which could make the OAU a credible 
instrument for mediation. It could give the OAU's actions 
some kind of political and moral weight. 
The decision whether and how to make the OAU intervene 
in a crisis depends, however, very much on the international 
connotations and non -African interference. As the Congo 
conflict has demonstrated it is more likely that the African 
states split along cold war lines if the superpowers are 
divided; one group aiding the Central government and the 
294. Ibid., p.469. 
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other bloc coming to the support of the "rebels ". In the 
case of Nigeria the big powers were not so divided. Thus 
in its assessment of the crisis the OAU member states were 
not primarily concerned about the cold war aspect of the 
conflict but were guided by African principles, i.e. the 
adherence to the status quo. However, for the country and 
the people involved in an internal war both types of inter- 
vention can be equally damaging and lead to uncontrollable 
escalation. It is likely to lessen the readiness for 
compromise of both parties engaged in the struggle about the 
political future of a state. This lack of compromise makes 
the task of the OAU a hopelessly difficult one. In Nigeria 
as well as in the Congo it was unable to find an "African 
solution ". What made the international aspect of the 
Nigerian war interesting beyond this particular conflict was 
that Africa was confronted with a new phenomenon. East 
and West took a concerted action, Britain and the Soviet 
Union both backed the same side. The crisis did not develop 
into a cold war issue. This certainly reduced the danger of 
an international confrontation. But it aggravated the 
situation in Nigeria- Biafra and it protracted the war. The 
combined one -sided interference of the big powers "led to 
rigidity and refusal to compromise... and for the losing side 
the conviction of being defeated unfairly." 
295 "Rivalry 
between the supporting powers led to a gradual increase in the 
means of destruction. The decisive difference was that 
rather than balancing the forces, the combined effort gave a 
295. Ibid., p.503. 
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tremendous advantage to one (the Federal) side. More than 
ever, it was not the parties nor the broader African 
community so much as the intervening powers that determined 
the outcome. "296 Only if the big powers had stopped 
supplies completely thus making a military solution impossible 
would the OAU have been faced with the real task of trying to 
find a peaceful negotiated settlement. 




The case studies have shown the limitations for a 
generalized assessment of the CAU's failures and successes 
in handling African conflicts. In each case of dispute the 
Organization and the African leaders were confronted with 
a specific history and set of problems which influenced 
the OAU's approach to the dispute and the part it aimed to 
play in its solution. However, comparative analysis 
helps to work out certain categories of problems common to 
different kinds of conflicts with which the African 
politicians have to come to grips if they intend to develop 
the OAU into an efficient instrument in inter -state relations. 
Thus, this conclusion aims at pinpointing some of the problems. 
It cannot provide a comprehensive theory of African conflict 
resolution. 
The performance of the OAU must first of all be looked 
at in relation to the nature of the international African 
political system. The OAU serves as the institutionalized 
framework in which the African states attempt to pursue 
the development of their relations with each other. Some 
of the specific characteristics of these relations can only 
be perceived with reference to pan- African ideas. Pan - 
Africanism, however diffuse a conglomeration of ideas and 
ideals it might have been all through its history, has never- 
theless been a rallying point for the African political 
leaders and it still serves as a reference point in inter- 
African affairs. It has left its mark on all of them, 
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regardless of whether they became outspoken Pan- Africanists 
who centered their political creed around these ideas or 
whether they only paid lip- service to it. P an- Africanism 
provided the impetus which made some African statesmen work 
ardently for a system able to put African international 
relations on an African basis which was to improve the 
capacity of its members to cope with internal and external 
challenges. The drive was strong enough to draw those 
leaders less enthusiastic about African unity into the 
process of striving for an all- African organization. The 
pan- African background with the notion of brotherhood and 
solidarity shared by all African leaders together with their 
awareness that they encounter similar problems within their 
states and in relation to the developed world made it 
possible to institutionalize these feelings as early as 
1963.1 "With the formation of the OAU, there finally 
existed a continental organization which translated 
institutionally what African brotherhood amounted to at its 
greatest. It was a prescriptive unity, not a unity based 
on the long experience of continental collaboration. "2 
Although Pan- Africanism was strongest at the emotional 
level it undoubtedly spurred the African leaders into action 
and still permeates the African system. However, Thompson 
1. "Unlike the emerging countries on other continents and 
even the older nations, the newly formed states of Africa 
were able to overcome their differences sufficiently to 
found organization after organization until a satisfactory 
solution was reached." J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.621 
2. W. Scott Thompson and R. Bissell, "Legitimacy and 
Authority... ", op.cit., p.19. 
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and Bissell's contention that the OAU was the institution- 
alization of African brotherhood is not really borne out 
in a critical analysis of the OAU as could be seen in the 
second chapter of this thesis. When the OAU and its 
Charter were finally agreed upon after a long bargaining 
process between the 'radical' and 'moderate' African 
politicians it was evident that the OAU only reaffirmed 
some of the historical goals of Pan-Africanism, namely 
those which the African leaders could adhere to without 
curtailing their countries' sovereignty and independent 
existence. Their first consideration was to set up an 
organization capable of regulating the intercourse between 
sovereign states. They were not interested in merging 
into a greater unit their (at least legally) independent 
states which represented the basis of their power and 
influence. Basing the OAU on principles which safeguarded 
their position and the territorial status quo they left no 
doubt that they were not interested in an organization 
with supranational functions, at least not for the time 
being. "Decidedly, despite the contrary pressure of Pan - 
Africanism, the state as the African political unit seems 
here to stay. "3 In whatever field the OAU will become active, 
the peaceful settlement of conflicts included, the over- 
riding principle guiding its elaborations is the sovereignty 
of the African state. Following as a direct corollary 
the Charter stipulates that the African states pledge them- 
selves to refrain from interference into the internal affairs 
of a member country. With this principle the Charter 
contained a stumbling -block for the OAU's tackling of internal 
conflicts. 
To recapitulate, the notion of pan -African brotherhood 
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and the much more important emphasis on the sovereign 
existence of the individual African state are the two 
opposing poles of the international African system. This 
illuminates the dilemma which confronts the actors within 
the system. A political action undertaken in the name of 
pan -African solidarity always faces the challenge of being 
rebuked as an infringement upon the sovereignty of a state. 
Any analysis of the role of the OAU in African conflicts 
bears out this dilemma. It is one of the components of 
the African system. According to Zartman, another 
characteristic of the African system is its autonomy. He 
states that the "African foreign policies relations between 
African states are primarily governed by intra- African 
stimuli ".4 In this respect the formation of the OAU was 
the outcome of African events more than of other factors. 
However, autonomy does not imply that the system 
is independent. This is a point that has to be stressed. 
The dependent relationship with the overall international 
system has considerable consequences for the political leeway 
of the African inter -state system. This relationship is 
primarily the result of Africa's economic predicament and 
the subsequent dependence on the developed world. The 
underdeveloped states of Africa are too powerless to be 
able to fight efficiently against the interference of non - 
African powers in their affairs. This often leads to an 
3. I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State 
System in International Relations ", in: Marion E. Doro 
and Newell W. Stultz, (ed.), Governing in Black Africa, 
Perspectives on New States, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970, 
P.337. 
4. Ibid., p.327. 
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inability to control the development of events in their 
own continent. Since they are too weak to take steps 
against the involvement which is in many cases responsible 
for a deplorable increase of destructiveness of a conflict, 
e.g. the Nigerian civil war, they rely on the willingness 
of the cold war antagonists to remain aloof from African 
conflicts. The option to refrain from intervention is 
not only and above all influenced by the character of the 
conflict which has erupted in Africa but is foremost 
determined by the general political 'climate' prevailing 
among the big power blocs. In times of general detente, 
as well as in times of increased struggle among the great 
powers to secure spheres of influence in other regions of 
the world, Africa will no doubt stand a greater chance of 
being left alone. Africa's future also hinges on the role 
the continent as a whole or certain of its regions will be 
given in the longterm strategic and ideological concepts of 
the great powers. 
It was indicated in the case studies to which degree 
the big powers abstained from involvement, and what sort of 
repercussions this had in any particular conflict. Without 
wishing to overemphasize this aspect, i.e. the international 
connotations, of conflicts in Africa, they are nevertheless 
related to the system of relationships currently prevailing 
among states and blocs of the international system. The 
more the global as well as the African international systems 
are stabilized, the greater the chances that disputes can 
be solved without recourse to interference and violent means. 
The foregoing remarks are by no means exhaustive, however, 
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they constitute part of the wider framework in which the 
OAU as a peace -maker has to operate. 
Looking at the OAU's record of performance in 
African conflicts three basic questions can be asked in 
order to assess the Organization's usefulness: 
1) Did the OAU prevent the outbreak of open conflicts? 
2) Was it able to limit the geographical and political 
extension of a conflict once it had come into the open? 
3) Was there any dispute for which it was able to find a 
solution which was acceptable to all parties involved? 
In other words, did a distinctive pattern emerge from the 
conflicts dealt with in this thesis about the way the OAU 
handles disputes? 
The OAU has not managed to prevent the outbreak of 
conflicts. It is not a powerful supranational body ready 
to take up a threatened dispute between some of its members, 
or within a member country, before it leads to the outbreak 
of hostilities. It never considered a conflict without 
being asked to do so by at least one of the antagonists. 
However, it is conceivable that problems between member 
states were ironed out in informal talks for which the OAU 
provided a forum. In the absence of empirical material this 
can only be an assumption. The OAU has definitely increased 
the chances for discussion amongst the African politicians. 
The general inefficiency in conflict prevention can only 
be partly pinned on the deficiencies in the OAU's structure 
or on the lack of experience of continental collaboration. 
There is great conflict potential in Africa, to a 
considerable extent as the result of her colonial history. 
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The border conflicts bore evidence that some African 
countries are not prepared to accept the colonial legacy, 
thus challenging one of the principles upon which African 
foreign relations are based. The domestic instability 
with which many states have to cope is another cause for 
conflicts. It pushes some governments to seek an outlet 
to their internal problems. They look for a scapegoat, 
stirring up troubles with other states in an effort to 
divert the country's attention from internal grievances 
towards external conflicts. One has of course to remember 
that a clear -cut division line can not be drawn between 
internal and external disputes. 
Domestic strife in one of their member countries 
also invites OAU states to become mixed up in each other's 
domestic political struggles. This does not only more 
often than not exacerbate the intensity of the internal 
disputes but also encourages the breaking of one of the rules 
which originally was set up by consensus as a guide to 
policy -making in the international African system, i.e. the 
non -intervention into domestic affairs. This demonstrates 
that there is a wide gap between the "rules" on paper and 
the concrete political actions which serve the end of curbing 
instability. Disregarding the "rules" might itself increase 
the turmoil in the African international system. "The 
conflict between the radical, intervention school and the 
moderate, sovereignty school in the second Congo case was a 
basic conflict over rules to govern relations in the 
system... "5 The catalogue of reasons responsible for the 
5. Ibid., p.336. 
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OAU's failure as an instrument of conflict prevention is 
of course a longer one than indicated in the previous 
paragraph. African politicians seem to be aware of that 
fact and this was one of the reasons for setting up a 
machinery which could help tackle the problems. Unfortunately, 
the OAU shares the record of unsuccessful conflict prevention 
with other, older international organizations. The problems 
international organizations with no real supranational powers 
are confronted with often exceed their capabilities. 
However, as far as the limitation of open conflicts 
is concerned the OAU was able to score some success. It 
could only do so where ideological differences were of minor 
importance to the conflict. Where this was not the case, 
as in the second Congo crisis, the OAU could not meet one of 
the vital prerequisites which are necessary to limit the 
involvement of other African and non -African states: in 
the Congo the dispute surpassed right from the beginning the 
bilateral character of confrontation. 
The other case studies gave evidence that the African 
states refrained from interfering directly. That did not 
hinder them from expressing their sympathy for either side 
more or less openly. Generally speaking they showed "less 
reticence in interfering in domestic conflicts which constitute 
a challenge to the political legitimacy of incumbent 
regimes" .6 The Nigerian civil war showed that even of 
those governments which openly revealed their sympathies, 
6. Robert O. Matthews, "Interstate Conflicts in Africa: 
A Review ", in: International Organization, vol. 24, 
no. 2, Spring 1970, p.346. 
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an overwhelming majority stopped short of becoming actively 
involved. This was a self- imposed restriction motivated 
more by the realistic assessment of their own military and 
political powerlessness, as well as by a lack of interest, 
than it was a result of OAU intervention and pressure. The 
African politicians shared a genuine awareness that involve- 
ment in a dispute bears the risk of stirring up troubles 
in their own countries. 
With regard to the OAU's achievements of finding a 
solution to any open conflict, any conclusive analysis has 
to differentiate not only between different types of conflicts, 
but also between the various phases in the process of conflict 
settlement. The first concern in this process is to bring 
the hostilities to a standstill and to get the antagonists 
to the conference table, while the second assignment is to 
provide assistance in finding a longterm agreement which 
would tackle the roots of the problem. 
In the light of the case studies it may well be 
contended that the OAU did not yet prove capable of playing 
a useful role in the second stage of the conflict settlement 
process, regardless of the type of conflict. What is 
probably even more discouraging is that there was also a 
decrease in the efforts made in this phase of dispute settle- 
ment. While the Organization appointed a commission to seek 
a permanent settlement of the territorial question poisoning 
the relations between Algeria and Morocco, no organ to study 
the problems of the Horn was established in the aftermath of 
the Ethiopia- Somalia -Kenya crisis. In the Nigerian case 
there was never any question of drawing up alternatives to 
a return to the status quo. The Consultative Commission never 
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got much further than offering its support and assistance 
to the Lagos Government. After all a longterm solution 
other than going back to the status quo implies that both 
sides in a conflict believed that "a compromise were not 
too much against their interests ".7 A compromise, however, 
was neither acceptable for Ethiopia and Kenya nor for the 
Federal Government of Nigeria. All three were supported 
in their attitude by the vast majority of African leaders 
who loathed any attempt to alter the territorial map of 
the African continent. 
The efforts of the OAU concerning the first phase 
provide a less unequivocal record. In both territorial 
disputes it stepped in fairly quickly and managed to stop 
the fighting, bringing the parties to the negotiation table. 
The Nigerian civil war was already well under way until the 
OAU finally considered the crisis. It never came anywhere 
near being able to impose a cease -fire and no lasting 
positive results came of the talks it succeeded in arranging 
between the warring sides. 
It would of course be wrong to attribute such successes 
as there were to the OAU alone. Positive results in the 
boundary disputes have been achieved due to the efforts of 
individual African statesmen rather than to the workings of 
the OAU bodies. However, the OAU's existence helped create 
the right atmosphere in which individual leaders could become 
active on its behalf. Their prestige was undoubtedly 
increased and their tasks were eased when the OAU endorsed 
their mediation efforts. 
7. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.437. 
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It is of some consequence that at the time of the 
outbreak of territorial conflicts the OAU was still a 
very young institution. Its machinery was not yet fully 
established. It could not base its actions on any 
precedents. It had not sorted out the problems of how 
to operate efficiently. Not being a supranational body 
the OAU felt reluctant to take up the discussion and the 
intervention into a crisis without the consent of both 
antagonists. To reach such mutual agreement, however, might 
take up some time, as the Algerian- Moroccan case and to a 
lesser extent the Somali dispute revealed. Thus, ad hoc 
mediation of individual political leaders offers the 
advantage of an early intervention before the crisis threatens 
to expand. On the whole no fixed pattern of conflict 
resolution has been worked out. It seems that the OAU 
members rely on ad hoc procedures and on the skill and 
willingness of individual African statesmen. The informal, 
ad hoc approach was appropriate for states anxious to safe- 
guard their sovereignty. The OAU was not able to establish 
itself as an ultimate authority in African conflicts. 
The 1972 skirmishes between Uganda and Tanzania gave 
evidence that this phenomenon did not change over the years. 
A peace agreement between the two countries was signed on 
October 5, 1972, in Mogadishu. It was Somalia's foreign 
minister who had acted as a go- between and mediator, albeit 
under OAU auspices.8 The OAU Secretary- General got involved 
also but only by encompassing Somalia's plan.9 
8. The Scotsman, 6 October, 1972, p.5. 
9. The Times, 28 September 1972. 
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But neither was the Council of Ministers convened for an 
extraordinary meeting nor was the Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration used. The Uganda- Tanzania 
conflict was yet another example to show that many disputes 
in Africa are embittered by feelings of personal animosity 
between leaders. This might account for the fact that 
attempts at mediation by an individual politician who has 
the confidence of both sides is more welcome than a collective 
one by a body which is bound to include leaders who are not 
acceptable to one or the other of the parties. It seems 
that in the process of individual mediation it is easier 
to keep the negotiations down to the direct causes of the 
conflict. Discussions in the OAU bodies, on the other hand, 
are much more likely to enter into the broader ramifications 
of a dispute, thus making it more difficult to patch up a 
crisis for the time being. 
It is fair to say that the OAU has exerted a limited 
influence in conflict settlement. The obvious conclusion 
is that "1) the organization has not been a total failure 
but 2) neither has it been an unqualified success. "10 The 
OAU acquired importance as an official forum, as a meeting 
place for Africa's leaders. "Normatively, it has 
constituted a collective conscience that no African govern- 
ment can entirely afford to ignore. "11 It provided Africa's 
political leaders with the chance of finding "African 
solutions" to African problems. If they had to give in to 
10. P. Saenz, op.cit., p.217. 
11. R.O. Matthews, op.cit., p.352. 
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African pressure, they could always claim to have done so 
in a true pan -African spirit, in the interest of African 
unity which covered up a potential loss of face.12 
One of the basic reasons for the difficulties which 
the OAU faced in its role in African conflicts was that 
it could not bridge the gap between formation and enforce- 
ment of those norms which were supposed to guide the 
international political process in the continent. Its 
comparatively successful attempts at formulating guide lines 
were not matched with an equally efficient performance to 
make its members abide by the rules. In the OAU Charter 
the African states had agreed upon a number of ground rules. 
This was an important achievement even though these rules 
included serious impediments to their power to act as a 
collective body. And furthermore, the strict adherence to 
one principle consequently hindered the fulfilment of 
another. The Charter's prohibition against interference 
in the domestic affairs of states was meant to bar OAU 
involvement in intrastate conflicts. In practice, however, 
the OAU departed frequently from the stipulations of the 
Charter. 
The statesmen were aware that the Charter alone would 
not suffice as a code of norms for their political intercourse. 
In order to clarify their stand on one of the purposes for 
which the OAU was set up, i.e. the defence of the territorial 
integrity of its members, they adopted a resolution to 
emphasize their adherence to the principle of uti possidetis. 
The OAU was playing a useful role in setting out and expressing 
12. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.437. 
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the African consensus, and to find an agreed position on 
an important issue. This aim is very much in keeping with 
what the intergovernmental type of organization can perform. 
When it came to acting in accordance with its rules 
the OAU has proved to be hampered by its weaknesses. It 
lacks the power to enforce the norms and decisions upon 
those member states which are involved in a conflict and it 
is likewise unable to press the other states to become 
active in their collective role as a peace- maker.13 But 
before the blame is squarely put upon the intransigence of 
the African leaders all following their own little goals, 
it has to be kept in mind that the OAU's powerlessness is 
predominantly a result of the shortcomings of the international 
African system. Changes in this realm can only be the out- 
come of a long historical process. Does this imply that 
the performance of the OAU in African disputes cannot be 
improved in the short run by means of altering its 
institutional set -up as well as by revising some of the 
principles and purposes which constitute the framework in 
which it operates? Would it help to get away from the 
prevailing pattern of informal and ad hoc approaches to 
conflict resolution and go on to institutionalized, regular 
procedures? 
As long as the basic premise of the OAU - its 
character as an organization of sovereign states - will be 
kept, and there is no evidence that this will not be the case 
13. M. Manigat, op.cit., p.400: "Elle (L'OUA) ne jouit pas en 
effet d'un pouvoir supranational lui permettant de 
s'imposer aux Etats; son intervention est donc subordonnée, 
non seulement des parties en cause, mais aussi á celui 
de ses propres membres." 
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in the foreseeable future, it would be a mistake to assume 
that a perfect constitutional and institutional framework 
would lead to more successful conflict resolution. That 
is not to say that amendments to the Charter which would 
bring it more in line with political realities on the African 
continent should not be considered. It would be worth- 
while to reflect upon article III,2 of the Charter 
stipulating the "non- interference ". An attempt should be 
made to draw a clearer line as to when a conflict ceases to 
be internal and instead takes on pan -African connotations. 
African states should be prepared to ask for support from 
their fellow Africans rather than to have recourse to non - 
African help in cases where their domestic strife exceeds 
the capacities of their country. It is also conceivable 
that the OAU Charter should include some stipulations about 
the means of pressure which the Organization would exert on 
those member states which failed to comply with its rulings. 
Another problem concerns the role of the OAU Secretary - 
General. One wonders whether he should not be entrusted 
with a slightly more political task. The African states 
should be more confident -that it is possible to find an 
African politician prepared to perform such an assignment 
with the necessary impartiality. In political reality as far 
as conflict mediation was concerned Diallo Telli embarked upon 
some kind of 'personal diplomacy', especially during the 
Nigerian civil war. It would be helpful to update the 
Charter in order to take account of the fact that the Secretary - 
General has gradually increased his importance beyond his 
role of being nothing else but the top administrator of the 
OAU.14 The efficiency of the OAU as a troubleshooter could 
14. J. Woronoff, op.cit., p.190. 
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be enhanced if the Secretary- General assumed ex officio the 
role of a go- between. 
The OAU must be flexible enough to adjust its functions 
to new demands for action. If the African governments gain 
confidence in their Organization because it appears to be 
capable of coping with problems, they might be more ready 
to provide it with appropriate funds and manpower. They 
have to be convinced that controversial issues, no matter 
how divisive they might be, are not going to split the 
OAU. Unfortunately, for too many years the African leaders were 
too busy to avoid a collapse of their Organization; organ- 
izational survival was the main concern and little time was 
left to strengthen the organizational effectiveness. It 
seems only logical that as long as the OAU is preoccupied 
with contriving its own survival little energy will be left 
for its role as a peace -maker. 
Nevertheless, the history of the OAU gives grounds for 
some encouragement, if one approaches the problem with 
realism. The OAU has held together for a decade. If its 
mere existence could not prevent non -African states, and 
African for that matter, from fishing in the troubled waters 
of African conflicts, it made it at least possible for non - 
African powers and notably the UN to abstain from interference, 
if they so wished. The world organization was no longer the 
only body to sort out troubles between the African states. 
On quite a few occasions the OAU's activities were encouraged 
by the UN, which expressed through the voice of its Secretary - 
General the hope that Africa would be able to tackle her 
problems in her own organizational framework. 
Predictions into the future about the role of the OAU 
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in African conflicts are difficult to make. Generally 
speaking the OAU will be what the members want it to be. 
As long as it continues to exist it retains a chance of 
improving its peace -making capacities. It seems that for 
the time being its survival can be taken for granted, 
although its existence is fragile. Pan- African solidarity, 
so vital in the fight to free thoseareas of the continent 
still under white domination, will prevail. However, 
although this solidarity is strong on an emotional level it 
is very difficult to achieve vis-a-vis concrete political 
situations. Unfortunately this situation is detrimental 
to any increase of the OAU's authority. This authority is 
also weakened by the frequent absence of leaders from summit 
meetings. The absence is often motivated by a reluctance 
of those statesmen who pursue a policy which is running 
against the majority view to be exposed to open criticism 
from the other member countries. Undoubtedly, avoiding open 
clashes at the meetings helps guarantee the OAU's survival, 
but unfortunately at the expense of enhancing the 
Organization's authority. 
The case studies helped to illuminate one contention 
very clearly: the absence of solidarity in political action 
combined with a lack of effective powerl5is, apart from the 
international connotations, the main stumbling -block for a 
successful performance of the OAU in African conflicts. "La 
collaboration interétatique est la source de leur energie; 
le nationalisme et l'affirmation individuelle des interéts 
sont des freins á (son) efficacité."16 
15. See Y. Tandon, op.cit., p.1173. 
16. M. Nlanigat, op.cit., p.401. 
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